

**JOINT PUB 3-02**

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# **JOINT DOCTRINE FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS**




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
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1. This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth principles and military guidance to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States.
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JOINT DOCTRINE FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

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## JOINT DOCTRINE FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

### PREFACE

1. Purpose. This publication sets forth principles and selected tactics, techniques, and procedures to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by commanders of combatant commands and other joint force commanders and prescribes doctrine and selected tactics, techniques, and procedures for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by armed forces in preparing appropriate plans.

2. Application

a. Principles and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, joint task forces (JTFs), and the subordinate components of these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service, or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service, under criteria set forth in this publication.

b. In applying the principles and doctrine set forth in this publication, care must be taken to distinguish between distinct but related responsibilities in the channels of authority to forces assigned to combatant commands. The Military Departments and Services recruit, organize, train, equip, and provide forces for assignment to combatant commands and administer and support these forces. Commanders of unified and specified commands exercise combatant command (command authority) over these assigned forces. Service component commanders are responsible both to joint force commanders in the operational chain of command and to the Military Departments and Services in the chain of command for matters that the joint force commander has not been assigned authority.

c. This publication is authoritative but not directive. Commanders will exercise judgement in applying the procedures herein to accomplish their missions. This doctrine should be followed, except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate

otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally with the consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance.

3. Scope. This publication provides principles and selected tactics, techniques, and procedures necessary to plan, coordinate, and conduct amphibious operations.

4. Basis. This publication is based on the following primary sources:

- a. Joint Pub 1, "Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces."
- b. Joint Pub 0-2, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)."
- c. Joint Pub 1-01, "Joint Publication System, Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Development Program."
- d. Joint Pub 1-02, "DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms."
- e. Joint Pub 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations."
- f. Joint Pub 5-00.2, "Joint Task Force (JTF) Planning, Guidance, and Procedures."

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## CHAPTER I

### THE CONCEPT OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

1. Purpose. To present doctrinal fundamentals and selected tactics, techniques, and procedures that govern the planning and execution of joint amphibious operations.

2. General

a. Amphibious operations are designed and conducted primarily to:

- (1) Prosecute further combat operations.
- (2) Obtain a site for an advanced naval, land, or air base.
- (3) Deny use of an area or facilities to the enemy.
- (4) Fix enemy forces and attention, providing opportunities for other combat operations.

b. The essential usefulness of an amphibious operation stems from its mobility and flexibility (i.e., the ability to concentrate balanced forces and strike with great strength at a selected point in the hostile defense system). The amphibious operation exploits the element of surprise and capitalizes on enemy weaknesses by projecting and applying combat power at the most advantageous location and time. The threat of an amphibious landing can induce enemies to divert forces, fix defensive positions, divert major resources to coastal defense, or disperse forces. Such a threat may result in the enemy making expensive and wasteful efforts in attempting to defend their coastlines.

c. The salient requirement of an amphibious assault, which is the principal type of amphibious operation, is the necessity for swift, uninterrupted buildup of sufficient combat power ashore from an initial zero capability to full coordinated striking power as the attack progresses toward amphibious task force (ATF) final objectives. This requirement, although similar to those for an airborne or airmobile assault, dictates the organizational and technical differences between an amphibious operation and sustained land warfare.

d. Other difficulties that must be considered and planned for when conducting an amphibious operation include:

- (1) Natural forces such as unfavorable weather, seas, surf, and features of hydrography.
- (2) Technical, operational, and logistic problems associated with:
  - (a) Loading large numbers of troops, equipment, and supplies onto ships (sometimes at geographically separated embarkation points).
  - (b) Moving the landing force (LF) to the landing area.
  - (c) Landing the LF in the proper sequence on open beaches or landing zones (LZ), often while under fire. The LF is especially vulnerable during the ship-to-shore movement.
  - (d) Combating possible employment of nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) weapons by the enemy. This requires use of effective countermeasures, both active and passive, during all stages of the operation.
  - (e) Ensuring close cooperation and detailed coordination among all participating forces in an amphibious operation. Forces involved must train together, each possessing a clear understanding of mutual obligations and the special capabilities and limitations of every other element of the ATF.

### 3. Command and Organization

- a. Forces assigned to conduct an amphibious operation are organized as an ATF or, when the criteria for a JTF are met, a joint amphibious task force (JATF). Unless otherwise noted, throughout this publication the terms ATF and Commander, Amphibious Task Force (CATF), apply equally to either JATF or Navy and Marine Corps amphibious operations. Other forces may be directed to provide support to the ATF.
- b. When the ATF is organized as a joint force, organization and command relationships will be in accordance with the general principles set forth in Joint



Pub 0-2, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)," and Joint Pub 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations." When the ATF is not specifically organized as a JTF, i.e., JATF, it is normally a subordinate command of the Navy component of a combatant or subordinant joint force command structure. The criteria for deciding on task force organization are the Service composition of the force and the desires of the joint force commander. In either case, CATF will retain responsibility for, and operational control of, forces assigned to the ATF and JATF.

c. In accordance with Joint Pub 0-2, the composition of the CATF staff will reflect the organizational form of the assigned forces.

d. Type unit designations used in the text of this publication are interchangeable with, and applicable to, US and allied units of comparable size and nature.

e. Relationships of CATF and commander landing force (CLF) with other commands will be the subject of specific instruction contained in the initiating directive (see Chapter II). Command relationships are covered in detail in Chapter II, paragraph 3.

4. Context. The complexity of amphibious operations and the vulnerability of forces engaged in these operations require an exceptional degree of unity of effort and operational coherence. The difficulties involved in conducting amphibious operations will normally dictate that the combatant commander will participate in planning, theater integration, and support. During embarkation, rehearsal, movement, and assault, the CATF must exercise clear and unambiguous authority over assigned, attached, and supporting forces. When unforeseen contingencies arise, the combatant commander (and the commanders of participating and supporting forces) must establish and prepare on-call responses in anticipation of ATF and LF needs following the guidelines provided in operational plans and orders. The CATF and CLF should gain and maintain exceptional situational awareness using the best command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) means available and exercise on-scene command and control through streamlined and highly reliable communications.

#### 5. Characteristics

a. An amphibious operation is a military operation launched from the sea by naval and landing forces embarked in ships or craft involving a landing on a

hostile or potentially hostile shore. It is directed by the combatant commander, subunified commander, or JTF commander delegated overall responsibility for the operation. An amphibious operation requires extensive air participation and is characterized by closely integrated efforts of forces trained, organized, and equipped for different combat functions.

b. Some combat operations that involve waterborne movement possess certain characteristics and employ some of the techniques of an amphibious operation. Examples are: inland-water ferrying, waterborne administrative landings on friendly territory, and water terminal and logistics-over-the-shore (LOTS) operations. These are not, however, amphibious operations as described by this doctrine.

## 6. Types of Amphibious Operations

a. The principal type of amphibious operation is the amphibious assault, which is distinguished from other types of amphibious operations in that it involves establishing a force on a hostile or potentially hostile shore.

b. Other types of amphibious operations governed by this doctrine that do not involve establishing an LF on a hostile or potentially hostile shore include:

(1) Amphibious Withdrawal. An amphibious operation involving the extraction of forces by sea in naval ships or craft from a hostile or potentially hostile shore.

(2) Amphibious Demonstration. An amphibious operation conducted to deceive the enemy by a show of force with the expectation of deluding the enemy into a course of action unfavorable to it.

(3) Amphibious Raid. An amphibious operation involving swift incursion into or a temporary occupation of an objective followed by a planned withdrawal. Raids are conducted for such purposes as:

(a) Inflicting loss or damage.

(b) Securing information.

(c) Creating a diversion.

(d) Capturing or evacuating individuals and/or materiel.

(e) Executing deliberate deception operations.

(f) Destroying enemy information gathering systems to support operations security (OPSEC).

c. Not all amphibious operations conducted can be included in the four types. Forces may be called upon to conduct nonconventional amphibious operations that may closely parallel one of the four types (e.g., non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) may closely parallel an amphibious raid). In these situations, the command relationships described in this publication for conventional types of amphibious operations should be used.

## 7. Supporting Operations

a. In amphibious operations, supporting operations are those operations conducted by forces other than those assigned to the ATF. They are ordered by higher authority at the request of the CATF and normally are conducted outside the area for which the CATF is responsible at the time of their execution. Supporting operations conducted in the amphibious objective area (AOA) before or during the amphibious operation will be coordinated with CATF. Command relations will be in accordance with Chapter II, paragraph 3. Examples of supporting operations are:

(1) Military deception operations conducted to induce favorable enemy actions that contribute to the accomplishment of the ATF mission.

(2) Isolation of the landing area by the conduct of interdiction operations.

(3) Operations designed to assist in gaining or maintaining air, ground, or naval superiority in the landing area.

(4) Air, surface, subsurface, or special operations designed to secure information.

(5) Special operations designed to disrupt, delay, or confuse the enemy.

(6) Mine countermeasures (MCM) operations conducted in the vicinity of the intended landing area(s) before the establishment of the AOA.

(7) Special operations, in and along the beachhead area(s) prior to the establishment of the AOA, to gather intelligence and/or clear obstacles.

b. Preassault operations are not supporting operations. Preassault operations are conducted in the AOA by elements of the ATF before the arrival of the major assault elements.

8. Subsidiary Landings. In an amphibious operation, a subsidiary landing is a landing, usually made outside the designated landing area, to support the main landing. An amphibious operation may require one or more subsidiary landings. These landings may be conducted before, during, or after the main landing. If made before, the effect on the main landing must be considered in terms of possible loss of surprise. Subsidiary landings must be planned and executed by commanders with the same precision as the main landing. Division of forces to conduct subsidiary landings is justified only when such employment will be of greater anticipated value than commitment to the main landing. Forces employed in subsidiary landings that precede the main landing may be reembarked and employed as tactical reserve supporting the main landing. Subsidiary landings may be executed to accomplish one or more of the following specific purposes:

a. Seize specific areas to be used in support of the main landing; i.e., seizing islands or mainland areas adjacent to the main landing area for use as:

(1) Artillery, missile, and rocket firing positions.

(2) Airfields or vertical/short take-off/landing (V/STOL)-capable locations.

(3) Protected anchorages, temporary advanced naval bases, or logistic and combat service support (CSS) sites from which the main landing can be supported.

(4) Air warning and air control system sites.

b. Seize an area to deny its use to the enemy in opposing the main landing.

c. Divert enemy attention and forces from the main landing or fix enemy defensive forces in place.

9. Relative Strength Requirements. To achieve success, an ATF should be assured in the landing area of naval superiority against enemy surface and subsurface forces, air superiority, and a substantial superiority over enemy forces ashore. In the face of compelling necessity, commanders may undertake an amphibious operation on the basis of a reasonable total superiority of force. For example, naval and air superiority may justify a landing even though the ATF does not possess the desired numerical superiority in ground forces, if friendly surface and air units can be used effectively against enemy forces to negate their advantage. In addition to a preponderance of forces within the landing area, an ATF should have reasonable assurance of:

a. Freedom from effective interference by enemy surface, subsurface, air, or ground forces from outside the landing area.

b. The ability to provide continuous support for the forces ashore.

10. Sequence. The amphibious assault follows a well defined pattern for which this publication is primarily focused and structured. This should not create significant difficulties for planners preparing for other types of amphibious operations, because this sequence of events or activities occurs to an equal or lesser degree in each of the other amphibious operations. Unique aspects of planning, organizing, and conducting withdrawals, demonstrations, and raids are discussed in Chapter XVI.

a. The general sequence consists of planning, embarkation, rehearsal, movement to the landing area, assault, and accomplishment of the ATF mission. While planning occurs throughout the entire operation, it is normally dominant in the period before embarkation. Successive phases bear the title of the dominant activity taking place within the period covered.

b. The organization for embarkation needs to provide for maximum flexibility to support alternate plans that may of necessity be adopted. The landing plan and the scheme of maneuver ashore are based on conditions and enemy capabilities existing in the AOA before embarkation of the LF. For instance, a change in conditions of US or enemy forces during the movement phase may cause changes

in either plan with no opportunity for reloading the LF. In a situation such as this, the sequence of an amphibious operation changes to embarkation, movement, planning, rehearsal, and assault. The extent to which changes in the landing plan can be accomplished depends on the organization for embarkation.

11. Planning. The planning phase denotes the period extending from the issuance of the initiating directive to embarkation. Although planning does not cease with the termination of this phase, it is useful to distinguish between the planning phase and subsequent phases because of the change that occurs in the relationship between commanders at the time the planning phase terminates and the operational phase begins. Command relationships are covered in detail in Chapter II.

12. Embarkation. The embarkation phase is the period during which the forces, with their equipment and supplies, embark in assigned shipping.

13. Rehearsal. The rehearsal phase is the period during which the prospective operation is rehearsed for the purpose of:

- a. Testing the adequacy of plans, the timing of detailed operations, and the combat readiness of participating forces.
- b. Ensuring that all echelons are familiar with plans.
- c. Testing communications.

14. Movement. The movement phase is the period during which various elements of the ATF move from points of embarkation to the AOA. This move may be via rehearsal, staging, or rendezvous areas. The movement phase is completed when the various elements of the ATF arrive at their assigned positions in the AOA.

15. Assault. The assault phase is the period between the arrival of the major assault forces of the ATF in the landing area and the accomplishment of the ATF mission.

16. Termination of an Amphibious Operation

- a. The termination of the amphibious operation is predicated on the accomplishment of the ATF mission in accordance with the specific conditions contained in the initiating directive (see Chapter II, paragraph 4). The

firm establishment of the LF ashore is usually specified as one of these conditions.

b. When the mission is to establish the LF ashore, the following conditions must be met:

- (1) The beachhead is secured.
- (2) Sufficient tactical and supporting forces are established ashore to ensure the continuous landing of troops and material requisite for subsequent operations.
- (3) Command, communications, and supporting arms coordination facilities are established ashore.
- (4) CLF is ready to assume full responsibility for subsequent operations.

c. When CATF and CLF are satisfied that the conditions stated above have been met, CATF will report these facts to the commander designated in the initiating directive. This authority will then terminate the amphibious operation, disestablish the AOA, dissolve the ATF, and provide additional instructions, as required, to include command arrangements and disposition of forces.

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## CHAPTER II

### ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND

1. Purpose. To provide guidance on the organization and command relationships that will normally exist for planning and executing amphibious operations.
2. Scope. Amphibious operations may be conducted as a stand alone operation or as a part of a larger joint operation. With respect to planning and conducting amphibious operations, paragraph 4 below lists topics the joint force commander (JFC) is required to address in an initiating directive sent to the CATF. The JFC who issues the initiating directive ensures that:
  - a. Communication channels are established with assigned forces as soon as amphibious operations are contemplated to facilitate required planning before the initiating directive is issued.
  - b. Requirements submitted by CATF that cannot be provided from within the ATF (e.g., additional forces, shipping, intelligence) are filled.
  - c. Differences between CATF and CLF that arise during the planning phase and differences between CATF and other commanders outside the ATF are resolved.
  - d. Supporting operations are coordinated with CATF.
  - e. The conduct of any nonamphibious operations within the AOA that are not specifically supporting operations are coordinated with CATF.
3. Command Relationships
  - a. General
    - (1) JFCs establish command relationships and assign authority to subordinates based on the operational situation, the complexity of the mission, and the degree of control needed to ensure that strategic intent is satisfied. Combatant commanders may exercise combatant command of an ATF directly, or by delegation of authority, through:

- (a) A Service component commander.
- (b) A functional component commander, if established.
- (c) A commander of a subordinate unified command.
- (d) A commander of a joint task force who reports directly to the combatant commander.

(2) Applicable guidance on command relationships between CATF and other commanders external to the ATF are included in the initiating directive.

(3) CATF exercises authority through the commanders of the task organizations, who exercise authority through their respective chains of command.

(4) Within the AOA, CATF is given specific authority, as prescribed by the commander having overall authority for the operation. The CATF will exercise the degree of control prescribed in the initiating directive over forces not a part of the ATF when such forces are operating within the AOA after the arrival of the advance force or the ATF. When such forces are merely passing through the AOA, control will be exercised only to the extent of preventing or minimizing mutual interference and in accordance with Joint Pub 0-2 regarding support by transient forces under emergency conditions.

(5) Subject to the overall authority of CATF, responsibility for conduct of operations ashore and for security of all personnel and installations located within the area of operations ashore is vested in CLF. CLF's authority includes operational control of all forces, including airborne and/or air assault forces, operating ashore within the landing area, or as directed by the commander who issued the initiating directive.

(6) Upon termination of the amphibious operation, command relationships will be as directed in the initiating directive.

b. Relationships During Planning. Operational planning for an amphibious operation is unique with respect to command relationships in that operational control (OPCON)

of forces is normally not passed to CATF until the amphibious operation plan is approved by the commander who issued the initiating directive. Regardless of the status of forces, when the initiating directive is received, special planning relationships are observed during the planning phase. These planning relationships are designed to ensure that both naval and LF considerations are adequately factored into decisions made concerning the conduct of the amphibious operation. CATF is responsible for the preparation of the overall plan for the amphibious operation. The CATF coordinates planning. However, the CATF, CLF, and other commanders so designated in the initiating directive are coequal in planning matters and decisions. All decisions must be reached on a basis of common understanding of the mission, objectives, and procedures and on a free exchange of information. Any differences between commanders that cannot be resolved are referred to their common superior in the operational chain of command. Once the LF is embarked on amphibious shipping, CATF assumes full responsibility for the ATF and for the operation. If a change in the mission occurs after commencement of operations or if an amphibious operation is initiated from an afloat posture, coequal planning relationships, either as described above or as specified in the initiating directive, will apply to any subsequent planning. As the operational situation dictates, however, CATF OPCON may specify planning relationships to coordinate planning efforts, especially where time-sensitive planning is required under the provisions of Joint Pub 5-03.1, "Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Volume I (Planning Policy and Guidance)."

c. Reporting of Commanders. At the time specified by appropriate authority, various commanders of subordinate task organizations of the ATF report to CATF for operations. In the case of CLF, this will occur at the time of embarkation unless the LF is already embarked, in which case CLF will report to CATF before commencement of either the rehearsal or the movement to the AOA, whichever is earlier.

d. Navy Authority Over LF Units. CATF is normally the only Navy commander that exercises authority over or assumes responsibility for the operation of LF units. An exception exists when a CATF has designated a Navy commander below the ATF level as commander of a subordinate task organization composed of Navy and LF

units (as discussed in subparagraph 14c). The decision to delegate authority over LF elements below the level of the ATF is made by CATF during the planning phase, after consultation with CLF. In these cases, CATF exercises authority through the commander(s) of such subordinate task force(s) or group(s). Whenever CATF issues an order to such subordinate commanders that affects the corresponding LF element, CLF will be informed and consulted before the order is issued. When authority over LF elements is delegated below the level of CATF, relationships between such a commander and a related LF commander are substantially the same as those between CATF and CLF. The direct chain of command of Navy and LF component commanders of the ATF is reestablished upon dissolution of the subordinate task force(s) or groups(s) or upon the release therefrom of the portion of the command assigned to it. Command responsibilities of a subordinate commander exercising authority over a corresponding LF element are terminated by CATF on fulfillment of specific conditions set forth in the order.

e. Naval Authority Over Air Force and/or Other Assigned Forces. CATF is normally the only Navy commander that exercises authority over or assumes responsibility for operation of Air Force and/or other assigned forces. An exception exists when a CATF has designated a Navy commander below the ATF level as commander of a subordinate task organization composed of Navy, Air Force, and/or other assigned forces. The decision to delegate authority over Air Force and/or other assigned forces below the level of the ATF is made by CATF during the planning phase, after consultation with the commanders of the other major forces. The exercise of authority, relationships of commanders, and termination of authority is similar to that discussed in subparagraph 3d above.

f. Consultation Between Commanders. In the course of planning and executing amphibious operations, CATF obtains and considers the opinions and professional judgment of appropriate commanders. This requirement, however, in no way limits CATF's authority.

g. Consultation Between Parallel Chains of Command. Parallel chains of command between the naval force, LF, and, in some cases, Air Force elements of an ATF create special requirements for consultation. No significant decision contemplated by a commander in one chain of command that affects the plans, disposition, or

intentions of a corresponding commander in another chain of command will be made without consultation with the commander concerned.

h. Personnel Under Parallel Chains of Command. All necessary orders from one commander affecting personnel under command of a corresponding commander at a parallel level of command are, insofar as possible, issued through the appropriate counterpart commander. The foregoing will not affect the paramount authority of a commander of a ship or aircraft over persons embarked therein concerning matters affecting safety and good order of his ship or aircraft or authority of a senior officer present to act in an emergency.


i. Command Relationships with Air Force Forces. Command relationships concerning Air Force forces are detailed in paragraph 11 of this chapter.

j. Command Relationships in a Joint Amphibious Task Force During the Planning Phase and During Operations. Command relationships are shown in Figures II-1 and II-2 respectively. The organization external to the JATF of each JTF is unique and based primarily on mission requirements.

#### 4. Initiating Directive

a. The initiating directive is an order to CATF to conduct an amphibious operation. It is issued by the combatant commander, subunified commander, Service component commander, or JTF commander delegated overall responsibility for the operation. Copies of the initiating directive need to be furnished to all major subordinate and supporting commanders.

b. The initiating directive may not be a single comprehensive document. During Crisis Action Planning (CAP) for contingency operations, the information contained in the initiating directive may be found in several orders, such as, the warning order, alert order, planning order, and execute order.



NOTE: 1. AS APPROPRIATE, FORCES FROM TWO OR MORE SERVICES COMPRISE A JTF. IF BOTH ARMY AND MARINE CORPS FORCES ARE PARTICIPATING, PLANNING WILL BE CONDUCTED UNDER A SINGLE DESIGNATED CLF.

2. CATF IS THE COORDINATING AUTHORITY FOR PLANNING THE AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS AT THIS LEVEL.

LEGEND:

- COMBATANT COMMAND
- ===== OPERATIONAL CONTROL
- ● ● ● SERVICE ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT
- ← ← SUPPORTING OPERATIONS
- ■ ■ ■ COORDINATION/PARALLEL PLANNING

Figure II-1. Sample JTF Command Relationships During the Planning Phase




Figure II-2. Sample JTF Command Relationships During Amphibious Operations

c. The initiating directive:

- (1) Establishes the ATF.
- (2) Assigns a mission.
- (3) Provides forces to accomplish the mission.
- (4) Assigns assault shipping for both assault echelon (AE) and assault follow-on echelon (AFOE).
- (5) Designates CATF, CLF, and other commanders as appropriate.
- (6) Positively defines the AOA in terms of sea, land, and air space. The size must be sufficient to ensure accomplishment of the ATF mission as well as to provide sufficient area for the conduct of necessary air, land, and sea operations.
- (7) Provides code words for the operation name and for other key specifics about the operation.
- (8) Sets target dates for execution of the operation.
- (9) Provides special instructions on command relationships.
- (10) Provides special instructions pertaining to the planning, employment, allocation, and control of nuclear and chemical munitions.
- (11) Includes:
  - (a) Positive instructions governing the termination of the operation and, if feasible, command arrangements and disposition of forces to be effective at that time.
  - (b) Information regarding operations to be conducted after termination of the amphibious operation.
- (12) Assigns responsibility and provides necessary coordination instructions for the conduct of supporting operations.
- (13) Provides cryptographic and OPSEC guidance.



(14) Provides a concept for military deception operations to be conducted in support of the amphibious operation.

(15) Provides other information considered necessary.

5. Principles of Amphibious Organization. Considerations that govern task organization of forces for any combat operation apply to amphibious operations. However, the organization for execution of the amphibious operation reflects interrelationships at every level between the tasks of the LF, corresponding naval forces, special operations forces (SOF), and participating Air Force forces. The interrelationships dictate that special emphasis be given to task grouping, economy, and coordination between parallel chains of command.

a. Task Grouping. After the mission is analyzed and necessary forces are allocated, they are assigned to task groups according to their respective functions in support of the amphibious operation.

b. Economy. Amphibious operations make extensive demands on assault shipping. Limited availability of these assets requires that the LF be composed of only those units necessary to accomplish the mission.

c. Parallel Chains of Command. The interrelationship of naval and LF tasks during the planning for and execution of the amphibious operation requires the establishment of parallel chains of command and corresponding commanders at all levels of the amphibious task force organization. The following fundamental considerations govern the application of such a system of parallel command:

(1) CATF, a Navy officer, is responsible for the operation and, except during the planning phase, exercises that degree of authority over the entire force as necessary to ensure success of the operation.

(2) CLF is either an Army or Marine Corps officer who has OPCON of the LF (which may include aviation units).

(3) The CATF and CLF are on a corresponding level of command with regard to their respective components.

(4) Corresponding commanders are established at each subordinate level of both naval and landing force elements.

(5) Matters of command that affect only Navy forces are dealt with by CATF through the Navy chain of command.

(6) Matters of command that affect only the LF are dealt with by CLF through the LF chain of command.

(7) Matters of command that affect both the Navy force and the LF are dealt with through the corresponding Navy and LF chains of command. Commanders at all levels are required to maintain close and continuous relationships to ensure that, except in emergencies, no commander makes decisions affecting corresponding commanders without consultation. In such cases the commander making an emergency decision will notify corresponding commanders of his action at the earliest practicable time.

(8) Detailed provisions covering special command arrangements, not otherwise provided for herein, must be clearly specified in the initiating directive for each operation.

6. ATF Task Organization. Task organization of the ATF as a whole must meet the requirements of embarkation, movement to the AOA, protection, landing, and support of the LF. No standard organization is applicable to all situations that may be encountered in an amphibious operation. For this reason, the task organization is determined according to the requirements of the anticipated tactical situation. Flexibility is essential. Once the organization has been promulgated, task organization titles of the various task units of the ATF are used exclusively for operational purposes. Administrative titles are retained for administrative purposes only.

7. Numerical Designation. The standard Navy numerical task unit designation system is utilized for naval forces within the ATF. Normally, the LF is given a single numerical designator. If separate attack groups are formed, corresponding landing groups also will be given numerical designations. Other major task groupings are numerically designated as necessary.

8. Amphibious Task Force. The task organization formed for conducting an amphibious operation is the ATF. The ATF always includes Navy forces and an LF, both of which normally have organic aviation. Other air and SOFs may be included, as required. Task elements of the ATF are described in the following paragraphs.

9. Navy Forces

a. Navy elements that are part of the ATF or support the ATF are organized into task groups for the operation. At CATF's discretion, two or more of these groups may be combined and others added or deleted as dictated by operational requirements. Normal task organization titles are listed below.

(1) Transport Group(s). Amphibious and Commander in Chief, US Transportation Command (USCINCTrans), provided common-user shipping under the operational control of Military Sealift Command (MSC), which provides support for embarkation, movement to the AOA, and landing of the LF. Landing craft to be employed in ship-to-shore movement are organic to, or attached to, the transport group(s).

(2) Control Group(s). Personnel, ships, and craft designated to control the waterborne ship-to-shore movement.

(3) Tactical Air Control Group. A shipborne organization established to operate a Tactical Air Control Center (TACC (afloat)) and a Tactical Air Direction Center (TADC) for control of air operations within the AOA.

(4) Surface Fire Support Group(s). Surface combatants assigned to the ATF to provide surface fire support of the assault landings and landing force operations ashore.

(5) Tactical Air Group(s) (shore-based). Tactical air units assigned to the ATF that are land based within, or sufficiently close to, the AOA to provide tactical air support to the ATF.

(6) Carrier Battle Group(s). Carrier battle group(s) (CVBGs) listed in the initiation directive assigned to or in support of the ATF to provide air, surface, and subsurface protection and strike warfare.

(7) Screening Group(s). Groups whose function is to provide protection to the ATF en route to and during operations in the AOA. Within the screening group, elements are task organized to provide specific functions; e.g., antiair warfare (AAW), antisurface warfare (ASUW), or antisubmarine warfare (ASW) in accordance with the Navy's composite warfare commander (CWC) concept described in Appendix A.

(8) Mine Warfare Group. Mine warfare capable units assigned to the ATF that conduct offensive and/or defensive naval mine operations in support of the ATF.

(9) Reconnaissance and Special Warfare Group. Includes ships, embarked reconnaissance troops, and sea-air-land (SEAL) teams that conduct reconnaissance, hydrographic surveys, demolition of natural and manmade obstacles, and other special operations missions as assigned (see Chapter XIV). SEAL teams support amphibious operations as prescribed in Joint Pub 3-05, "Doctrine for Joint Special Operations," and Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 22-4, "Underwater Demolition Teams in Amphibious Operations."

(10) Tactical Deception Group. A task organization established within the ATF to conduct tactical deception operations against the enemy.

(11) Inshore Undersea Warfare Group. One or more mobile inshore undersea warfare (MIUW) units that provide surface and subsurface surveillance of enemy targets in the seaward approach to the landing area.

(12) Maritime Patrol Air Group. Maritime patrol air (MPA) units that conduct ASW and surface-subsurface search and classification (SSSC) while the ATF is en route to and within the AOA.

(13) Air Transport Group. Transport aircraft units that provide air transport for LF elements and provide logistic support.

(14) Naval Beach Group. A task organization that may consist of traffic control, communications, beach and surf salvage, causeway and fuel elements of the beach party, assault craft (not organic to assault shipping), and elements of the Navy Cargo Handling and Port Group (NAVCHAPGRU). Specifics on the

NAVCHAPGRU are contained in Appendix G, Joint Pub 3-02.2 "Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Embarkation." The naval beach group (NBG) supports the amphibious operation as prescribed in NWP 22-5, "The Naval Beach Group."

(15) Electronic Warfare Group. A task organization within the ATF established to conduct electronic warfare operations. A separate EW group may not be formed in the circumstance that the EW mission is assigned to one of the other groups within the ATF.

b. The CATF will exercise OPCON over the transport, control, and tactical air control groups in all cases. Other groups may fall under CATF OPCON as specified in the initiating directive. At a minimum, however, CATF will exercise tactical control (TACON) of forces from each of these other groups while they are conducting operations inside the AOA.

c. Ideally, the LF will be embarked in Navy ships possessing full amphibious assault capabilities. Because amphibious shipping may not be sufficient to satisfy total lift requirements, the use of USCINTRANS-provided common-user shipping under the operational control of MSC may be necessary, particularly for the AFOE. Such ships are assigned in the initiating directive. If insufficient, CATF may request additional shipping from the combatant commander, JFC, or other higher authority. The additional shipping will be arranged through Navy and USCINTRANS channels. When employed, this shipping becomes an integral part of the ATF. The Navy has basic responsibility for personnel and material augmentation to enable USCINTRANS-provided common-user shipping to perform the amphibious mission including:

(1) Procurement and pre-positioning of augmentation materiel (i.e., cargo handling and lifesaving equipment).

(2) Navy communications equipment and personnel.

(3) Shipboard advisors and cargo handlers, except for ship's platoon when provided by the LF.

#### 10. Landing Force

a. The LF consists of the command, combat, combat support, and CSS elements assigned to conduct the

amphibious assault (air and ground). The term LF as used in the publication refers to the highest LF echelon, and CLF is the senior LF officer in the ATF.

b. The LF may be composed of Army and/or Marine Corps forces.

c. The LF is specially organized for the following functions:

- (1) Embarkation of troops, equipment, and supplies.
- (2) Debarkation and landing of troops by air and/or surface units.
- (3) Conduct of air and waterborne assault operations.
- (4) Control of naval surface fire support (NSFS).
- (5) Provision, as appropriate, and control of air support.
- (6) Discharge of logistic and CSS elements and cargo from assault shipping and establishment of throughput and service areas (known as combat service support areas (CSSA), beach support areas (BSA), landing zone support areas (LZSA), and ports).
- (7) Operation and tactical employment of organic amphibious vehicles and/or aircraft.

d. The amphibious assault requires that the LF be organized at various times in one of three functional forms. The first two are peculiar to amphibious operations:

- (1) Organization for Embarkation. The temporary administrative task organization of forces established by CATF and CLF, which is formed to simplify planning and facilitate execution of embarkation at all levels of command.
- (2) Organization for Landing. The specific tactical grouping of forces for a landing.
- (3) Basic Tactical Organization. The conventional organization of LF units for combat, involving combinations of command, ground and aviation combat, combat support, and CSS units for accomplishment of missions ashore. This organizational form is

employed as soon as possible during the battle for the beachhead following the landing of various assault elements of the LF.

11. Air Force Forces

a. When Air Force forces are assigned to the ATF by the JFC, they will normally be organized as a separate task organization under the command of an Air Force officer. In that event, the CATF exercises OPCON of the assigned Air Force forces through the Air Force commander.

b. When the air forces for the amphibious operation are provided by the Air Force component of the joint force and assigned to the ATF, the Air Force component commander should provide an Air Force officer to advise CATF and assist the ATF Tactical Air Officer concerning the total air effort in the AOA. At CATF's discretion (based on criteria such as ability to perform the function and the preponderance of aviation assets), that officer will normally be assigned as the ATF Tactical Air Officer. In addition, the Air Force component commander should provide staff officers to integrate into the CATF and ATF Tactical Air Officer staffs. When control of air operations is passed ashore, those Air Force officers will normally assume the same responsibilities for CLF or the appropriate commander ashore, as they had for CATF.

12. Other Forces. Forces other than those discussed above may be temporarily assigned or attached to the ATF for planning and conduct of special tasks such as those associated with garrison and base development, civil-military operations, psychological operations (PSYOP), special operations, and liaison with US Government and host-nation civil authorities. Other commanders, so designated in the initiating directive, will participate in planning and coordinating their participation in the amphibious operation. As appropriate, CLF provides for embarking and landing these forces and assisting, as directed, the initiation of assigned tasks as permitted by the operational situation.

13. Forces Operating in Support of the ATF. There may be occasions when certain forces will be tasked to support amphibious operations without being assigned to CATF. Specific examples include: (a) instances where special operations, PSYOP, or specific Air Force forces are not assigned to the ATF but have been tasked in the initiating directive to support the conduct of amphibious operations or

(b) instances where a carrier battle group force is not assigned to the ATF but has been tasked in the initiating directive to support the conduct of the amphibious operation--usually conducting operations within the geographic limits of the defined AOA before activation or providing screening and other support when the AOA is activated. In such cases, the initiating directive must specify the degree of authority to be exercised by the supported commander (CATF) and any limitations on support to be provided. Support will be accomplished in accordance with Joint Pub 0-2. When such forces operate within the AOA, paragraph 3 of this chapter will apply.

#### 14. Parallel Attack and Landing Groups

a. It may be necessary to form subordinate parallel task groups within the ATF. The decision to do so is made during the planning phase by CATF and CLF when it is deemed that:

(1) Simultaneous or nearly simultaneous assaults in widely separated geographic areas preclude effective control by a single tactical commander.

(2) The size of the forces involved precludes effective centralized control.

b. When required, subordinate parallel task groups are organized as follows:

(1) Attack Group. A subordinate task organization of the navy forces of an ATF. It is composed of assault shipping and supporting naval units designated to transport, protect, land, and initially support a landing group.

(2) Landing Group. A subordinate task organization of the LF capable of conducting landing operations, under a single tactical command, against a position or group of positions. It is composed of specially organized, trained, and equipped forces, including aviation units (when assigned).

c. Under certain conditions, as described in paragraph 3, an attack group commander may be delegated OPCON or other appropriate authority over a corresponding landing group.



15. Advance Force

a. An advance force is a subordinate task organization of the ATF that precedes the main body to the landing area. Its function is to prepare the intended landing area for assault by conducting reconnaissance, MCM, preliminary bombardment, underwater demolition, and other operations as required. The advance force organization may include several or all of the following:

- (1) Tactical air control group.
- (2) Surface fire support group.
- (3) Support CVBG or other air elements.
- (4) Screening group.
- (5) Mine warfare group.
- (6) Reconnaissance and special warfare group.
- (7) Tactical deception group.
- (8) IUWG.
- (9) NBG.

b. If the seizure of offshore islands or extensive land reconnaissance operations need to be conducted, a landing group, a transport group, and a control group may be included in the advance force to conduct a subsidiary landing.

c. When the ATF arrives in the area, the advance force is usually dissolved and its elements reassigned within the ATF. The exact time of dissolution and reassignment must be disseminated so that all commanders are apprised of the shift in responsibility.

d. If airborne MCM units are to be employed, it may be necessary to utilize compatible amphibious shipping to support this effort.

16. Airspace Control and Control of Air Operations

a. Extensive air operations are characteristic of amphibious operations under most circumstances. This facet of the operation is very complex and demanding because of the combination of:

(1) The participation of all types of aircraft (fixed- and rotary-wing) from all Services (including assets that are not organic to the JATF).

(2) The performance of a wide variety of essential missions (i.e., close air support (CAS), close-in fire support (CIFS), suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD), interdiction, airborne assault, logistic support, air defense operations, casualty evacuation, surveillance, NSFS spotting, electronic warfare (EW).

(3) Utilization of the latest technology (e.g., stealth, cruise missile, and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV).

b. Success of amphibious operations depend on the successful integration and optimal employment of air forces. Centralized planning, coordination, and deconfliction by CATF of air resources assigned to the ATF or other forces while operating within the AOA is required.

c. Airspace control during amphibious operations is guided by the fundamental principles presented in this publication. However, the doctrine governing air operations in a maritime environment (Joint Pub 3-04, "Doctrine for Joint Maritime Operations (Air)") and the principles presented in Joint Pub 3-52, "Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone," apply to the unique requirements of amphibious operations. Specifically, airspace control in the amphibious operating area includes coordinating, integrating, and regulating airspace to increase operational effectiveness by promoting the safe, efficient, and flexible use of airspace with a minimum of restraint placed on friendly airspace users while simultaneously making it as difficult as possible for the enemy to employ its air power effectively. AOA airspace control provides CATF the operational flexibility to effectively employ air forces.

d. In an amphibious operation, a single coordinated tactical air control system is developed by CATF to facilitate control and coordination of all air operations within the AOA. Within the ATF, the TACC (afloat) is the senior air control agency that coordinates and controls all air operations supporting the ATF. The TACC (afloat) may assign local responsibility to coordinate and control

some sector air operations at certain times during an amphibious operation prior to transfer of control ashore to a land or an airborne element capable of better controlling those operations. These elements should be designated as the tactical air direction center (TADC) (ashore) and the tactical air coordinator (airborne) (TAC(A)) respectively.

e. Criteria for the selection of the CATF coordinator for air operations includes, but is not limited to, the following:

- (1) Mission response capabilities (preplanned and immediate).
- (2) Fire support coordination capability.
- (3) Planning capability.
- (4) Communications and interoperability.
- (5) Targeting capability.
- (6) Capacity.
- (7) Flexibility.
- (8) Personnel manning.
- (9) Data and information availability.
- (10) Survivability.
- (11) Training.
- (12) Air traffic control capability.
- (13) Air resource composition.

f. Whenever an amphibious operation involves assigning or attaching elements of the Army and/or the Air Force, a joint amphibious task force (JATF) is established by the appropriate commander or other establishing authority (see Chapter I, paragraph 4, and Chapter II, paragraph 3, of this publication). In exercising command and control of air forces during joint operations, CATF, as the JFC, may choose to designate a Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC). CATF has the option to designate a member of his staff, such as the Tactical Air Officer, or one of the Service component commanders as JFACC. The

Tactical Air Officer or JFACC, if designated, is the single point of contact within the ATF for other agencies controlling airspace outside of the AOA. As the amphibious operation progresses, CLF, or a commander of forces ashore who has the capability to control and coordinate air operations, establishes air command and control systems ashore (subordinate to the TACC (afloat) and incrementally accepts responsibility for various air control and coordination functions from CATF. In the latter stages of phasing these systems ashore, CLF, if Marine Corps, or the commander of forces ashore who has the capability to control and coordinate air operations, is capable of fully accepting responsibility for airspace control and management in the AOA through his Tactical Air Command Center (TACC (ashore)) or Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) respectively. At a mutually agreed upon time, the CLF, if Marine Corps, or the commander of forces ashore who has the capability to control and coordinate air operations, assumes this responsibility from CATF.

g. When the JATF is part of a larger joint force operation, CATF has the responsibility to interface with external airspace control agencies for air operations transiting the boundaries between the AOA and all airspace outside the AOA. Additionally, CATF (through the Tactical Air Officer or JFACC, if designated) will coordinate with the JFC's designated agency for air operations to ensure the efficient application of air power in support of the overall joint force operation. To ensure unity of effort, CATF will coordinate air operations planning and execution with the larger joint force JFC as necessary. Specific command, control, and communications responsibilities for the integration of sea- and land-based air efforts are detailed in Joint Pub 3-04, "Doctrine for Joint Maritime Operations (Air)," Chapter III. For additional details on the organization and functioning of a JFACC both within the JATF organization and as an agency of an external joint force, see Joint Pub 3-56.1, "Command and Control of Joint Air Operations."

h. Upon termination of amphibious operations, the AOA (including associated airspace) will be disestablished and airspace control passed to the ACA designated for that area in accordance with the JFC's initiating directive.

i. Guidance on the coordination procedures required for aircraft providing support into the AOA and ATF aircraft

providing support outside the AOA must be established in the initiating directive. Approved missions will be reflected in the standard joint force air tasking order as described in the Joint Pub 3-56 series of publications.

j. For further discussion of air assets and their employment, see Chapters VI and VII.

17. Combined Operations. Command relationships during combined operations are based on international standardization agreements or on bilateral agreements between nations. The command relationships for these operations will be defined in the initiating directive. This allows the commander directing the amphibious operation to define the relationships in accordance with existing military and/or political agreements.

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## CHAPTER III

### APPROACH TO PLANNING AND BASIC DECISIONS

1. Purpose. To provide guidance on the approach to planning and basic decisions for an amphibious operation.

2. General. Chapters III through XI provide guidance on the factors and considerations that apply to amphibious operations during the Planning Phase. This chapter is introductory in nature and restricted to delineation of responsibility, matters of mutual interest, problems peculiar to amphibious planning, and basic decisions made before detailed planning begins.

3. Campaign Perspective. Amphibious operations may involve high-risk, high-payoff efforts to accomplish critical missions. The mission of the ATF may be expressed as directly supporting the LF in the accomplishment of its mission. However, the ATF's mission is an integral part of a campaign that creates favorable conditions for the amphibious operation and exploits its results. Planning amphibious operations commences with an understanding of national and theater objectives and overall campaign aims, which will determine whether the amphibious operation is a primary effort, a diversion, or designed to be ambiguous to force the enemy to commit to a course of action. Diversion and preparation efforts to support the amphibious operation are determined based on the capabilities of the enemy, geography, and security required. In circumstances of exceptional security against an enemy with ineffective surveillance and detection capabilities, the best preparation may be no visible preparation whatsoever.

#### 4. The Approach to Planning

##### a. Basic Planning Considerations

(1) Planning for an amphibious operation is continuous from receipt of the initiating directive by CATF to termination of the operation. Amphibious planning procedures are distinguished by the necessity for concurrent, parallel, and detailed planning by all participating forces. Parallel and concurrent planning favors the assembly of commanders and staffs of corresponding echelons in the same locality. If such an arrangement is not practicable,

the exchange of liaison officers qualified to perform essential planning is necessary (see Joint Pub 5-00.2, "Joint Task Force (JTF) Planning Guidance and Procedures").

(2) Because opposing forces are not initially in physical contact, the likelihood of unforeseen contingencies confronting the ATF and LF is significantly increased. No preconceived directive, however detailed and carefully prepared, can provide for every eventuality. Plans, therefore, must be flexible so these contingencies can be handled with the most effective and economical use of forces assigned.

(3) Accurate and adequate intelligence is a prerequisite for sound amphibious planning. Intelligence collection efforts directed toward obtaining essential information must begin as soon as practicable.

(4) Early on, CATF must determine the criticality of surprise, the need for a preparatory phase of military deceptions to divert enemy forces from the AOA, and the need for ocean surveillance counter-measures to protect forces in transit to the AOA. Critical information must be identified and OPSEC planning guidance must be issued at the earliest practicable time.

(5) Planning for a specific operation may be related to other previous, ongoing, or contemplated operations. Therefore, care must be taken to ensure that adequate instructions are issued to prevent mutual interference.

(6) Development of the LF concept of operations ashore must precede detailed planning for surface and air operations in support of the amphibious operation. The LF concept must be examined by all commanders concerned to determine its supportability, and it must be concurred with by CATF before detailed planning begins. All commanders who provide support for the assault must be prepared to alter and accommodate their supporting plans to reflect the changing requirements of the LF as dictated by changes in the enemy situation.



b. Planning Documents. CATF and subordinate commanders use the following documents to coordinate the planning effort at all levels of the ATF.

(1) Planning Directive. Following receipt of the warning order or other directive requiring the planning for an amphibious operation, CATF issues a planning directive to ensure interdependent plans are coordinated, planning is completed in the time allowed, and important aspects are not overlooked. The planning directive specifies the principal plans to be prepared and sets a deadline for completion of each major step in the planning process for the ATF headquarters and major forces assigned. The planning directive includes a mission statement, commander's analysis, assumptions, forces apportioned, proposed courses of action, OPSEC guidance, task assignments, administrative schedules, and coordinating instructions. See Joint Pub 5-03.1, "Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Volume I (Procedures Description)," for further discussion of these concepts.

(2) Planning Program. Using the ATF planning directive as a guide, each commander prepares a planning program that contains the schedule of planning events for his force. The planning program includes concept development, mission analysis, planning guidance, staff estimates, the commander's estimate, and the concept of operations. Refer to Joint Pub 5-03.1 for further details.

(3) Planning Memorandums. As fragmentary information and instructions are received, and before preparing formal plans, commanders issue planning memorandums to ensure subordinate commanders are in possession of all available details that will affect their own planning.

c. Distribution of Drafts. Drafts of operation plans and orders, or portions thereof (i.e., annexes and appendixes), should be distributed to other commanders, as appropriate, to keep them abreast of current planning for the operation.

d. Planning Procedures

(1) Preliminary Planning. Upon receipt of the warning order or other directive requiring the planning for an amphibious operation, CATF conducts a

thorough review of the mission and other information provided therein. As necessary, studies and initial estimates are prepared at both the LF and ATF levels. These estimates provide information required to support the basic decisionmaking process and for the detailed planning that follows.

(2) Basic Decisions. As described herein, basic decisions are those decisions that must be made at the highest level within the ATF before detailed planning for an amphibious operation can proceed. Some of these decisions will be dictated in the initiating directive by the issuing commander. The basic decisions and who makes them are described below and listed in matrix form in Figure III-1. Although listed in the general sequence in which they are made, certain decisions may be made concurrently and others held in abeyance pending further information. A more detailed discussion of the various considerations involved in making these basic decisions from a LF perspective is contained in Joint Pub 3-02.1, "Joint Doctrine for Landing Force Operations."

(a) Selection of ATF General Course of Action. CATF and CLF jointly select a general course of action for the ATF as a whole that will accomplish the mission assigned in the initiating directive. At a minimum, agreement must be reached by CATF and CLF on a general area for the landing if not specified by higher authority.

(b) Selection of ATF Objectives. Once the general course of action has been determined, CATF and CLF jointly select those ATF objectives essential for the accomplishment of the mission.

(c) Determination of LF Mission. Based on the ATF mission, general course of action, and objectives, CLF develops a mission statement for the LF and submits it to CATF for concurrence.

- (d) Designation of Landing Sites. A landing site is a continuous segment of coastline over which troops, equipment, and supplies can be landed by surface means. A landing site is restricted in maximum length only to the extent of usable, uninterrupted coastline, but must be

Basic Decision	May Be Contained In Initiating Directive	CATF	CLF*	JOINT
1. Select Amphibious Task Force General Course of Action	X			X
2. Select Amphibious Task Force Objectives	X			X
3. Determine Landing Force Mission		X		
4. Designate Landing Sites		X		
5. Determine Landing Force Objective			X	
6. Determine Beachheads			X	X
7. Select Landing Areas				
8. Formulate Landing Force Concept of Operations			X	
9. Select Landing Beaches			X	
10. Select Helicopter Landing Zones			X	
11. Select Fixed Wing Aircraft Landing Zones and Drop Zones			X	
12. Select D-Day and H-Hour	X	X		
*All Basic Decisions made by CLF are Subject to review/concurrence by CATF from a supportability perspective				

Figure III-1. Basic Decision Responsibilities Matrix

a minimum length to contain at least one landing beach (see subparagraph 4d(2)(i) below). CATF designates the potential landing sites within the AOA and furnishes CLF with pertinent information concerning them.

(e) Determination of LF Objectives. After analyzing the assigned mission and designated landing sites, CLF determines LF objectives, usually defined in terms of physical or terrain features, attainment of which are necessary to accomplish the ATF mission.

(f) Selection of Beachheads. A beachhead is a designated area on a hostile or potentially hostile shore which, when seized and held, ensures the continuous landing of troops and materiel and provides maneuver space requisite for subsequent projected operations ashore. It is the physical objective of an amphibious operation. CLF determines possible beachheads for each landing site designated by CATF and notifies him of the selections so they may be incorporated in the designation of tentative landing areas.

(g) Selection of the Landing Area. The landing area is that part of the objective area within which the landing operations of an amphibious force are conducted. It includes the beach, the approaches to the beach, the transport areas, the fire support areas, the air occupied by close supporting aircraft, and the land included in the advance inland to the initial objective (Joint Pub 1-02). CATF delineates landing areas, expressed in terms of sea area and airspace required, for each beachhead selected by CLF. (To ensure unity of effort, CATF should coordinate air planning for air operations within the AOA with the designated Air Force Commander.) CATF then forwards to CLF an evaluation of each tentative landing area in terms of supportability from a naval perspective (sea and air), including the relative order of preference. From a LF perspective, CLF then selects primary and alternate landing areas from among those provided that will best facilitate accomplishment of the LF-ATF mission. CLF presents final selections to CATF for




Figure III-2. Selection of Landing Areas

concurrence. Naval and LF considerations in the selection of landing areas are shown in Figure III-2.

(h) Formulation of the LF Concept of Operations Ashore. The LF concept of operations ashore is usually a written and graphic representation, in broad outline, of CLF's intent with respect to the operation. It gives an overall picture of the operation, including the formation for landing and the scheme of maneuver for accomplishing the LF and ATF objectives by LF and other forces; e.g., airborne/air assault, SOF units. CLF formulates alternate concepts for operations ashore, including plans for alternate landing areas, subsidiary landings, and link-up operations, and presents them to CATF, who then determines if they can be supported.

(i) Selection of Landing Beaches

1. A landing beach is that portion of a shoreline usually required for the landing of a battalion landing team. However, it may also be that portion of a shoreline constituting a tactical locality (such as the shore of a bay) over which a force larger or smaller than a battalion landing team may be landed (Joint Pub 1-02).

2. CLF selects specific landing beaches from available landing sites within the selected landing areas. When the ATF is composed of two or more attack groups with related landing groups, a landing area may be selected for each attack group. In this case, each landing group commander selects landing beaches from within the assigned area.

3. Principal factors in the selection of landing beaches, in addition to those previously described for selection of landing areas, are:

a. LF concept of operations ashore.

b. Capacity for landing supplies and equipment.

- c. Suitability for beaching landing ships, landing crafts, and amphibious vehicles.
- d. Beach trafficability.
- e. Suitability of offshore approaches.
- f. Number, location, and suitability of beach support areas and beach exits.
- g. Location, type, and density of beach obstacles, including underwater obstacles.
- h. Nature of the terrain immediately inland from the beach.
- i. Suitability of communications facilities, roads, railroads, waterways, and air facilities.
- j. Suitability of beach from standpoint of expected weather and tidal conditions.
- k. Known hostile force dispositions, strengths, and capabilities.

(j) Selection of Helicopter Landing Zones. An HLZ is a specified ground area for landing assault helicopters to embark or disembark troops and/or cargo. A landing zone may contain one or more landing sites.

1. CLF selects helicopter landing zones (HLZs) and advises CATF. In reviewing these selections, CATF considers the ability of other forces to support the proposed assault landing therein.
2. Principal factors in the selection of HLZs are:
  - a. LF concept of operations ashore.
  - b. Enemy capabilities and dispositions, particularly the

location, type, and density of enemy antiaircraft installations.

c. Nature of the terrain where the helicopterborne forces must operate after landing.

d. Requirements for CSS.

e. Supporting arms requirements.

f. Available helicopter routes to and from the HLZ and restrictive effects on employment of supporting arms.

g. Ease of identification from the air.

h. The capabilities of the helicopters and other aircraft employed to move personnel, equipment, and supplies ashore in support of the operation.

(k) Selection of Fixed-Wing Aircraft LZs and Drop Zones for Airborne and Air-Transported Operations. When airborne or air-transported forces are employed, CLF, after consulting with the airborne troop commander and air commanders, selects the drop zones (DZs) and LZs. CATF reviews the selected zones to determine the ability to support operations with forces available.

(l) Selection of the Tentative Date and Hour of Landing

1. If not specified in the initiating directive, CATF, after consultation with CLF and other commanders as appropriate, selects the tentative date (D-day) and hour (H-hour) of landing. During planning, tentative dates and hours are promulgated as early as possible.

2. Principal factors in the selection of the tentative date and hour for landing are shown in Figure III-3.

(m) Detailed Planning. When CATF has determined that the ATF can support the preferred LF concept of operations ashore,




## DATE FOR LANDING

				1	2	3
4	5	6	7	8	9	10
11	12	13	14	15	16	17
18	19	20	21	22	23	24
25	26	27	28	29	30	

- ✧ AVAILABILITY OF FORCES
- ✧ READINESS OF FORCES
- ✧ PRESENT AND PROJECTED ENEMY SITUATION
- ✧ SEASONAL CONDITIONS IN THE AREA UNDER CONSIDERATION
- ✧ LOCAL CONDITIONS OF WEATHER, TIDE, CURRENT, PHASE OF MOON (DURATION OF DARKNESS AND DAYLIGHT)
- ✧ DESIGNATION OF LIMITING DATES BY A HIGHER AUTHORITY
- ✧ COORDINATION WITH PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS

## HOUR FOR LANDING...



- ✧ KNOWN ENEMY ROUTINE
- ✧ DURATION OF DAYLIGHT
- ✧ NEED FOR TACTICAL SURPRISE
- ✧ CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS ASHORE OF THE LANDING FORCE
- ✧ FAVORABLE CONDITIONS OF WIND, TIDE, AND PHASE OF MOON
- ✧ REQUIREMENTS FOR CONDUCTING CERTAIN OPERATIONS DURING HOURS OF DARKNESS
- ✧ MOST EFFECTIVE EMPLOYMENT OF SUPPORTING ARMS

Figure III-3. Principal Factors for Selecting the Tentative Date and Hour of Landing

detailed planning begins. Detailed LF planning includes formulation of the detailed scheme of maneuver ashore and other supporting plans, i.e., plan of supporting fire (air, naval surface fire, and artillery), obstacle and denial plans, and ship-to-shore movement plan. Plans for naval forces and participating Air Force forces, as appropriate, provide for transporting, protecting, landing, and supporting the LF. During detailed planning, the adequacy of forces made available for the operation is constantly reexamined. If additional forces are required, they are requested of higher authority through appropriate channels.

5. Initiation of the Amphibious Assault Beyond Visual and Radar Range. The conduct of landings from beyond enemy visual and radar range is a technique that employs maneuver warfare concepts such as surprise, operational speed, operational flexibility, and tactical mobility to achieve a tactical advantage over the enemy that can be decisively exploited while minimizing risk to assault shipping (see NWP 22-3, "Ship-to-Shore Movement"). This technique can be applied to all types of amphibious operations and require special planning considerations.

a. The amphibious capabilities of the landing craft air cushion (LCAC), combined with its speed and range, provide a tremendous improvement in ship-to-shore mobility, expanding the range of tactical options from a surface landing launched a few thousand yards from shore to launch of the initial waves in excess of 25 nm from shore. For the combined helicopterborne and LCAC capabilities to provide maximum advantage to CATF, these extremes must not be viewed as unique and separate concepts, but rather as endpoints of a continuous spectrum of possibilities.

b. Conceptually, the operation should be viewed as a single integrated evolution rather than two or three parallel operations (e.g., helicopterborne assault, conventional surface assault, LCAC assault). Within the constraints of the available amphibious ships and their unique characteristics, the landing plan should be designed around the concept of operations ashore and should provide maximum flexibility to respond to changes in the tactical situation. Additionally, the order of landing of the various assault waves (helicopter, displacement craft, and LCAC) and the conduct of general

unloading should be driven by the tactical situation and the need for rapid buildup of combat power ashore.

c. A number of factors must be considered by the commander in arriving at the best possible landing plan in any given scenario. For example, although LCAC can successfully cross beaches inaccessible by displacement craft, the required force buildup rate ashore may require that the beach be accessible by displacement craft as well.

d. The increased range and capabilities of LCACs and helicopters establish a need for detailed information on potential landing areas over a wider frontage. Intelligence plays a critical role in amphibious operations because tactical decisions depend on accurate and timely information on the enemy and area of operations. Because the operational tempo of amphibious operations using LCACs and helicopters will be much faster than in conventional operations, intelligence information must be processed and disseminated expeditiously.

e. Traditional approaches to combat loading and craft assignment procedures must be reconsidered when LCAC assets are added to the force. As the landing plan broadens, the embarkation plan becomes more complex. Time, distance, and payload considerations become significant embarkation planning factors.

f. The LCAC, therefore, becomes a significant factor that must be considered carefully throughout the planning process and during execution of the amphibious operation.

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## CHAPTER IV

### INTELLIGENCE PLANNING

1. Purpose. To provide guidance for requirements, responsibilities, and documents associated with intelligence planning for an amphibious operation.

2. Planning Requirements

a. Successful accomplishment of the ATF mission is dependent on timely and accurate intelligence. Intelligence planners must direct the intelligence collection effort toward the preparation of an estimate of the situation that supports decisionmaking regarding what will be done as well as when, where, how, and why. The collection effort is continuous throughout the amphibious operation and involves collection agencies from the national level down to the individual service member.

b. CATF, working closely with CLF, coordinates the collection process to ensure integration of effort, expeditious collection, rapid processing, and prompt dissemination of intelligence.

c. Effective use of operational intelligence depends largely on the ability to deny the enemy intelligence regarding the plans and composition of the ATF. To this end, appropriate OPSEC measures must be applied to the information gathering operations to deny the enemy indicators about the commanders' intentions.

d. If the amphibious operation is to be conducted as part of a larger joint force operation, coordination with the JFC, through the JFC intelligence officer (J-2), is imperative. Very often the theater combatant commander's Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) is the entry for the Navy component commander for national level systems support for the amphibious operation.

3. Planning Responsibilities

a. Commander Amphibious Task Force. During planning, CATF is responsible for:

(1) Determination of intelligence requirements for planning by the naval forces, review of intelligence requirements of the LF and other forces, and consolidation of these requirements for the ATF as a whole.

(2) Collection, processing, production, and dissemination of intelligence to major elements of the ATF in accordance with their special requirements.

(3) Acquisition and distribution of maps, charts, photographs, and other intelligence materials.

(4) Preparation of intelligence estimates and studies relating to ATF operations as a whole.

(5) Development of security and counterintelligence measures, in addition to those specified by higher authority.

(6) Preparation and distribution of an intelligence annex to the ATF operation plan.

(7) Establishment of, in coordination with CLF, a Target Information Center (TIC) and JIC.

(a) The TIC is formed during the planning phase to process intelligence data in order to identify likely targets for attack by supporting arms. It is composed of ATF and LF target intelligence officers (TIO), air intelligence officers from all participating Services, supporting arms representatives, and appropriate assistants to maintain a continuous flow of target information.

(b) The JIC is established at the onset of planning to coordinate collection of information and production and timely dissemination of derived intelligence to all interested agencies and commands of the ATF.

(8) Establishment of liaison with intelligence agencies that are not part of the ATF, including theater and national agencies.

b. Commander Landing Force. During planning, CLF is responsible for:

- (1) Determining intelligence requirements for planning by the LF and making these requirements known to CATF.
- (2) Collecting and processing information and disseminating derived intelligence to the LF.
- (3) Establishing liaison with intelligence organizations of the ATF and with other intelligence organizations within the theater of operations.
- (4) Disseminating maps, charts, photographs, beach studies, and other intelligence materials to LF units.
- (5) Assisting in preparing and distributing an intelligence annex to the ATF operation plan.

c. Other Force Commanders. Other force commanders are responsible for determining and stating their intelligence requirements and preparing and executing an intelligence plan compatible with the specific needs of their respective forces. Requests for intelligence peculiar to specialized operations of these forces must be submitted to CATF, for integration into the overall intelligence effort.

4. Collection of Information. Once intelligence requirements are determined by force commanders and consolidated by CATF, a collection plan is developed. For those intelligence collection tasks that cannot be accomplished by organic ATF collection agencies, a request is initiated by CATF to the appropriate collection agency through the chain of command. The principal collection agencies and sources of information are:

a. Reconnaissance Agencies. During the planning phase, collection of information by reconnaissance must be coordinated by CATF. Agencies normally available for support during the planning phase include:

- (1) Aerial, subsurface, and surface ship reconnaissance.
- (2) SOF.
- (3) Theater and national level agencies (i.e., Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Security Agency (NSA)).

b. Sources. All sources of information that may be of intelligence value must be exploited by the ATF. Among these are:

- (1) Friendly force reports.
- (2) Information from former residents and visitors to the objective area.
- (3) Commercial and industrial studies prepared by civilian businesses.
- (4) Captured enemy military personnel and documents.
- (5) Film and brochure travelogues.
- (6) Strategic studies of the enemy order of battle.
- (7) Imagery from all national, theater, and tactical systems.
- (8) Satellite multispectral imagery.
- (9) Hydrographic charts.
- (10) Technical intelligence reports.
- (11) Signal intelligence.
- (12) Weather and climate forecasts and studies.
- (13) Medical intelligence.

5. Dissemination of Intelligence

a. Dissemination is accomplished at each command level of the ATF in accordance with requirements determined during the planning phase. A distribution plan is prepared, listing the intelligence products to be promulgated, commanders who are to receive them, methods of delivery, number of copies, and delivery dates.

b. Principal requirements for dissemination are:

- (1) Timeliness.
- (2) Usability of form (i.e., oral, graphic, written).



(3) Pertinence (i.e., selective dissemination to avoid overloading lower echelons with too much information).

(4) Security.

c. Every effort must be made to keep the classification level of intelligence products as low as possible to increase releasability; however, sources must be protected to avoid compromise.

d. Intelligence information gathered by the ATF will be disseminated outside the ATF by CATF in accordance with national, theater, JTF, and Service coordinated reporting requirements and formats.

6. Security and Counterintelligence. CATF prescribes the special security and counterintelligence measures to be observed during planning for and preparation of the operation. Other commanders also issue necessary directives and supervise the activities of their forces. Special measures may include:

- a. Establishment of secure planning areas.
- b. Use of code words and symbols.
- c. Classification of material used in planning.
- d. Restrictions on dissemination of information and completed plans.
- e. Measures for handling civilians.
- f. Armed forces censorship.
- g. Control of accredited correspondents to include field press censorship.
- h. Measures to counter subversion within and espionage directed against the ATF.
- i. Security of classified documents and material.

7. Intelligence Estimate. CATF is responsible for maintaining a continuing intelligence estimate. When practicable, a preliminary formal estimate and other special reports are made available to principal commanders of the ATF for planning. The full formal intelligence estimate may be an appendix to the intelligence annex of the ATF operation

plan or may be distributed separately. Other commanders also maintain continuing intelligence estimates.

8. Intelligence Annex

a. Intelligence planning accomplished during the planning phase culminates in preparation of the intelligence annex to the ATF operation plans. The intelligence annex serves two broad purposes:

(1) To disseminate, in a form usable to subordinate units, intelligence required for conduct of initial operations.

(2) To provide instructions regarding the collection, processing, production, and dissemination of intelligence to subordinate commanders as well as requests for intelligence support from adjacent and senior commanders.

b. Preparation of the intelligence annex demands continuous cooperation among all echelons of command.

c. Drafts of the intelligence annex should normally be distributed to other commanders in advance of the operation plan for use in planning.

9. Additional Guidance. See Joint Pub 2-0, "Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations," for additional pertinent joint intelligence planning guidance.

## CHAPTER V

### COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS SUPPORT PLANNING

1. Purpose. To provide guidance regarding command, control, and communications (C3) requirements, planning considerations and planning responsibilities for the ATF organization when preparing for an amphibious operation.

2. Scope and Requirements of Communication Planning

a. An amphibious operation requires a reliable, secure, rapid, flexible, and interoperable C3 system capable of hostile environment operations. This communication system must provide for command and control of the ATF as a whole and for lateral communications between all elements of the ATF in execution of common or coordinated functions.

b. Communications support requirements in an amphibious operation include:

- (1) Reliable, secure, rapid, and interoperable communications commencing during the planning phase.
- (2) Control of NSFS.
- (3) Ship-to-shore movement control.
- (4) Coordination of logistic support and CSS, including embarkation.
- (5) Coordination of the protection of the ATF.
- (6) Coordination of support of the ATF by other forces.
- (7) Tactical air operations, including helicopter operations during the assault landings and for logistic support and CSS.
- (8) Medical regulation (i.e., a system to coordinate the orderly movement of a casualty from the site of wounding, or injury, or the onset of disease to and between medical treatment facilities).
- (9) Assault vehicle and craft control.

(10) Coordination and effective use of communications intelligence and electronic countermeasures (ECM) by surface, air, subsurface, and LF units.

c. Changes in command relationships, task organization, and disposition of forces require maximum flexibility in C3 plans. These plans must minimize the number of nonessential circuits and, whenever possible, maximize the use of multiple-purpose circuits. Common agencies must be used to assist in the reduction of mutual interference by decreasing frequency requirements. Exploiting alternate means of communication, such as visual or helicopter or surface messenger, is essential to ensure rapid and secure delivery of information between forces within the ATF.

3. General C3 Planning Considerations. C3 requirements vary with size and composition of the ATF. Planners must carefully consider the following factors:

a. C3 planning must support the requirements of the ATF during each phase of the operation from planning through the conduct of the assault.

b. Each major command of the ATF must have communications interoperable with the tactics and techniques employed by that force. Circuits provided must assure effective exercise of command and coordination of supporting fires. In joint or combined operations, the dissimilar nature of the forces and equipment involved may require allocation of additional circuits to permit the desired degree of command and control.

c. Individual C3 capabilities of major groups of the ATF must be provided for because elements may operate in widely separated areas during some phases of the amphibious operation. At the same time, the communication plan of each element must permit operation of the force as a whole without undue interference between elements when they are in close proximity. During the assault phase, extensive support from the sea, by surface and air means, makes it imperative that plans for joint tactical communication circuits be thoroughly coordinated.

d. Separation of individual ships and forces as a passive measure of defense against nuclear weapons and during OTH amphibious operations increases the

requirement for long range communications. Accordingly, allocation of shipboard equipment must be considered carefully in the planning process with respect to Navy and LF requirements.

e. Geographic location of the landing area may dictate need for special and alternate means of communications. Local communication standards, frequency uses, and facilities must be considered to prevent interference, to monitor conflicting traffic, and to ensure continuity.

f. If operating as part of a larger joint operation, ATF C3 plans must be integrated into the JFC's Joint Communications Electronic Operating Instructions (JCEOI) to ensure deconfliction of frequencies and call signs.

g. Using best-available knowledge of threat capabilities to monitor and counter ATF C3, an effective C3 plan must:

- (1) Provide an emission control plan for the use of C3 systems that execute OPSEC measures, execute the military deception actions, and maintain command and control of one's own forces.

- (2) Provide for transmission and cryptographic security to deny the enemy OPSEC indicators and classified information, respectively.

- (3) Provide for low probability of detection or intercept and antijam systems, redundant nets, authentication, and physical defense of C3 systems.

- (4) Provide for avoidance of mutual interference and deconfliction of friendly communications jamming with friendly use of communications.

h. Components of the ATF must be prepared to use the appropriate United States Message Text Formats (USMTF) in accordance with Joint Pub 6-04 Series, "US Message Text Formatting Program."

i. CATF and CLF should possess a deployed Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) capability.

4. C3 During the Planning Phase. C3 must be established among all major participating commands at commencement of the planning phase. Communication security (COMSEC) is essential and must be maintained throughout. Personal liaison will diminish the communication security problem as well as facilitate concurrent planning.

5. C3 During the Embarkation Phase. Before embarkation, planners must provide for adequate C3 between naval elements, the forces to be embarked, and any external agencies involved in transportation to the port of embarkation. CLF will normally be assigned responsibility for planning and providing C3 in the embarkation area. This may include coordinating the use of established facilities (military or civilian) and the establishment of communications in pier or beach areas. Early liaison between corresponding Navy and LF elements will ensure efficient functioning of communications during embarkation.

6. C3 During the Rehearsal Phase. To test C3 systems, equipment, and techniques, plans should provide for a full-scale rehearsal for all elements of the ATF as the operational situation permits. OPSEC requirements may dictate adoption of the following COMSEC during the rehearsal:

- a. Maximum use of secure voice equipment.
- b. Use of minimum power on radio nets.
- c. Periodic changing of call signs and frequencies.
- d. Strict adherence to circuit discipline and cryptographic procedures.

7. C3 During the Movement Phase. Plans for communications during movement to the AOA will require Navy forces to provide all external and internal ship communications. This requirement does not preclude the planned use of embarked LF communications personnel and equipment under the supervision of CATF. The use of communication facilities, particularly radio, must be severely restricted to prevent disclosure to the enemy of locations, movements, and intentions of the ATF. CATF prescribes conditions of emission control (EMCON) in effect during the movement. The C3 plan must reflect those restrictions applicable to radio circuits and provide for handling important messages within imposed limitations. Communications within various movement groups of the ATF will be provided by helicopter messenger, visual means, or radio in consonance with the degree of EMCON in effect.

8. C3 During Preassault Operations

- a. Before preassault operations begin, plans must be made for communication among elements of preassault forces. Within constraints of EMCON prescribed by CATF, provisions for communications among various air and ground reconnaissance elements (SEAL teams and LF

reconnaissance elements), minesweeping elements, submarines, surface ships, aircraft, and air, artillery, and naval gunfire must be considered and coordinated. In addition, special consideration must be given to passing intelligence information from preassault elements to CATF.

b. Pre-H-hour traffic should be sent within normal radio broadcast schedules as much as possible to avoid a sudden increase in message traffic between amphibious force ships that might reveal the intention of conducting amphibious operations.

9. C3 During the Assault Phase. Primary reliance must be placed on single and multichannel radio communications during the assault phase. This requirement is considered in planning numbers and types of circuits required and in assigning available frequencies. ATF and LF communication plans must provide sufficient channels of communications during ship-to-shore movement to facilitate control and coordination at all echelons. LF communications plans must provide for the rapid development of communications systems ashore that support the tactical requirements as the assault progresses. These plans must also provide CLF's access into a worldwide communications system from ashore. Such external communications initially are provided through CATF and subsequently established ashore by special units attached to the ATF. This communications system will become the basis for an advance base communications system, if required.

10. Advanced Base Development and Garrison Communications

a. The initiating directive may prescribe that advanced base development and/or garrison communications personnel and equipment be embarked and landed with the LF in order to begin early installation of an advanced base communications system. In this case, all usable elements of LF communications systems ashore should be included in the plan for development of the advanced base communications system.

b. These plans may also provide for establishment of external communications ashore following termination of the amphibious operation. A mobile communications unit may be assigned to CLF for embarkation and early establishment ashore to accomplish this task.

11. Responsibilities

a. C3 Planning Responsibilities of CATF. CATF is responsible for:

(1) Determination of C3 requirements of Navy forces, to include requirements of USCINTRANS-provided common-user shipping under the operational control of MSC, review and approval of C3 requirements of the LF and other forces, and consolidation of C3 requirements for the ATF as a whole.

(2) Establishment of provisions to ensure adequate communications for air elements of the ATF with the supporting air elements in the theater during the planning phase.

(3) Acquisition and assignment of necessary technical facilities to subordinate elements of the force.

(4) Determination of priorities and allocation of shipboard communication facilities to each participating force.

(5) Establishment of provisions to ensure adequate communications for the naval elements of the ATF during the planning phase.

(6) Preparation of appropriate OPSEC and military deception guidance to convey and deny indicators to enemies by communications means.

(7) Announcement of requirements for establishing liaison between all commands of the participating forces for C3 planning.

(8) Preparation and promulgation of a coordinated plan for employment of communications during the operation.

(9) Development of the communications system to support medical regulating in conjunction with CLF.

(10) Preparation and promulgation of an airborne and air assault coordinated plan for employment of C3 during airborne and air assault operations.

b. C3 Planning Responsibilities of CLF. CLF is responsible for:

(1) Establishment of provision for adequate LF communications during the planning phase.



- (2) Development and promulgation of a plan integrating air operations ashore with air support from air elements outside the AOA.
- (3) Determination of requirements for communication facilities controlled by higher headquarters and submitting these requirements to CATF.
- (4) Determination of requirements for shipboard communication facilities and services while embarked.
- (5) Maintaining liaison with CATF and subordinate LF units in all C3 planning matters.
- (6) Development and promulgation of a coordinated plan for the LF and for submitting this plan to CATF for review, coordination, approval, and inclusion in the ATF C3 plan as appropriate.
- (7) Development and promulgation of a plan for link-up operations with other ground forces ashore.

c. C3 Planning Responsibilities of Commanders of Other Forces. Commanders of other major forces of the ATF are responsible for determining their C3 requirements and submitting those requirements to CATF.

## 12. Communication Deception and Countermeasures and Protection Against Enemy Countermeasures

- a. The scope of employment of communications deception and countermeasures will normally be specified in the initiating directive. Additional ATF requirements for employment of these techniques should be made known to higher authority during planning. Employment of communications deception and countermeasures is ordinarily most profitable when the enemy has committed itself to a course of action or when the value of confusing or disrupting radio communications outweighs the value of communications intelligence, which might be obtained by listening only.
- b. During planning, equipping, and training for the operation, commanders must bear in mind that, during the assault, the enemy may attempt to interfere with command and control radio communications by use of jamming or imitative communications deception. The effects of these types of interference can be minimized by:

- (1) Use of alternate frequencies and call signs.
- (2) Development of plans for locating enemy jamming stations and neutralizing or destroying them by offensive action as required.
- (3) Provision of specialized training for all operators in anti-jamming procedures.
- (4) Use of authentication.
- (5) Provisions for other means of communication (i.e., beamed superhigh frequency, infrared, visual, boat messenger, and helicopter messenger).
- (6) Employment of quiet landing procedures (see NWP 22-3).
- (7) Terrain masking.
- (8) Maximum use of directional antennas.
- (9) Use of power to burn through jamming.
- (10) Frequency hopping radios and anti-jamming modems.

13. C3 Plan

a. The ATF C3 plan is based on the operation plan and must reflect the C3 requirements of CATF, CLF, and the coordinated requirements of the commanders of participating forces. These requirements may include radio and missile guidance and control frequencies, call signs, compatible cryptographic and authentication systems, and special communication equipment or support.

b. The C3 plan fulfills C3 requirements of the operation in terms of circuits, channels and facilities required, and policies and procedures governing the operation and coordination of the overall system. The plan includes:

- (1) General coverage of the communication situation, including assumptions, guiding principles, and the concept of operational communications employment.
- (2) Announcement of the communications mission.
- (3) Delegation of communications tasks and responsibilities to major elements of the force.

(4) Detailed instructions relative to organization, installation, operation, coordination, and maintenance of the communications system.

(5) Assignment and employment of call signs, frequencies, cryptographic aids, and authentication systems.

(6) Instructions concerning countermeasures, OPSEC, military deception, COMSEC, recognition and identification, navigation aids, and other special communications and electronics functions.

(7) Communications-electronics logistic and CSS support.

c. The plan is prepared in minute detail to facilitate its use by participating commanders at all echelons. Whenever possible, various appendixes to the ATF C3 plan should be prepared so that they may be readily duplicated for inclusion in subordinate unit C3 plans.

d. Subordinate commanders' C3 plans are based on the ATF C3 plan. The number and scope of those plans should be kept to the minimum consistent with distribution and security considerations.

14. Additional Guidance. See Joint Pub 6-0, "Doctrine for C3 Systems Support to Joint Operations," for additional pertinent Joint Communications Planning Guidance.

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## CHAPTER VI

### SUPPORTING ARMS PLANNING

1. Purpose. To provide guidance on the requirements and responsibilities for planning supporting arms employment in an amphibious operation.
2. General. Supporting arms are air, sea, and land weapons of all types employed to support ground units. The principal supporting arms for amphibious operations are air, naval surface fire, and artillery.
3. Force Application Scheme. The application of force by various arms best supports the ATF objectives when guided by a coherent scheme. Supporting force application can create conditions for successful amphibious operations by systematically neutralizing specific enemy capabilities, diverting resources, restricting lateral movement along coastal areas, restricting movement of reinforcements, and other actions. Because there are normally far more targets than means to attack them simultaneously, a scheme of attack is necessary to establish a logical sequence that will attain cumulative results in increasingly favorable conditions. The force application scheme may be a separate operation, a preparatory operation, or briefer effort. In any case, a systematic force application scheme seeks to amplify force effectiveness with deliberate use of time, successive phasing of its parts, creating and exploiting enemy responses, and adaptation to changing circumstances. Command and control is, therefore, a critical planning factor.
4. Requirements
  - a. Naval Requirements. Naval operations in the landing area (such as beach reconnaissance, hydrographic survey, removal of beach and underwater obstacles, and mine clearance) normally require an allocation of assets that can provide command and control, naval surface fire support, air, and as required, artillery support. Additionally, allocations of aircraft and escort ships must be made to support protection of the ATF from hostile air, surface, or subsurface attack.
  - b. LF Requirements. The LF must be supported by adequate supporting arms before, during, and after the initial landing. Fires are delivered to destroy or

neutralize defenses capable of opposing the landing and subsequent operations ashore. Until field artillery units are landed and capable of providing fire support, all requirements must be fulfilled by aircraft and naval surface fire.

5. Responsibilities of Commanders

a. Commanders requiring fire support should have a clear understanding of the characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of ships, aircraft, and artillery which deliver fire support. Tasks involved in planning fire support and associated responsibilities are:

(1) Selection of Targets. Target selection is the prerogative of the supported commander.

(2) Target Classification and Priority. Each target added to the ATF target list is assigned a target classification and target priority that serves to determine the sequence of attack and the effort allocated to the attack.

(a) Targets are classified according to the effect they can impose on enemy capabilities during phases of operation or to the degree of restriction imposed upon attack. The CATF announces a general policy for classification of targets to be attacked by air and naval surface fire. Usually, targets are grouped as follows:

1. Class A. Installations that threaten ships, aircraft, mine clearance, and Naval Special Warfare or SOF operations.

2. Class B. Installations that threaten assault forces in the ship-to-shore movement and assault of the beach.

3. Class C. Installations that threaten or oppose LF operations after landing or affect enemy ability to continue resistance.

4. Class D. Installations that will not be fired on prior to D-Day.

5. Class E. Installations that must not be destroyed (unless specifically ordered by CATF) either because of probable future use by own forces or for humanitarian reasons.

(b) Priority is assigned to each target indicating the desired sequence of attack. CATF issues the general policy regarding the priority of targets to be attacked by air and naval surface fire. CLF establishes target priorities for those targets that are of primary concern to the LF. Usually, targets are prioritized as follows:

1. Targets capable of preventing the execution of the plan of action of the ATF or its elements.
2. Targets capable of immediate serious interference with the plan of action to the ATF or its elements.
3. Targets capable of ultimate serious interference with the plan of action of the ATF or its elements.
4. Targets capable of limited interference with the plan of action of the ATF or its elements.

(3) Selection of Means. CATF selects and allocates ships and air elements to deliver fire support and CLF selects and allocates artillery units to deliver required fires. Selection and allocations by both commanders are interdependent; therefore, continuous liaison and exchange of information are essential.

(4) Timing of Missions. The supported commander determines the time when fire support missions are to be executed.

(5) Adjustment of Fire. The supported commander designates targets and timing of fires and recommends type and amount of ammunition to be used. Adjustments are accomplished by supporting units.

(6) Nuclear and Chemical Weapons. Guidance for the allocation and employment of nuclear and chemical weapons is usually contained in the initiating directive. See Chapter X for further discussion related to NBC operations.

b. CLF uses the same target classification and prioritization system for artillery as was discussed above for air and naval surface fire. However, because

artillery does not become a factor in the initial phase of the assault, its usefulness is primarily against rapidly changing targets of opportunity. By the time artillery is established ashore, the targets of the ATF Target List should, to a very large extent, have already been serviced. Artillery support, therefore, does not readily lend itself to a considerable amount of target preplanning.

c. Once Navy and LF requirements are determined and prioritized, the CATF develops an ATF Target List. As appropriate, the ATF Target List is further submitted to the JFC's Joint Target Coordination Board (JTCCB) for inclusion in the Joint Target List. Targets approved by the JTCCB will be reflected in the final ATF Target List distributed to all concerned.

d. See Joint Pub 3-09, "Doctrine for Joint Fire Support," for additional pertinent joint fire support guidance.

6. Fire Support Coordination. Efficient, economical, and safe employment of supporting arms fires requires detailed planning and coordination and is achieved through the application of the following principles:

- a. Exploit all available targeting and fire support assets.
- b. Use the most effective means.
- c. Furnish the type of support requested.
- d. Avoid unnecessary duplication or prevent mutual interference.
- e. Provide adequate support.
- f. Provide rapid coordination and flexibility.
- g. Use the lowest echelon capable of coordinating and controlling the requisite support.
- h. Safeguard friendly forces, which may include forces already operating in the landing area prior to the arrival of the ATF. Coordination with forces already operating in the landing area should be specifically addressed in the initiating directive.
- i. Safeguard friendly installations.



- j. Ensure airspace coordination.
- k. Ensure continuous flow of targeting information.

7. Fire Support Planning Responsibilities

a. CATF is responsible for:

- (1) Coordinating planning for employment of all supporting arms.
- (2) Preparing coordinated naval surface fire and air plans for all phases of the operation.
- (3) Establishing a supporting arms coordination agency during planning and execution of the operation.
- (4) Establishing a supporting arms coordination agency at subordinate naval echelons when appropriate.

b. CLF is responsible for:

- (1) Establishing at each appropriate level of the LF a fire support agency to discharge and implement LF fire support coordination responsibilities throughout the planning and execution of the operation.
- (2) Determining the supporting arms requirements of the LF, and ensuring requirements are integrated with the planned scheme of maneuver of the LF.
- (3) Coordinating requests for supporting arms for the LF.
- (4) Providing coordinated requests for naval surface fire and air support to CATF.
- (5) Preparing the artillery fire plan.

c. When Air Force forces participate, the Air Force commander is responsible for:

- (1) Providing staff representation as indicated in Chapter II, subparagraph 4f.
- (2) As directed by CATF, establishing a tactical air control system or elements thereof.

8. Coordinating Agencies

a. Fire support agencies:

- (1) Navy--Supporting Arms Coordination Centers (SACC).
- (2) Marine Corps--Fire Support Coordination Centers (FSCC).
- (3) Army--Fire Support Elements (FSE).
- (4) Air Force--Air Support Operations Center (ASOC) at Army corp, and Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) at Army divisions, brigades, and battalions.

b. Agencies for coordinating air support:

- (1) Navy--TACC (afloat).
- (2) Marine Corps--TACC (ashore).
- (3) Army--Battlefield Coordination Element (BCE) at Army level.
- (4) Air Force--TACC.

c. The operation of these agencies during the assault discussed in Joint Pub 3-02.1.

9. Attack Group Commanders. When attack groups are formed and separate landing areas are designated, each attack group commander is normally assigned responsibility for control and coordination of supporting arms in his landing area.

10. Air Support Planning. Air support operations require extensive planning and must be integrated into the ATF operation plan whether provided by air elements assigned directly to the ATF or by elements that are not a part of the ATF.

a. Principal Considerations for Air Support Planning

- (1) Control of Air Operations. A tactical air control system capable of providing control of all aircraft operating in the AOA must be organized. Plans must provide for the orderly transfer of control as the amphibious operation progresses (see subparagraph 10g).

(2) Achievement of Local Air Superiority. Air superiority in the landing area is a prerequisite for success of an amphibious operation. Because complete destruction of enemy air strength is rarely attained, all elements of the ATF must be provided with air defense throughout the operation. Plans must provide for the coordination and integration of friendly and/or allied forces' air defense capabilities and assets.

(3) Access to Control Agencies. Plans must ensure that all LF command levels are provided direct access to the agency controlling aircraft providing CAS. Intermediate ground command levels may countermand or modify requests of subordinates for CAS at the time the requests are made to the CAS control agency.

(4) Deployment of Air Units. Plans should provide for early seizure of enemy or use of host-nation or allied air facilities and sites that can be used by land-based aviation units for air operations, early warning, and air control.

(5) Aircraft Availabilities. Initially, Navy and Marine air support and Army attack helicopters must operate from ships or forward operating bases within range of the landing area. Air Force air support may include long-range, land-based aircraft not requiring forward operating bases and aerial refueling aircraft that can extend the range of these and shorter-range aircraft as well. As facilities for operating land-based aircraft increase within the AOA, such aircraft will fulfill an increasing amount of total air support requirements.

b. ATF Air Plan. The ATF air plan is developed by CATF's staff and published as an annex to the ATF operation plan. The ATF tactical air officer, in close coordination with the CLF, is responsible to CATF for preparation of the air plan and subsequent direction of the air effort within the AOA. The ATF air plan includes provision for:

(1) Pre-D-Day Operations

(a) Achievement of air superiority within the landing area, to include neutralization or destruction of enemy air defense capabilities.

(b) Neutralization or destruction of enemy forces within the landing area.

(c) Interdiction of enemy forces capable of interfering with assault landings.

(d) Airborne MCM.

(e) Naval gunfire air spotting.

(f) ASW.

(g) Combat search and rescue (CSAR).

(h) Reconnaissance.

(i) PSYOP.

(2) D-Day Operations

(a) Pre-H-Hour neutralization of beaches, DZs, HLZs, and LZs.

(b) Transport and assault helicopter operations.

(c) Tactical airlift operations.

(d) CAS, both preplanned and immediate.

(e) SEAD.

(f) Air observation and spotting.

(g) Operations of TAC(A), Forward Air Controllers (Airborne) (FAC(A)), and Forward Air Controllers (FAC).

(h) Continuation of applicable pre-D-day air operations, including maintaining local air superiority and interdiction of enemy forces.

(i) Battlefield illumination.

(j) Air delivery of supplies.

(k) Medical evacuation.

(l) CSAR.

(m) Air defense.

(n) Attack helicopter operations.

(o) Other assault support.

(3) Post D-Day Operations. Post-D-day air support operations can only be planned in general, because actual requirements will depend on the tactical situation ashore. Applicable pre-D-day and D-day operations are continued.

(4) Other General Air Planning Provisions Applicable To Air Operations

(a) Comprehensive plans for aircraft control, air warning, and air defense.

(b) Movement of forces and supplies into the AOA by air transport.

(c) Early arrival of liaison and observation aircraft in the landing area.

(d) Rehabilitation or construction of airfields and V/STOL-capable locations in the landing area.

c. CATF Air Support Planning Responsibilities. CATF air support planning responsibilities are:

(1) Determination of Naval Requirements for Air Support. Naval requirements remain generally constant throughout the operation. Air superiority must be attained and maintained in the AOA, and movement of enemy forces into, and within, the AOA must be curtailed or halted. There is a continuing requirement for defense against enemy air, surface, and subsurface attack.

(2) Determination of Navy Air Support Capabilities. CATF determines air support capabilities of Navy air elements of the ATF in terms of sorties, endurance, and payloads.

(3) Coordination of Air Requests. CATF coordinates all requests for air support originating within the ATF and allocates aircraft sorties in accordance with previously determined capabilities. If requirements exceed capabilities, CATF requests additional support from the higher authority designated in the initiating directive.

(4) Preparation of the ATF Air Plan. The ATF tactical air officer, in close coordination with the CLF, prepares the ATF air plan, which then becomes the basis for the air plans of subordinate commanders.

d. CLF Air Support Planning Responsibilities. CLF responsibilities in planning air operations in support of LF are:

(1) Determination of LF Air Support Requirements. CLF coordinates all requests for air support originating within the LF and submits the consolidated requirements to CATF.

(2) Determination of LF Air Support Capabilities. CLF determines the air support capabilities of organic LF aviation units in terms of sorties, endurance, payloads, and provides this information to CATF.

(3) Submission of Deployment Plans. CLF submits recommendations to CATF for deployment of nonembarked and embarked LF aviation to the AOA.

(4) Preparation of an Air Plan. CLF prepares a supporting air plan based on the ATF air plan.

e. Air Support Planning Responsibilities of the Air Force Commander. The Air Force commander's air support planning responsibilities are:

(1) Providing Air Force staff representation to CATF as indicated in Chapter II, paragraph 4f.

(2) Determining the air support capabilities of assigned units in terms of sorties, endurance, and payloads; and providing this information to CATF and CLF.

(3) Submitting recommendations to CATF for the deployment of assigned Air Force units.

(4) Coordinating requirements for supporting air missions and/or capability, and submitting the consolidated requirements to the CATF.

(5) Preparing a supporting air plan based on the ATF air plan.

(6) Preparing a supporting plan to establish the necessary links with other in-theater air control systems.

f. Sequence of Air Support Planning. The usual sequence for planning air support is as follows:

- (1) Submission of consolidated LF air support requirements.
- (2) Determination of naval requirements.
- (3) Consolidation by CATF of all requirements for air support.
- (4) Computation of number and types of aircraft and amount and kinds of armament necessary to fulfill requirements.
- (5) Determination of the combined air support capabilities of the entire ATF.
- (6) Request by CATF, if necessary, for additional air support from immediate superior in the operational chain of command.
- (7) Adjustment of plans by CATF, in consultation with CLF and Air Force commander, if additional air support means cannot be made available.
- (8) Assignment of forces to support consolidated air support requirements and formulation of the ATF air plan.
- (9) Formulation of subordinate air plans, including details appropriate to the issuing command level.

g. Control of Air Operations. Control of the airspace and air operations in the AOA is exercised by various commands as the operation progresses.

- (1) Control of Pre-D-Day Air Operations. Upon activation of the AOA and at CATF's request, control of air operations within AOA airspace is the responsibility of the CATF. If advance force operations are being conducted, the CATF normally exercises control through an advance force commander (the position and the ability to exercise control by the CATF or the advance force commander is one of the determinants of the AOA activation time). The advance force commander controls operations in the AOA airspace through an air control agency tailored and trained for the command's mission. It may consist of the TADC afloat, an airborne command and control element, or dedicated duty controllers of liaison officers on an airborne C3 asset.

(2) Shift of Control Upon Arrival of CATF. The CATF assumes responsibility for local airspace control and the conduct of all air operations on arrival in the AOA. Control is exercised through the air control agency (which may be an airborne element or the TACC (afloat)). Subordinate TADCs, as designated, monitor air control circuits in readiness to assume all or part of the duties of the air control agency if required.

(3) Control by Attack Groups. When attack groups are formed for operations in widely separated landing areas, the CATF normally delegates to each attack group commander authority for control of airspace and air operations in the area surrounding his respective landing area. The attack group commander exercises control through a local air control agency, either consisting of airborne elements or the TADC in the attack group flagship. Overall direction of air support, as it applies to the operation as a whole, is retained by the CATF and exercised through the CATF's air control agency.

(4) Shift of Control Responsibility. As the operation progresses, facilities are established ashore by CLF or other commander who has the capability to control air operations that parallel those of CATF. When ashore control facilities are complete, CATF will pass control of air operations in the AOA ashore to CLF or other commander who has the capability to control such operations. To facilitate an orderly transfer of control, specific control functions may be incrementally passed as facilities ashore become operational. After passage of control ashore, afloat control centers continue to monitor air circuits in a standby status, ready to assume control in event of an emergency.

(5) Shifting Air and Airspace Control in Termination of the Amphibious Operation. Upon termination of the amphibious operation, the ATF will be dissolved, the AOA disestablished, and control passed in accordance with the initiating directive.

11. NSFS Planning. NSFS can play a vital role in the successful accomplishment of the ATF mission by destroying or degrading enemy capabilities before D-day, protecting and covering the assault on D-day, and supporting the offensive action of forces during actions ashore after D-day.



a. General NSFS Requirements. The following basic requirements are necessary for effective employment of NSFS and must be considered during NSFS planning:

- (1) Sufficient ships and spotting assets assigned to accomplish the mission.
- (2) Sufficient quantities and types of munitions to maintain the required volume of fire.
- (3) Adequate sea room and suitable hydrographic conditions in the Fire Support Areas (FSA).
- (4) Maintenance of local air and naval superiority.
- (5) Observation of the target areas by one or more agencies.
- (6) Separate communication circuits between ships, LF units ashore, and ground and air spotters.
- (7) Sufficient time to effect essential destructive fires.
- (8) Complete integration of NSFS with the LF scheme of maneuver, artillery and air operations, and associated naval operations.
- (9) Accurate and common charts and maps with grid locations held by ATF ships, LF, and ground and air spotters.

b. NSFS Planning Responsibilities

- (1) CLF is responsible for determination of LF requirements for NSFS, including selection of targets to be destroyed in the preassault operations and the selection and timing of targets to be fired on in support of operations. After determining requirements of NSFS, fire support means, and priority of targets, CLF presents them to CATF.
- (2) CATF is responsible for preparation of the ATF NSFS plan, based on both NSFS requirements presented by CLF and naval requirements. The plan includes allocation of NSFS ships.
- (3) When attack groups are formed and separate landing areas are prescribed, each attack group commander will normally plan NSFS in his landing area under the overall guidance of CATF.

c. The Sequence of NSFS Planning. NSFS plans are usually formulated in the following sequence:

- (1) Overall LF requirements are submitted to CATF.
- (2) Naval requirements are determined.
- (3) CATF consolidates LF and naval requirements and subsequently determines the number of ships required to support the operation. Insofar as practicable, LF requirements are approved and provisions for meeting them are incorporated in the ATF NSFS Plans.
- (4) CATF may request additional NSFS ships, if the ships and aircraft available cannot satisfy overall supporting arms requirements. If additional NSFS ships cannot be made available by higher authority, CATF, in consultation with CLF, adjusts plans accordingly.
- (5) After final allocation of NSFS ships, detailed LF and naval requirements are formulated and submitted to CATF and NSFS plans are prepared.

d. Pre-D-Day NSFS Plans. The primary objectives of pre-D-day NSFS are physical destruction of vital enemy defenses and ground installations to prepare the landing area for the assault and destruction and/or interdiction of enemy lines of communication. The following elements are normally included:

- (1) Assignment of ships to FSAs and zones of responsibility.
- (2) Announcement of ammunition allowances and plans for replenishment.
- (3) NSFS communications instructions.
- (4) Designation of targets, provision for damage assessments, and acquisition of target intelligence.
- (5) Provision for availability of spotting aircraft and UAVs, and reference to appropriate air support plans.
- (6) Provision for coordination with minesweeping, LF reconnaissance, Naval Special Warfare, other SOF, and air operations.
- (7) Provision for recording target information and reporting latest intelligence data to CATF.

e. D-Day NSFS Plans

(1) The major purposes of the D-day NSFS plans are, in conjunction with other supporting arms, to provide for:

(a) Closely timed neutralization of remaining enemy defenses to cover waterborne and helicopterborne ship-to-shore movements and support of the landing, deployment, and advance of troops.

(b) Prompt and effective delivery of call fires in direct support of troop units.

(c) Interdiction of enemy C3 systems.

(d) Isolation of the landing area and defense against enemy counter offensive action by massed fires on likely avenues of approach.

(2) Essential elements of the plan include:

(a) Initial assignment of ships to FSAs and zones of fire for direct or general support of specific LF units.

(b) Location of helicopter approach and retirement lanes and necessary coordinating instructions.

(c) Announcement of ammunition allowances and plans for replenishment.

(d) NSFS communication instructions.

(e) Provisions for spotting aircraft.

(f) Instructions for massing fires of several ships.

(g) Provisions for coordination with ship-to-shore movement, minesweeping, LF reconnaissance, Naval Special Warfare and SOF, artillery, and air operations.

f. Post-D-Day NSFS Plan. NSFS continues to support the landing after D-day by assignment of ships for:

- (1) Call fires in direct support of troops ashore.
- (2) Close and deep fires in general support.
- (3) Delivery of NSFS on the flanks of the landing area and fires against targets of opportunity.

g. Employment Techniques. Both prearranged and call fires are extensively employed in pre-D-day, D-day, and post-D-day naval gunfire operations. Plans for NSFS of LF operations are prearranged as far as practicable, but provision for call fires must also be made.

(1) Prearranged Fire. Fire that is formally planned and executed against targets or target areas of known location. Such fire is usually planned well in advance and is executed at a predetermined time or during a predetermined period of time.

(a) Close Supporting Fire is fire placed on enemy troops, weapons, or positions which, because of their proximity, present the most immediate and serious threat to the supported unit. In supporting either initial landings or follow-on ground operations, close supporting fires must continue until LF or naval gunfire spotters are able to conduct call fires. Major considerations in planning close supporting fires include:

1. Terrain. The natural and manmade features of an area that affect both enemy and friendly military operations. Terrain affects the ability of supporting arms to provide direct and indirect fires; e.g., terrain masking, defilade positions, and line-of-sight.

2. LF Safety. Provision must be made for lifting fires ahead of and to flanks of advancing forces at prescribed distance as determined by the effective casualty radius of ammunition used, type of fuze, overhead or flank fire, battery of dispersion, probable error, and estimated rate of LF advance.

3. Observation of LF Advance. Direct observation provides a basis for modification of schedules of fires when the advance of the LF is faster or slower than the planned rate.

4. Size of Target Areas. Size of the target area determines amount of ammunition required to obtain and maintain neutralization or suppression.

(b) Deep Supporting Fire is fire directed on objectives not in the immediate vicinity of US forces to neutralize and destroy enemy reserves and weapons, and to interfere with enemy command, supply, communications, and observations. Major factors that must be considered in planning prearranged deep support are the availability of suitable NSFS ships and the availability of spotting aircraft.

(2) Call Fire. Fire delivered on a specific target in response to a request from the supported unit. Plans for providing call fires require assignment of Shore Fire Control Parties (SFCP) to infantry battalions, reconnaissance units, and provisional independent task units that will employ NSFS and provision for air spotters, as required. Special NSFS staff representation is required at all higher elements of the LF. Direct support ships are designated to provide call fires for specific ground maneuver elements through their assigned SFCPs while general support ships are provided to answer calls for fire from the supported unit and subordinate elements as directed.

h. Provision for Control of Naval Surface Fire. Control of NSFS is exercised by, and passes to, different commands and agencies as the operation progresses.

(1) Pre-D-Day Bombardment. The advance force commander is responsible for NSFS control during pre-D-day operations. Control is normally exercised through the advance force SACC.

(2) Transfer of Control Responsibility Upon Arrival of CATF. CATF assumes responsibility for control of NSFS on arrival in the landing area. Control is exercised through the ATF SACC.

(3) Shift of Responsibility for Control to CLF. When CLF establishes the necessary facilities ashore, responsibility for control of NSFS may be passed to him. CLF is then authorized to assign NSFS missions directly to the NSFS ships and to supervise execution of these missions. In this case, CATF (or a designated subordinate) retains responsibility for:

(a) Allocation of available ships for fire support duties.

(b) Ammunition resupply and logistic support of NSFS ships.

(c) OPCON of NSFS ships.

i. Conduct of Fire. When ships are placed in direct or general support of LF units, selection of targets, timing of fires on the targets, specification of line of fire (when not inconsistent with safe navigation), and adjustment of fires are functions of the supported LF unit.

(1) A ship placed in direct support of a specific troop unit (normally a unit of battalion size) delivers call fire missions, which are conducted and adjusted by a SFCP or assigned air spotter working with the supported unit, and delivers prearranged fires as requested.

(2) A ship placed in general support of a specific LF unit (normally a unit of regimental or larger size) conducts fire missions directed (usually in general terms) by the naval gunfire team of the supported unit. Fires delivered in general support, if observed, are adjusted by an assigned spotting agency. Fire missions against targets of opportunity are conducted directly by the NSFS ship providing general support as provided for in the plans. Specific fire missions may be ordered by the commander responsible for controlling NSFS. For prearranged fires, these orders are issued in the form of a schedule of fire.

12. Artillery Planning. Field artillery, including field artillery rockets and missiles, is organic to the LF. Because of its capability to provide close and continuous fire support, along with its ability to mass fires rapidly on critical points, field artillery plays a major supporting role. Plans should provide for early landing and entry into

action of LF artillery units. Only those aspects of artillery that are of mutual interest to Navy and LF units are included in this discussion.

a. Requirement for Field Artillery Support. The amount of field artillery support provided will exert a considerable influence on calculations of the overall supporting arms requirements of the ATF. It is important to remember, however, that artillery must be first landed ashore before its effects can be considered in supporting arms requirements calculations. CLF determines the amount and type of artillery required to support an operation.

b. Responsibility. CLF is responsible for planning for employment of field artillery. Field artillery that can be emplaced before the main landing may serve to reduce the D-day NSFS and air support requirements. Because artillery fires must be carefully integrated into the overall supporting arms plan, as well as the maneuver of the supported LF units, the LF artillery fire plan must be formulated concurrently with plans for NSFS and air support. Applicable naval echelons must be kept informed of contents of these plans.

c. Support of Local Naval Operations. Field artillery may be able to support local naval operations such as MCM operations, thereby releasing NSFS units for other missions.

d. Plans for Landing of Field Artillery. Employment of field artillery units involves handling and transporting heavy equipment and ammunition. Because of the importance of early entry into action of these units, plans should include provisions for maximum utilization of landing ships, amphibious vehicles, landing craft, and aircraft for the landing of field artillery.

e. Field Artillery Air Observation. To exploit its full capability, field artillery requires air observation as soon as firing units are in position. Plans should include provision for assignment of adequate spotting aircraft for this purpose, until such time as the LF observation aircraft (including UAVs) are able to operate in the landing area.

### 13. Countermechanized Defense Planning

a. The threat posed by enemy mechanized forces against the LF warrants special emphasis on effective use of

NSFS, obstacles and barriers, air, artillery, and antimechanized units. Planning for countermechanized defense involved the coordination of active means with passive means.

b. When the enemy mechanized capability is significant, a countermechanized plan should be prepared that provides for coordination of all effective defense means to block enemy mechanized reinforcements during the initial assault. Special consideration should be given to the early landing of forces equipped with material for creating obstacles and establishing blocking positions.

c. Ammunition requirements are to be addressed as early as possible in the planning stage. Against large mechanized formations, ammunition expenditures for countermechanized fire will be large and significantly impact planning for air, NSFS, and artillery support.



## CHAPTER VII

### COUNTERAIR OPERATIONS PLANNING

1. Purpose. To provide guidance regarding the planning and employment of joint forces in counterair operations in the AOA.

2. Air Threat

a. Complete appreciation of the amphibious operation must include recognition of its chief limitation; i.e. the vulnerability of the landing force during the early hours of the operation. Strength ashore must be built up from zero to a coordinated, balanced force capable of accomplishing the assigned mission.

b. Throughout the amphibious operation, but most particularly during the highly vulnerable ship-to-shore movement phase, success may hinge on the ATF's capability to integrate both land-based and maritime air defense resources to isolate the AOA from hostile air platforms and airborne weapons attack to the maximum extent possible.

c. Enemy fixed-wing aircraft and cruise missiles pose a primary threat to friendly forces and must be countered to gain control of the air and to protect US forces. Additionally, enemy SOF, airborne forces, and attack helicopters pose a threat in their capability to attack friendly forces independently and in conjunction with hostile ground forces. Tactical ballistic missiles employing conventional, chemical, or nuclear warheads also pose a significant threat to the ATF. Lethal unmanned, nonballistic systems, such as glide bombs or unmanned aerial vehicles, and nonlethal air vehicles with electronic or psychological warfare capabilities, also threaten the ATF. Airborne surveillance systems could provide the enemy with warning, reconnaissance, and other capabilities to increase friendly force vulnerability.

3. Counterair Operations

a. As described in Joint Pub 3-01.2, "Joint Doctrine for Theater Counterair Operations," counterair operations are those operations conducted to attain and maintain a desired degree of air superiority by the destruction or

neutralization of enemy forces. Counterair operations in the AOA include such measures as the use of fighter-interceptors, bombers, cruise missiles, surface-to-air missile and gun systems, and electronic countermeasures to destroy the air or missile threat either before or after it is launched. Other measures that are taken to minimize the effects of hostile air actions are cover, concealment, dispersion, deception (including electronic), and mobility.

b. Both offensive and defensive actions are involved. The former range throughout enemy territory and are generally conducted at the initiative of friendly forces. The latter are normally conducted in or near to the AOA and are generally reactive to the initiative of the enemy air forces.

#### 4. Airspace Control and Coordination of the Counterair Effort

a. Airspace control is a vital factor in all operations and planning must include procedures to facilitate routing and recognition of friendly aircraft. Establishment of identification and weapons engagement zones and the direction of noncombat air traffic should be arranged to permit maximum use of air defense resources while offering the least inhibition to offensive counterair and other tactical operations penetrating and returning from enemy territory.

b. As noted in paragraph 16 of Chapter II and Appendix A, responsibilities for directing the overall air effort of the amphibious operation and relationships between participating entities change as the operation moves from phase to phase.

(1) Before activation of the AOA, all counterair forces of the ATF, supporting CVBG(s), and other supporting counterair forces operating in support of the ATF are normally integrated under a single officer in tactical command (OTC) or CWC and antiair warfare commander (AAWC).

(2) Once the AOA has been established, the CATF and supporting CVBG commander(s) each exercise full, independent CWC responsibilities in their respective operating areas. Other counterair forces not operating within the AOA or in support of CATF revert to the commander exercising control authority designated by higher authority.

(a) AADC responsibilities may be further delegated to the AAWC in the CATF's CWC

organization or other entity possessing the requisite sensor and communications capability to effectively carry out these functions.

(b) As counterair assets are established ashore in the landing area, CLF will request from the CATF that the landing force be given AAW responsibility in the landward sector of the AOA, the dimensions of which will have been predetermined during the planning phase. With the CATF's concurrence, the AADC will pass responsibility of this landward sector to the LF control agency while retaining overall AAW responsibility in the AOA as well as coordination duties with the CVBG AAW organization and the JFC's overall ACA.

(3) As a prelude to the termination of amphibious operations, total AAWC responsibilities in the AOA will be transferred to the TACC (ashore), or TACC, upon CLF's request and CATF's concurrence. The afloat AAWC will normally then be given sector AAW responsibility for the seaward sector of the AOA, under TACC (ashore), or TACC, direction until the AOA is dissolved.

## 5. Counterair Operations Planning

a. A coherent air defense plan, therefore, requires the CATF to conduct coordinated planning with a supporting CVBG commander, if that CVBG is not part of the ATF, and any adjacent JFC to establish a robust command and control arrangements. Effective counterair operations require the development of a control system that must be able to function despite high volume friendly aircraft operations within the AOA and the difficult overland target detection environment present in the amphibious operation.

b. The precepts, priorities, and details for air defense planning are covered in the Joint Pub 3-01 series.

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## CHAPTER VIII

### LOGISTIC AND/OR COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT PLANNING

1. Purpose. To provide guidance on the responsibilities, sequence, and general and functional area considerations of logistic and CSS planning in an amphibious operation.

2. General

a. Logistics is the science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, logistics includes those aspects of military operations that deal with:

(1) Design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel.

(2) Movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel.

(3) Acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities.

(4) Acquisition or furnishing of services.

b. CSS is the essential logistic functions, activities, and tasks necessary to sustain all elements of operating forces in an area of operations. At the tactical level of war, CSS includes but is not limited to that support rendered by service troops in ensuring the operational and tactical levels of supply, maintenance, transportation, health services, and other services required by aviation and ground combat troops to permit those units to accomplish their missions in combat. Operational logistics encompasses those activities at the operational level of war that link strategic objectives to tactical objectives on the battlefield. (Joint Pub 4-0, "Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations").

c. This chapter addresses both external logistic support provided to the ATF and the narrower focus of CSS of forces operating within the AOA. Differing primarily in the point of application, the two terms essentially have the same broad meaning and, therefore, have been combined

for use in this chapter; i.e., logistics and/or CSS (except where distinction is necessary).

d. Combatant commanders are authorized to exercise directive authority over logistic operations within their areas of responsibility (AOR). This authority is designed to ensure effective execution of approved operation plans, provide effectiveness and economy in operations, and prevent or eliminate unnecessary duplication of facilities and overlapping of functions among Service component commands. Under wartime or crisis conditions, or when critical situations mandate diversion from the normal logistic process, this authority is expanded to authorize commanders of unified commands to use all facilities and supplies of all forces assigned to their commands as necessary for the accomplishment of their missions.

e. Each Service is responsible for the logistic support of its own forces except when logistic support is otherwise provided for by agreements with national agencies or allies or by common, joint, or cross-Servicing arrangements. Within the operational chain of command, logistic and/or CSS responsibilities are fulfilled by the Services through their respective Service component commanders at the unified command level.

f. Logistic and/or CSS planning for an amphibious operation embraces the determination of material and personnel requirements, their procurement and distribution to support the operation, and necessary administrative procedures incident thereto. Planning must consider both the intertheater and intratheater logistic and/or CSS systems established by the combatant commanders and the provision of requisite logistic and/or CSS for forces within the ATF.

g. CATF is responsible for determining overall ATF logistic and/or CSS requirements. Those that cannot be supported from resources available within the ATF are directed to the applicable Service component through the chain-of command as established in the initiating directive.

h. Additional guidance for joint logistic operations is contained in Joint Pubs 4-0 and 3-02.1.

3. Logistic and/or CSS Planning Responsibilities. CATF, CLF, and commanders of other major forces assigned to the ATF have specific and often complementary logistic and/or CSS planning responsibilities as listed below.

a. CATF is responsible for:

- (1) Consolidation of the logistic and/or CSS requirements of all elements of the ATF.
- (2) Determination of requirements that can be met by ATF resources. Those which cannot are directed to the appropriate Service through the chain of command.
- (3) Determination of priorities and allocation of the means to meet consolidated logistic and/or CSS requirements of the ATF.
- (4) Notification of appropriate responsible agencies early in the planning phase of any unusual requirements for routine or special supplies or equipment.
- (5) Preparation of the overall embarkation schedule to include plans for the assembly of shipping at points of embarkation.
- (6) Review and approval of embarkation and loading plans.
- (7) Organization of assigned logistic and/or CSS shipping into echelons as necessary to ensure continuing support of the LF tactical plan.
- (8) Provision of the means required for the establishment and maintenance of an adequate logistic and/or CSS system in the AOA.
- (9) Development of plans for handling enemy prisoners of war (EPW) and civilian evacuees and internees as well as establishing policy for the administration of civilian affairs if not prescribed by higher authority.
- (10) Development of the overall plan for health services, including medical treatment and evacuation of casualties.
- (11) Preparation of the logistic and/or CSS annex to the ATF operation plan.

b. CLF is responsible for:

- (1) Determination of overall logistic and/or CSS requirements of the LF, including units, special equipment, and shipping.
- (2) Determination of logistic and/or CSS requirements that cannot be met by the LF and submission of these requirements to CATF.
- (3) Determination and allocation of the means to meet logistic and/or CSS requirements of the LF.
- (4) Development of plans for the assembly of supplies and equipment to be embarked, to include the supplies and equipment of other forces that the LF is responsible for embarking.
- (5) Preparation of the LF embarkation and ship loading plans and orders, in coordination with CATF.
- (6) Planning for the coordination of logistics and/or CSS required by all elements of the LF.
- (7) Preparation of the logistic and/or CSS annex to the LF operation plan.

c. Commander(s) of other major forces of the ATF are responsible for determining their logistic and/or CSS requirements and submitting to CATF those requirements that cannot be met internally.

4. Logistic and/or CSS Planning Considerations and Factors. The requirement for afloat forces to provide continuing, coordinated support to the LF during the period in which its logistic and/or CSS system is primarily sea-based has a significant influence on logistic and/or CSS planning for an amphibious operation. ATF/LF logistic and/or CSS systems must have the following characteristics: responsiveness, simplicity, flexibility and mobility, economy, attainability, sustainability, and survivability. Development of effective logistic and/or CSS systems must take into account the planning considerations and factors listed below.

a. Planning Considerations

- (1) Orderly assembly and embarkation of personnel and material based on anticipated requirements of the LF scheme of maneuver ashore.



(2) Establishment and maintenance of a logistic and/or CSS system in the AOA that will ensure adequate support to all elements of the ATF and later support of base development and garrison forces as directed.

(3) Impetus of logistic and/or CSS support from the seaward, or the rear, and directed forward to the point of application at the using unit.

(4) Preservation of tactical security during logistic and/or CSS planning. Nonsecure logistic and/or CSS planning can compromise tactical surprise and landing location.

b. Planning Factors

(1) Character, size, and expected duration of the contemplated operation.

(2) Target date.

(3) Characteristics of the AOA

(a) Terrain and hydrography.

(b) Climate and weather conditions.

(c) Distance from supporting logistic bases.

(d) The ability of the indigenous population to provide support to the LF, or conversely, its need for support from the LF.

(e) Existing and potential facilities in the AOA.

(f) Transportation system capabilities, adaptability, and condition.

(g) Availability of local material resources.

(4) Enemy capabilities

(a) Freedom from enemy interference to lines of communication.

(b) Vulnerability of support functions to enemy action.

(5) Strength and composition of the LF.

- (6) Capabilities of the LF to perform logistic and/or CSS functions.
- (7) Progressive increase in the level and form of logistic and/or CSS required by the buildup of forces in the landing area.
- (8) Support required to provide for EPWs.
- (9) Availability of logistic and/or CSS means.
- (10) Compatibility, capability, and requirements of support systems.
- (11) Availability of communications means.
- (12) Elements of base defense and garrison plans may require consideration (see paragraph 14).
- (13) Requirements for rehabilitation or construction of aviation installations within the AOA or within supporting distance.
- (14) Possible impact of NBC warfare on the provision of logistic and/or CSS.
- (15) Availability of AE amphibious shipping and provision of AFOE and follow-up shipping to support the amphibious operation.

5. Logistic and/or CSS Planning Sequence. Logistic and/or CSS planning begins with receipt of the initiating directive. Planning must be coordinated and proceed concurrently with operations planning during development. The major steps, although overlapping, will usually be accomplished in the following general sequence:

- a. CLF determines overall LF logistic and/or CSS requirements.
- b. CLF determines the LF logistic and/or CSS requirements that can be met by the LF and submits those that cannot to CATF.
- c. CLF determines overall Navy requirements.
- d. Commanders of other major forces determine overall logistic and/or CSS requirements and submit to CATF those requirements that cannot be met internally.

e. CATF consolidates the requirements of the ATF, designates those that can be met by Navy forces, and then examines the ability of the ATF as a whole to fulfill other requirements.

f. Allocates available logistic and/or CSS means. If sufficient means are not available, consultation is required with interested commanders to adjust plans or to conclude that additional means must be requested from higher authority.

g. ATF, LF, and other major force commanders formulate logistic and/or CSS plans.

6. Logistic and/or CSS Plans. Certain logistic and/or CSS matters in an amphibious operation affect only one element of the force and are therefore prepared individually by that element. Such plans are not covered in this publication. The remainder of this chapter addresses logistic and/or CSS plans concerning more than one element of the ATF that require a certain degree of coordination, including:

- a. Embarkation and loading plans.
- b. Plans for supply and resupply, to include provision for debarkation and unloading.
- c. Medical and dental plans.
- d. Landing Force Support Party (LFSP) Plan.
- e. Pontoon causeway and lighterage planning.
- f. Engineer planning.
- g. Civil Engineer Plan.

7. Embarkation and Loading Plans. See Chapter XI and Joint Pub 3-02.2, "Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Embarkation." Special embarkation problems or considerations associated with the loading of USCINCTrans-provided common-user shipping include:

- a. Limited advance information concerning the ship's loading characteristics (deck diagrams, trim and stability tables, etc.).
- b. With regard to commercial charters (especially foreign flagged charters):

- (1) Ship masters and crews unfamiliar with military cargo (especially munitions).
- (2) Ship owners, masters, and crews not willing to sail into a hostile area. The owners, masters, and crews of both US and foreign flagged ships may accept the charter but have second thoughts about sailing into an AOA once hostilities commence.
- (3) Ships not structurally designed to carry heavy outsized cargo like tanks (i.e., car carriers).
- (4) Ships not having an instream offload capability. All USCINCTrans-provided common-user shipping to the ATF should be capable of instream offload or the capability to augment their instream offload must be organic to the ATF (e.g., Auxiliary Crane Ship (T-ACS), Roll-On/Roll-Off (RO/RO) discharge facility (sea-state sensitive)).
- (5) Acceptability of commercial charters (Coast Guard inspections).
- (6) The type of charter (time and voyage) and the stipulations in the contract (charter).

#### 8. Supply Planning

a. The necessity to provide continuing and coordinated supply to the LF when its logistic and/or CSS system is primarily sea based requires that the Navy and LF develop a control and delivery system that will ensure the LF is provided the necessary supply support.

b. Supply planning is accomplished under two major categories:

(1) Initial Supply. Initial supply comprises the supply levels carried as accompanying supplies in assault shipping (both AE and AFOE) to provide required initial support for the assault landing and initial operations ashore. Plans for initial supply include:

(a) Navy Forces. Provision for:

1. Loading ships with naval supplies to prescribed levels as far as practicable before embarkation of troops.

2. Rations for LF while embarked.

3. Special facilities required for (a) refueling and maintenance of aircraft, landing craft, amphibious vehicles, and other equipment, and (b) fuel for boat pools, beach groups, transportation pools, and other naval shore components.

4. Water for the LF ashore until supply from sources ashore are available.

(b) LF. Provision for:

1. Assembly and loading of supplies to be landed with the LF in such a manner to ensure availability for issue before and during debarkation.

2. Establishment of pre-positioned emergency supplies (floating dumps) containing limited amounts of selected supplies for emergency issue.

3. Establishment of selected prestaged supplies for ship-to-shore movement by helicopter (prestaged helicopter-lifted supplies).

4. Selective discharge of required supplies in accordance with the landing plan.

5. Positive and efficient control of the movement of supplies from ship to desired locations ashore.

6. Establishment of supply dumps ashore and the distribution of those supplies to forward units.

(2) Resupply. Resupply comprises the supply support transported to the landing area in follow-up shipping and aircraft to support tactical operations ashore.

(a) Planning provides for items to be introduced into the landing area by either one or a combination of the following systems:

1. Maintaining shipping and aircraft in an on-call status to be ordered into the AOA by CATF, as requested by CLF.

2. Establishing fixed schedules for bringing shipping or aircraft into the landing area automatically as planned by CLF.

(b) Factors affecting decision in this regard depend primarily on:

1. Distance between the landing area and loading points.

2. Availability of forward sheltered ports or anchorages for use as regulating stations.

3. Limitations imposed by naval convoy escort availability.

4. Availability of aircraft for resupply.

5. Hostile activity on lines of communication.

6. Plans for civil engineering support, including facilities required to accommodate supplies and the phase-in of LF units to handle supplies.

7. Availability of manpower, material handling equipment, and lighterage to unload shipping.

c. Supply plans are prepared by CATF, CLF, and commanders of other major forces in the ATF and include the following:

(1) Primary source(s) of supply and responsibilities.

(2) Levels of supply to be carried in AE, AFOE, and follow-up shipping.

(3) Control and distribution of supplies.

(4) Plan for landing supplies.

- (5) Resupply responsibilities, schedules, and sources.
- (6) Air delivery responsibility, procedures, and methods.
- (7) Captured material disposition instructions.
- (8) Salvage instructions.

9. Medical Planning Considerations

a. Medical planning for an amphibious operation must provide for maintaining the health of the command and for evacuation and hospitalization of sick and wounded.

b. Medical planning must consider:

- (1) Overall mission of forces and the supporting medical mission.
- (2) Policies of higher commanders.
- (3) Characteristics of the landing area such as terrain, climate, seasonal variations, endemic diseases and their incidence rates, sanitary conditions, and cover available; and corresponding preventive medicine, hygiene, and sanitation measures that must be instituted before and during the operation.
- (4) Physical and psychological factors affecting personnel.
- (5) Lines of communication and evacuation.
- (6) Evacuation policies and procedures.
- (7) Specific medical supplies required.
- (8) Specific planning for blood and colloid requirements.
- (9) Size and types of forces involved and their tactical employment.
- (10) Casualty estimates (i.e., include disease and nonbattle injury (DNBI) rates and the CLF estimates of combat casualties).

- (11) Medical personnel available and status of training.
- (12) Medical facilities and forces outside the AOA to provide medical support.
- (13) Medical needs for civilian population and EPWs.
- (14) Need for augmentation by naval medical units.
- (15) Requirements for casualty receiving and treatment ships (CRTS).
- (16) Aircraft and landing craft to provide ambulance facilities.
- (17) Requirements for designation and medical augmentation of specific amphibious and USCINCTrans-provided common-user shipping to meet anticipated hospitalization requirements.
- (18) Other medical facilities available for use within the AOA.

c. Medical Planning Responsibilities

- (1) ATF is responsible for preparation of plans, taking into account the following:
  - (a) Provision for medical service, including supplies, to all embarked personnel during the period between embarkation and landing.
  - (b) Provision for medical personnel, supplies, and equipment for all naval units based ashore and not attached to the LF.
  - (c) In conjunction with CLF, development of a procedure for medical regulation of casualties within the landing area.
  - (d) Seaward evacuation from the beach, including communications to support evacuation and medical regulation of casualties, receipt of patients, hospitalization afloat within the landing area, and initial casualty reporting for the Navy, LF, and other forces.
  - (e) Coordinating, with the JFC, patient evacuation by ship or air from the AOA to



medical facilities outside the AOA (see Joint Pub 4-02, "Doctrine for Health Services Support in Joint Operations," and Joint Pub 4-01.1, "JTTP for Airlift Support to Joint Operations").

(f) Air transport of medical supplies and equipment, which may involve intratheater airlift assets (see Joint Pub 4-02).

(g) Formulation, in conjunction with CLF, of an evacuation policy for the operation.

(h) Establishment of medical requirements and standards for the civilian population in the AOA, when not prescribed by higher authority.

(i) Positioning and employment of hospital ships (TAH) within the AOA.

(2) CLF identifies and coordinates medical support requirements for the LF with CATF. Once command is passed ashore, close coordination with CATF is still required. CLF is responsible for preparation of plans taking into account:

(a) Provision for medical service to LF personnel before embarkation.

(b) Assistance to ship's medical department by providing medical personnel to care for LF personnel while embarked.

(c) Evacuation to the rear and from the AOA as directed.

(d) Provision for medical service to all personnel ashore in the AOA who are not otherwise provided for.

(e) Determination of the medical service requirements of the LF that must be furnished by the Navy, and submission of these requirements to CATF.

(f) Submission of recommendations to CATF concerning establishment of the evacuation policy for the operation.

d. Medical Plans

(1) The ATF medical plan is usually issued as an appendix to the ATF operation plan. It provides for medical service to all elements of the ATF in accordance with the foregoing responsibilities and includes the following:

(a) A statement of the medical situation.

(b) A statement of the evacuation policy.

(c) Clear delineation of the medical responsibilities, organization, and employment of the several elements, with particular emphasis on shifts in responsibility during the several phases of the operation and measures necessary to ensure coordinated medical action by all elements of the ATF.

(d) Provision for medical services and medical regulation in the AOA.

(e) Medical supply, including operation of medical supply dumps afloat and provision for preplanned replenishment, repair, and exchange of supplies and medical equipment.

(f) Procedures and responsibilities for keeping necessary records and reports of the flow of casualties.

(g) Provision for medical service to patients while afloat.

(h) Provision for obtaining medical intelligence.

(i) Measures for preventive medicine, NBC warfare medicine, hygiene, and sanitation.

(j) Procedures for distribution of whole blood and colloids.

(k) Organization and operation of the ATF medical regulating system in accordance with the ATF medical regulating plan.

(2) The LF medical plan is issued as an appendix to the LF operation plan and includes the following:

- (a) Organization and employment of LF medical facilities in support of the operation.
- (b) Provision for collection of medical intelligence.
- (c) Provision for zones and phases of medical responsibility.
- (d) Provision for casualty evacuation.
- (e) Announcement of the evacuation policy.
- (f) Provision for medical supply and resupply and its control.
- (g) Provision for whole blood and colloids supply from afloat units during the assault phase and later when facilities are established ashore.
- (h) Medical instructions to subordinate units of the command.
- (i) Measures for preventive medicine, NBC warfare medicine, hygiene, and sanitation.
- (j) Provision for medical reports and records.
- (k) Provision for mass casualty evacuation.
- (l) Organization and operation of LF medical regulating system in accordance with the ATF medical regulating plan.

(3) Medical Regulating Plan. This plan contains policies and procedures for evacuation and primary medical regulation of casualties to designated CRTSS in the landing area by medical evacuation helicopters or by surface craft and provides medical services in connection therewith. It also provides for aspects of secondary medical regulating evacuation of casualties by air to medical facilities outside the AOA or to rear areas following medical or surgical treatment onboard the CRTSS.

10. Dental Planning. Dental planning for an amphibious operation must provide for maintaining dental health and specialized care for casualties with injuries about the face and mouth.

a. The ATF dental plan is normally issued as part of the ATF medical plan. It provides for dental service to all elements of the ATF and includes the following:

- (1) A statement of the dental situation.
- (2) Clear definition of dental responsibilities, organization, employment, and the measures necessary to ensure coordinated dental action by all elements of the ATF.
- (3) Provision for dental and casual care to casualties evacuated from the landing area.
- (4) Dental supply to include provision for replenishment of supply and exchange of dental equipment.

b. CLF is responsible for dental care of the LF before embarkation and after landing in the landing area. The LF dental plan is normally issued as part of the LF operation plan and normally includes:

- (1) The organization and employment of the initial and follow-on LF dental facilities.
- (2) Provision for zones and phases of dental responsibility.
- (3) Provision for and control of dental supply and resupply.
- (4) Dental instructions to subordinate units of the LF.
- (5) Measures for preventative dentistry.
- (6) Provisions for dental reports and records.

11. Landing Force Support Party Planning. The LFSP is a task organization of the LF and includes shore party, helicopter support, and Navy elements. It is formed and equipped to facilitate the landing and movement of personnel, supplies, and equipment across the beach, into an HLZ, or through a port; the evacuation of casualties and EPWs from the beach; and the beaching, retraction, and salvage of landing ships and craft. Additionally, LFSP provides personnel and equipment to helicopter support teams or air mobile support parties to facilitate the landing of airborne, air assault, or helicopterborne forces, equipment, and

supplies and evacuation of selected casualties and EPWs from designated DZs and LZs. Its specific organization depends on the number of beaches or zones through which the LF will land and the size of the units using the beaches or zones. The structure may contain a surface assault support element (shore party) and a helicopter or air mobile assault support element. CATF provides the naval elements that operate with LF elements of the shore party; i.e., beach party, pontoon causeway, pontoon barge, ship-to-shore fuel elements, and elements of assault craft units. The naval elements are sourced from the NBG, a permanently organized command within the Navy's amphibious force, and will be placed under the operational control of the LF. The LFSP plan is formulated in conjunction with related naval plans to provide for accomplishment of LFSP tasks.

a. LFSP Planning Considerations. In developing the LFSP plans, consideration must be accorded the following factors:

- (1) LF scheme of maneuver and related landing plan.
- (2) Enemy disposition in the landing area.
- (3) Weather, terrain, and hydrographic conditions in the landing area and adjacent areas.
- (4) Requirements for beach development and clearance of DZs or LZs.
- (5) Requirements for multiple, separate logistic and/or CSS installations to provide for passive defense against NBC weapons.
- (6) Amounts and types of supplies and equipment to be landed.
- (7) Types of ships (amphibious and commercial), landing craft (displacement or air-cushioned), and aircraft to be unloaded.
- (8) Availability of personnel and equipment for LFSP operations.
- (9) Policy concerning disposition and method of handling EPWs.
- (10) Casualty evacuation and medical regulating policies.

- (11) Coordination required with other agencies.
- (12) Provision for inter-Service support.

b. LFSP Planning Responsibilities

(1) CLF is responsible for the conduct of the LFSP operations; however, both Navy and LF participate in and contribute to the development of plans for its organization and employment.

(2) CATF is responsible for preparation of related plans that provide naval facilities and means to ensure effective support of LFSP operations. Examples of such plans are the pontoon causeway and lighterage plan, unloading plan, casualty evacuation plan, and EPW evacuation plan. CATF also provides the naval elements required for LFSP operations. Integrated training of LFSP and beach party elements should be conducted before embarkation begins.

(3) CLF determines and presents his requirements for and support of LFSP operations to CATF. These requirements should be presented as early as possible in the planning phase.

(4) CLF is responsible for ensuring necessary LFSP activation orders are issued as required. Activation orders include, but are not limited to, the following:

- (a) Date that activation is effective.
- (b) Assignment of units and their reporting dates.
- (c) Organizational details.
- (d) Designation of commander.
- (e) Authorization of additional equipment required.
- (f) Assignment of training area.

c. LFSP Plan

(1) CLF and appropriate subordinate commanders prepare LFSP plans containing instructions for the functioning of the LFSP, including the beach party

and helicopter support team (HST), and/or air mobile support party requirements.

(2) The LFSP plan includes:

- (a) Organization and mission of the LFSP.
- (b) Instructions to all subordinate elements.
- (c) LFSP communication instructions.
- (d) Beach, DZ, and LZ defense instructions.
- (e) Administrative instructions.

## 12. Pontoon Causeway and Lighterage Planning

a. CLF is responsible for presenting to CATF requirements on which plans for pontoon causeways and lighterage support for the operation are based. CATF prepares the pontoon causeway and lighterage plan in consultation with CLF and in consideration of the following:

- (1) LF requirements.
- (2) Hydrographic conditions.
- (3) Availability of required types of sealift.

b. The plan includes details on loading, transportation, launching, initial operational assignment, and provisions for maintenance and salvage of the causeway and lighterage equipment. It also contains specific instructions for transition of control. The plan should include provisions for retaining lighterage in the area, after the assault shipping departs, for use in unloading follow-up shipping and for other support of tactical operations. The plan is published as an annex to CATF's logistic and/or CSS plan.

## 13. Engineer Planning

a. Tasks performed by LF engineer units in support of amphibious operations include:

- (1) Mobility Enhancement
  - (a) Lines of communication development, maintenance, and repair.

- (b) Obstacle breaching and reduction.
  - (c) Beach and beach support area preparation.
  - (d) Helicopter landing site preparation.
  - (e) Preparation of forward operating base and locations for conventional and V/STOL fixed-wing aircraft.
- (2) Countermobility Operations
    - (a) Obstacle construction.
    - (b) Minefield installation.
  - (3) Survivability Enhancement
    - (a) Hardening logistic installations.
    - (b) Field fortification.
    - (c) Camouflage.
    - (d) Deception measures.
  - (4) General Engineering
    - (a) Bulk fuel handling and storage ashore.
    - (b) Potable water production and storage ashore.
    - (c) Construction of temporary camps.
    - (d) Mobile Electric Power (MEP) production.
    - (e) Survey Control.

b. Combat and combat support engineer plans are included in appropriate annexes of the LF and ATF operations plans. They describe in detail the manner in which engineer support is to be provided during the amphibious operation.

14. Advanced Base Development and Garrison Planning.  
Advanced base development and garrison planning is carried out in accordance with directives of the JFC or higher authority and responds to requirements of the strategic plan. CATF may be required to include in the plan provisions for initiation of civil engineering support.



a. Planning Considerations. Preparation of advanced base development and garrison plans are covered herein only as they influence the planning for an amphibious operation. Because of the progressive nature of advanced base development, which may commence during the assault phase and continue after the amphibious operation is completed, a high degree of planning coordination must be achieved among the ATF, LF, logistic forces, and other major force commanders.

b. Planning Responsibilities

(1) CATF has planning responsibility for:

(a) Allocation of shipping from the ATF to lift advanced base development forces.

(b) Embarkation and movement of forces and equipment to the AOA.

(c) Allocation of means to control, support, and coordinate base and garrison operations during the amphibious operation.

(2) CLF is responsible during planning for:

(a) Plans to initiate advanced base development.

(b) Plans to coordinate, control, and support garrison operations ashore.

(c) Security measures.

c. Advanced Base Development and Garrison Plans.

Advanced base development and garrison plans are issued separately from plans for an amphibious operation. They are prepared by a level of command higher than the ATF. Pertinent extracts may be included in the ATF plan.

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## CHAPTER IX

### SHIP-TO-SHORE MOVEMENT PLANNING

1. Purpose. To define responsibilities, considerations, and sequence required for ship-to-shore movement planning.

2. General

a. Ship-to-Shore Movement. The plan for ship-to-shore movement is developed to ensure the landing of troops, equipment, and supplies at the prescribed times, places, and in the formation required by the LF scheme of maneuver ashore.

b. Scope. Ship-to-shore movement begins on the order of CATF and ends when the unloading of assault shipping is completed. Unloading operations may be divided into two periods:

(1) The assault and initial unloading period is primarily tactical and must provide quick response to LF requirements ashore.

(2) The general unloading period is primarily logistic oriented and emphasizes rapid completion of the unloading of personnel and material remaining in assault shipping.

c. See Joint Pub 3-02.1 and NWP 22-3 for additional pertinent guidance.

3. Relation to Other Planning. Detailed planning for the ship-to-shore movement can begin only after the LF scheme of maneuver ashore is determined. Ship-to-shore movement planning culminates with preparation of the landing plan and must be substantially completed before embarkation planning can begin. The landing plan and plan of supporting fires are carefully integrated. The landing plan provides for requisite logistic support of all forces. Maximum attention should be given to preserving operational security during logistic planning. Nonsecure logistic planning can compromise tactical surprise and landing location.

4. Responsibilities for Ship-to-Shore Movement Planning

- a. CATF is responsible for the preparation of the overall ship-to-shore movement and landing plan. This includes the allocation of ships and landing craft.
- b. CLF is responsible for determining ship-to-shore movement requirements and presenting them to CATF. He advises CATF of the availability of LF helicopters, raiding craft, and amphibious vehicles. CLF prepares the LF landing plans.
- c. When attack and landing groups are formed, ship-to-shore movement plans are prepared by the attack and landing group commanders in the same manner as CATF and CLF.
- d. Commanders of other major forces assigned to the ATF (including those assigned for movement to the AOA for initiation of tasks not part of the amphibious operation) are responsible for determining and presenting their requirements to CATF. Normally, these will be integrated by CLF into those of the LF.

5. Ship-to-Shore Movement Planning Considerations.

Principal factors that influence planning are:

- a. Basic requirements for providing maximum support for accomplishment of initial tactical objectives ashore, including maintenance of tactical integrity of the LF, and achieving the required degree of concentration or dispersion.
- b. Required degree of dispersion of assault shipping to include contemplated employment of a sea echelon plan (see Joint Pub 3-02.1).
- c. Availability of the means for landing.
- d. Protection available to the ATF.
- e.- Need to maintain sufficient flexibility to exploit weaknesses in enemy defenses.
- f. Availability and planned utilization of supporting arms.
- g. Need for speed and positive centralized control.

6. Ship-to-Shore Planning Sequence

a. LF requirements are submitted to CATF, along with a statement of available organic LF ship-to-shore means (helicopters, raiding craft, and amphibious vehicles).

b. Naval and sealift requirements are determined.

c. LF and naval requirements are consolidated.

d. If the means available cannot satisfy requirements for ship-to-shore movement, CATF and/or CLF must request additional support. If additional means cannot be made available by higher authority, plans must be adjusted accordingly.

e. The landing plan is prepared after the final allocation of means has been made. It represents the integrated sum of detailed plans for waterborne and helicopterborne ship-to-shore movement prepared by corresponding naval and LF echelons at all levels.

(1) The landing plan is composed of certain specific documents that present in detail all instructions for execution of the landing.

(2) These documents are incorporated in annexes to operation and administrative plans and orders. Altogether they constitute the landing plan.

7. Landing Documents. Documents that support the landing plan are prepared by both the Navy and LF. Preparation responsibilities, purposes, descriptions, and examples of Navy and LF landing documents that form the overall landing plan are provided in Appendix A to Joint Pub 3-02.1.

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## CHAPTER X

### NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL WARFARE PLANNING

1. Purpose. To provide planning guidance for employment of nuclear and chemical weapons and defense against NBC weapon use by the enemy.

2. General. Nuclear and chemical weapons employment planning is a part of overall supporting arms planning described in Chapter VI. The basic principles and procedures that guide the coordination of supporting arms in an amphibious operation do not change with introduction of nuclear and chemical weapons; rather, the extent of coordination is increased because of their magnitude and widespread effect. For additional pertinent joint planning guidance see Joint Pub 3-11, "Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense"; Joint Pub 3-12, "Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations"; and Joint Pub 3-12.1, "Doctrine for Joint Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons Employment."

3. Planning Guidance. Subject to National Command Authorities (NCA) approval and restrictions, the use of nuclear and chemical weapons may be contemplated. If so, the initiating directive will provide specific instructions pertaining to the allocation, employment, and control of these weapons, plus instructions for requesting additional assets.

#### 4. Planning Responsibilities

a. CATF is responsible for:

(1) Preparing nuclear and chemical fire plans, allocating available weapons to meet the needs of all forces assigned to the ATF, and establishing the level of reserve weapons.

(2) Planning the assignment of nuclear and chemical weapons, including their component parts, to various ships of the ATF. In conjunction with CLF, CATF makes plans to move nuclear weapons ashore when the tactical situation requires.

(3) Preparing and disseminating signal instructions related to nuclear and chemical weapons employment, to include communications codes to be used.

b. CLF is responsible for planning nuclear and chemical weapons support of LF operations ashore including selection of targets and timing of fires in relation to operations ashore. Likewise, CLF is responsible for planning for security, maintenance, and movement of nuclear and chemical weapons that are positioned ashore. After determining requirements, CLF presents them to CATF. They include:

(1) Target priority list.

(2) A detailed employment plan for each target specifying type of weapon, timing (for prearranged fires), and method of delivery.

(3) Type, number of on-call, and reserve weapons desired.

5. Planning Sequence. Based on the guidance provided in the initiating directive, the sequence of nuclear and chemical weapons support planning is as follows:

a. LF, then naval requirements are determined.

b. CATF consolidates these requirements and determines the number of nuclear and chemical weapons required to support the operation.

c. CATF will submit nuclear and chemical weapon requirements up the chain of command to obtain NCA authorization for employment in the contemplated operation.

d. Approved requirements are incorporated in the ATF nuclear and chemical fire plans.

e. CATF may request additional weapons if those provided do not satisfy requirements.

f. If additional weapons cannot be made available by higher authority, CATF, in consultation with CLF, adjusts plans accordingly.

g. After final allocation of nuclear and chemical weapons, CATF ensures that weapon release procedures are clearly understood by all concerned.

h. When nuclear and chemical weapons are to be delivered by a commander outside the ATF, CATF provides essential



information necessary for coordination. Detailed plans are then prepared by both commanders.

6. Planning Considerations. Major considerations in planning for nuclear and chemical weapons employment are:

a. Supply and Resupply of Nuclear and Chemical Weapons

(1) The initiating directive may indicate the allocation of nuclear and chemical weapons based on requirements or by specific allocation of number and types of weapons.

(2) The initiating directive will also specify procedures for requesting additional weapons if the allocation falls short of requirements.

(3) ATF planning must include procedures and responsibility for:

(a) Requesting additional allocations and lead time requirements.

(b) Pickup and delivery of weapons in the AOA.

(c) Receipt, inspection, and storage of weapons in the AOA.

b. Selection of Targets. The initial step in nuclear and chemical fire planning is the determination of possible targets. Requirements of the operation are the governing considerations in the evaluation and selection process.

(1) Preliminary Target Evaluation. A preliminary target evaluation is made before a target is selected to determine its suitability for attack by nuclear or chemical weapons and the extent of damage required.

(2) Target Analysis. For each target selected, information on weather and terrain is studied and analysis is then based on:

(a) Nuclear Weapons. Type and yield of weapon, desired height of burst, preferred means of delivery, time of delivery, number of weapons on target, and predicted effects on the target and adjacent areas.

(b) Chemical Weapons. Type of weapon and agent(s) desired, burst height or spray line release altitude required, preferred means of delivery, time of delivery, number of weapons per target, and predicted effects on the target and adjacent areas.

(3) Prioritization. When various selected targets have been analyzed, they are compared and a relative priority for their attack is determined.

c. Selection of Weapons and Delivery Means. Factors that govern selection of nuclear and chemical weapons and delivery means for any particular situation are:

(1) Availability of weapons (including number and types of weapons allocated for a particular operation) and time and space factors.

(2) Method of delivery (including aircraft, missiles, rockets, artillery, and naval surface fire). Each method provides a variation in accuracy of delivery, magnitude of burst (nuclear weapons), area coverage (chemical weapons), range, and all-weather capability.

(3) Target characteristics defined by type, composition, location, size, vulnerability, and value.

(4) Effect of weather and topographic condition on delivery and effectiveness of weapons.

(5) The safety of friendly forces and the effect of residual contamination on present and future operations.

d. Timing of Attack on Targets

(1) Prearranged Fires. These fires normally consist of prearranged pre-D-day and D-day nuclear and chemical fires against fixed targets within the landing area. Delivery of such fires in support of the LF must be timed so as to maintain the element of surprise, support the LF scheme of maneuver, and ensure safety for friendly forces.

(2) Targets of Opportunity. Attack of certain targets with nuclear or chemical weapons may be profitable for only a relatively short period of

time. The ability to successfully attack such targets of opportunity requires:

- (a) Good intelligence.
- (b) Rapid and accurate target analysis.
- (c) A system wherein the authority and capability to employ and coordinate the use of such weapons is assigned to the lowest echelon that conforms to national policy on the employment of nuclear and chemical weapons.
- (d) Maintenance of nuclear and chemical weapons in an advanced state of readiness.
- (e) Availability of rapid delivery means.
- (f) Designation of priority targets to areas such as avenues of approach to the beachhead or DZs, HLZs, cushion landing zones (CLZs), LZs, open flanks, and potential assembly areas for armored units.

7. Content of Nuclear and Chemical Fire Plans. Nuclear and chemical fire plans are usually separate documents with appropriate portions included in other supporting arms plans.

a. Nuclear and chemical fire plans contain information concerning fire support for the ATF. Each plan indicates nuclear and chemical fire support provided by elements outside the ATF, delineates the concept of nuclear and chemical fire support, and assigns nuclear and chemical delivery tasks to elements of the ATF.

b. Both plans may include poststrike analysis requirements, alternate targets, alternate weapons, and plans for fires on targets of opportunity.

8. Defense Against NBC Weapons

a. Defense against NBC weapons includes a combination of intelligence concerning the capabilities and limitations of the enemy, detection and destruction of its delivery systems, and defensive measures that will reduce the effect of enemy NBC weapons on the ATF when employed.

b. CATF is responsible for planning overall NBC defense measures for the ATF.

c. CLF is responsible for determining and prescribing the active and passive NBC defense measures required for the LF. CLF then presents to CATF the NBC defense measures that should be provided by other forces.

9. Preparation of the NBC Defense Plan. Operation plans include provisions for active and passive defense against NBC weapons. Particular factors that must be considered in planning for defense against NBC weapons include:

a. Active Defense

- (1) Employment of nuclear or conventional weapons to eliminate enemy NBC capabilities.
- (2) Increased air defense measures.
- (3) Increased air ground reconnaissance.
- (4) Increased COMSEC measures, including the use of appropriate countermeasures.

b. Passive Defense. Passive protective measures used against NBC weapons include emphasis on unit separation, dispersion, mobility, warning systems, detection systems, protective clothing and equipment, and decontamination systems. In addition, provisions are made for:

- (1) Training personnel in use of protective clothing and operating in a contaminated environment for extended periods, including individual and unit decontamination procedures.
- (2) Distribution of trained NBC defense personnel.
- (3) Decontamination of terrain.
- (4) Adequate monitoring system.
- (5) Creation of NBC salvage units.
- (6) Plans for handling mass casualties.

10. Conduct of NBC Defense. Effective NBC defense requires establishment of NBC defense centers by CATF and CLF at appropriate echelons of the ATF and LF, to:

- a. Collect, record, and evaluate dosimetry and casualty data.

- b. Control monitoring teams.
- c. Supervise decontamination installations.
- d. Advises commanders on NBC defense matters, including determination of ground zero, execution of special ship-to-shore movement provisions, and rescue and salvage operations.
- e. Analyze friendly positions and contaminated areas.

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## CHAPTER XI

### EMBARKATION PLANNING

1. Purpose. To provide general planning considerations for execution of embarkation in an amphibious operation.

2. General

a. The embarkation phase is the period during which the forces, with their equipment and supplies, are embarked in the assigned shipping.

b. The primary goal of this phase is the orderly assembly of personnel and material and their embarkation in assigned shipping in a sequence designed to meet the requirements of the LF concept of operation ashore.

c. Detailed guidance on the organization for embarkation, planning, and execution of this phase of the operation, including MSC support to amphibious operations, is provided in Joint Pub 3-02.2 and NWP 22-8, "MSC Support of Amphibious Operations."

d. See Joint Pubs 4-01.1, 4-01.3, and 3-02.1 for additional information pertaining to embarkation of airlifted forces in support of amphibious operations.

3. Embarkation Planning. Plans for assembly of assault shipping and movement of troops to embarkation points are prepared by CATF and CLF, respectively, as separate documents in the form of movement order and embarkation and loading plans. These plans must be coordinated and distributed as soon as possible to permit initiation of preliminary movements and preparations to ensure the embarkation is begun without delay.

4. Embarkation Planning Responsibilities

a. CATF is responsible for:

(1) Allocating assault shipping and sealift assets to the LF based on stated LF requirements.

(2) Organizing Navy forces for embarkation.

(3) Preparing movement orders for assault shipping and sealift assets to get them to embarkation points in accordance with embarkation plans.

(4) Reviewing and approving the overall LF embarkation and loading plans.

(5) Providing Ship Loading Characteristics Pamphlets (SLCP) to CLF.

(6) Developing plans for the procurement and coordination of means required from external agencies to support the LF and amphibious shipping during the embarkation.

(7) Advising CLF as to numbers of personnel and stowage requirements for material for Navy and other forces to be embarked with the LF.

b. CLF is responsible for:

(1) Determining LF requirements for assault shipping associated with the AE, AFOE, and follow-up and so advising CATF.

(2) Developing the LF organization for embarkation.

(3) Determining the means (personnel, equipment, material, etc.) required from forces afloat and external agencies at the embarkation points during loading and advising CATF.

(4) Designating shipping in which troop units will be embarked and preparing detailed embarkation and loading plans and submitting them to the CATF for review and approval.

c. Other major commanders are responsible for:

(1) Providing to the CATF and CLF lift requirements (i.e., personnel, equipment, and supplies) to be embarked in LF spaces for inclusion in the embarkation and loading plans.

(2) Organizing his forces for embarkation.

(3) Providing representation at all embarkation planning meetings and conferences.



## CHAPTER XII

### REHEARSALS

1. Purpose. To address requirements, planning considerations, and necessary security measures.
2. General. The rehearsal is the period during which the prospective operation is rehearsed for the purpose of:
  - a. Testing adequacy of plans, the timing of detailed operations, and the combat readiness of participating forces.
  - b. Ensuring that all echelons are familiar with plans.
  - c. Testing communications.
3. Requirements. The rehearsal phase may be conducted concurrently with other initial phases of the amphibious operation but most often is associated with the movement to the objective phase. It is during this period that one or more rehearsal exercises are conducted by the ATF or elements thereof, ideally under conditions approximating those to be encountered in the landing area. OPSEC being the major limiting factor, CATF's objective during this phase should be to exercise as much of the force and the operational plan as the situation permits. Joint Pub 3-02.1 provides further detail on various types of rehearsals.
4. Rehearsal Plans. Responsibility for preparation of rehearsal plans is the same as for preparation of the actual operation plan. Rehearsal plans should be issued separately from actual plans and require execution of the various tasks and functions paralleling those required during the actual operation. Planning considerations are as follows:
  - a. The number, nature, and scope of rehearsals will be influenced by the following considerations:
    - (1) The complexity of the tasks assigned to the ATF.
    - (2) The time available for rehearsals.
    - (3) The state of training of the forces.
    - (4) Suitability of available rehearsal areas.

(5) Special or unusual problems to be faced in the actual operation, the solution to which must be given special attention in rehearsals.

(6) Intelligence and counterintelligence consideration.

(7) Adequacy of the communication plan (See Chapter V).

(8) Logistic and/or CSS availability to replenish, replace, or repair assets used during rehearsals.

(9) The degree of OPSEC required to prevent disclosure of the intent to conduct, the timing of, or the location of the amphibious operation.

b. The dates on which rehearsals are conducted and the time allocated for them must provide for:

(1) Complete and careful execution of the entire rehearsal.

(2) Reembarkation of all troops, equipment, and supplies.

(3) Replenishment, repair, or replacement of equipment and supplies used during rehearsals including landing craft, ships, or aircraft.

(4) Critiques at all levels of command for evaluation and correction of mistakes.

(5) Time to revise plans in those areas that the rehearsal has disclosed to be necessary.

c. Selection of the rehearsal area is influenced by the following:

(1) Suitability.

(2) Similarity of the rehearsal area to the actual landing area.

(3) Feasibility of employing live ammunition.

(4) OPSEC.

(5) Susceptibility to enemy interference.

- (6) Location of the rehearsal area in relation to the AOA and to points of embarkation.
  - (7) Health conditions at the rehearsal area.
  - (8) Activity of civilians, vehicles, shipping, and small craft that may interfere with the rehearsal.
- d. Testing the adequacy of the communication plan will be influenced by the following:
- (1) The state of training of assigned communication personnel.
  - (2) The material status of communication equipment.
  - (3) OPSEC and COMSEC restrictions.
  - (4) Advanced training time available before the rehearsal phase.

## 5. Security

- a. Because of similarity between the rehearsal and the actual operation, strict security measures must be enforced during rehearsals. The reconnaissance for, selection of, and arrangements for the use of the areas in which rehearsals are to be held must be accomplished carefully. Deception measures may be necessary to ensure the security of the rehearsal.
- b. Unauthorized observation by personnel not part of the ATF, or unauthorized communications by personnel of the ATF with external agencies, must be prevented. Restricting the movements of personnel and ships, and establishing security perimeter patrols around the rehearsal area, both at sea and ashore, are primary means of achieving security. Special precautions must be taken to achieve communications security.
- c. The threat of reconnaissance satellites cannot be ignored. Execution of the rehearsal may have to be timed to coincide with those time periods when satellites cannot observe the rehearsal area, which may or may not coincide with planned execution times. Adjustment to the rehearsal (e.g., selection of misleading terrain, decentralized rehearsals, subordinate rehearsals separated by time and distance, and deliberately executed deception operations) may also be used to mask the purpose, location, and timing of the amphibious operation.

d. In order to avoid enemy detection of rehearsal activities, deception through the exploitation of computer assisted and manual war gaming should be considered. There are many events that take place in an amphibious operation which lend themselves to gaming. Denying the enemy observation of our intentions is considered critical.

## CHAPTER XIII

### MOVEMENT TO THE AMPHIBIOUS OBJECTIVE AREA

1. Purpose. To provide guidance on the organization of the ATF, planning responsibilities, and execution of the movement phase of an amphibious operation.

2. Method of Accomplishment. Movement of the ATF to the AOA includes departure of ships from loading points in an embarkation area; passage at sea; and approach to, and arrival in, assigned positions in the AOA. The ATF is organized for movement into movement groups, which sail in accordance with the movement plan on prescribed routes (with alternate routes designated for emergency use). Sortie and entry usually require special protective measures to prevent losses en route. Movement of the ATF to the AOA may be interrupted by rehearsals, diversion to staging areas for logistic and/or CSS reasons, or temporary stops at regulating stations or points. Execution of a postponement plan due to adverse weather or other unfavorable situations may necessitate additional movements of the ATF before its arrival in the AOA. Reference points (designated by code words) are used for control purposes. Charts and overlays, promulgated to all commands concerned during planning, govern the movement.

#### 3. Echelons of the Landing Force

a. Assault Echelon. The element of a force that is scheduled for initial assault on the objective area (Joint Pub 1-02). The AE is embarked on amphibious assault shipping and comprises the tailored units and equipment packages along with the maximum amount of supplies that can be loaded on assigned shipping that initiate the assault of the beachhead. These supplies will not be less than 15 days of supply (DOS). Other elements included in the AE are:

(1) LF elements of the Advance Force deployed with sufficient supplies to accomplish their mission and sustain themselves until subsequent forces arrive.

(2) LF elements (including airborne and air assault forces) positioned at support bases and airfields, in and adjacent to the AOA before the assault, that provide initial combat capability to support the

operation. These forces will be deployed with sufficient supplies to sustain themselves until arrival of the AFOE.

b. Assault Follow-on Echelon. In amphibious operations, that echelon of the assault troops, vehicles, aircraft equipment, and supplies, which, although not needed to initiate the assault, are required to support and sustain the assault. In order to accomplish its purpose, it is normally required in the objective area no later than 5 days after commencement of the assault landing (Joint Pub 1-02).

(1) The AFOE is divided into airlifted and sealifted forces and supplies. Time required in theater, suitability of material for air and sea lift, and lift availability, in that order, will determine transportation mode. Ability to mass personnel and material and the flexibility to change time and place of landing dictates maximum use of sealift.

(2) The AFOE is organized for landing and embarkation, respectively, based on anticipated requirements of operations ashore. Units, personnel, and material configured in shipload and planeload lots as dictated by landing and embarkation plans are then organized into movement groups.

(3) CATF is responsible for loading the AFOE. Units and their equipment are marshalled at their home stations and staged at ports of embarkation (POEs) in accordance with their time-phased deployment schedules. Materiel arriving from logistic sources is assembled at POEs under LF supervision.

(4) The requirement to containerize AFOE material cannot be overemphasized. The capability of commands to containerize AFOE material will range from 30 to 70 percent, depending on the source of accompanying supplies and time-phased force requirements (more time would allow more containerization).

(5) Although CATF and CLF are responsible for planning and executing embarkation, civilian stevedores, contracted by the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) at commercial ports and by the Navy at naval installations, are used to load USCINTRANS-provided common-user shipping.

(6) Ship unloading is directed by the normal ATF-LF ship-to-shore control and support activities (Primary Control Officer (PCO), Helicopter Direction Center (HDC), Tactical-Logistical Group (TACLOG), LFSP, etc). The size and organization of these agencies will change as the operation matures. Additional cargo handling battalion (CHB) and amphibious construction battalion (PHIBCB) forces are required to support the offload of merchant ships. As they become accessible, developed seaports and aerial ports are used to supplement traditional beach operations, expanding the ship-to-shore organization accordingly. CATF and CLF are responsible for debark and offload until termination of the amphibious operation. In the case of an amphibious assault, the amphibious operation would not normally be terminated until the entire AFOE is ashore. At that time, the responsibilities for offload of follow-up may be passed to another offload organization designated by higher authority (see subparagraph 4b(4)).

4. Organization for Movement. Based on the landing plan, the ATF organizes its ships, self-deploying aircraft, and airlift for embarkation and deployment. This organization is based on the time-phased force requirements of the LF, Navy task group(s), and other Service units in the objective area.

a. Transport Groups. Those elements that directly deploy and support the landing of the LF are functionally designated as transport groups in the ATF task organization. Transport groups provide for the embarkation, movement to the landing area, landing, and logistic and/or CSS support of the LF. They comprise all sealift in which the LF is embarked. Navy landing craft, lighterage, and cargo offloading and discharge systems to be employed in ship-to-shore movement are organic or attached to the transport groups.

(1) Multiple transport groups. If more than one landing area is established in the AOA, additional transport groups are formed; one transport group for each landing area. Transport groups are combat loaded to support the landing plan for the landing area assigned. Each transport group is assigned assault shipping and lighterage required by the landing force in its assigned landing area. Assault shipping may include amphibious shipping, MSC owned shipping, and/or MSC chartered commercial shipping.

(2) Commercial Sealift. Because of problems associated with the use of commercial chartered ships as assault shipping, whenever possible, ships owned by the US government should be selected first, followed by US-flagged commercial ships, and as a last resort, foreign-flagged commercial ships. Commercial ships employed as assault shipping may consist of the types of shipping resources listed below.

- (a) MSC's maritime pre-positioning ships (MPS).
- (b) MSC's common user ships (tankers/dry cargo).
- (c) Ships acquired by MSC, both US and foreign, through voluntary charter.
- (d) Ships provided to the Department of Defense through the Maritime Administration. These include the Ready Reserve Fleet (RRF) and the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) ships. The RRF has some specialty assets, such as the crane ships (T-ACS) ships and Offshore Petroleum Discharge System (OPDS) Tankers.
- (e) Ships provided to the Department of Defense through MSC's Sealift Readiness Program (SRP).
- (f) Ships requisitioned by the United States (includes US-flag and effective-US-control (EUSC) ships).
- (g) Allied and friendly shipping.
- (h) Other unique sealift assets from MSC's controlled fleet, such as hospital ships (TAH) and aviation logistic support ships (TAVB).

b. Movement Group(s). The ATF may be task organized into movement groups based on ports or embarkation, individual ship's speed, mission, and required arrival time in the landing area. Using the above criteria, all Navy forces outlined in Chapter II, paragraph 9, self-deploying LF aircraft, and self-deploying Air Force units are task organized into individual movement groups. A movement group will include all required screen and logistic support.



(1) Pre-D-Day Groups. Movement groups arriving before D-day comprise the advance force. Under certain conditions when surprise is essential, an advance force may not be employed. The advance force usually proceeds to the landing area as a single movement group. However, if there is a wide disparity of speed between various ships, or if part of the LF is included to capture nearby islands or other key terrain before the arrival of the main body of the ATF, it may be necessary to organize the advance force into two or more movement groups, each with a screen.

(2) D-Day Groups

(a) Movement groups arriving on D-day comprise the main body of the ATF consisting of the following groups, each with a screen:

1. One or more transport groups.
2. One or more combat logistic groups.
3. One or more support battle groups.

(b) Under certain conditions, it may be desirable to attach all or part of the combat logistic groups and support battle groups to the transport groups to provide protection from attack while en route. Protection from attack while en route may also be provided by forces not a part of the ATF.

(c) Elements of the ATF may be phased into the AOA by echelons, instead of being brought in simultaneously. The elements arriving on D-day may consist only of the forces required to initiate the assault landing. The remaining elements may be phased in during succeeding days.

(3) Post-D-Day Groups. Movement groups of the ATF scheduled to arrive in the AOA after D-day are usually organized into one or more fast movement groups and/or one or more slow movement groups, each with a screen.

(4) Follow-up. In amphibious operations, follow-up is the landing of reinforcements and stores after the assault and follow-on echelons have been landed. Follow-up is carried by ships and transport aircraft not originally a part of the ATF. The first follow-up elements may arrive in the landing area before unloading of the AE or AFOE shipping is completed. In such cases, OPCON of these elements is passed to CATF at a designated point before their arrival in the AOA. CATF retains OPCON of these elements until such time as the amphibious operation is terminated, or the elements are detached from the ATF, or another offload authority has been designated (see Joint Pub 4-01.6, "JTTP for Joint Logistics Over the Shore (JLOTS)," and Joint Pub 4-01.5, "JTTP for Water Terminal Operations").

## 5. Planning Responsibilities

a. Movement Plan. CATF is responsible for preparing a movement plan during the planning phase. In operations in which several attack groups are involved, CATF usually prepares a general movement plan in which coordinating measures are included as necessary. Subordinate force and group commanders prepare their own detailed movement plans. Because details of the movement depend on overall requirements of the operation, the movement plans are generally among the last plans to be completed during the planning phase. Each movement plan is normally included as an annex to the appropriate operation plan or order.

b. Coordination with Other Forces. Coordination between forces supporting an amphibious operation and the ATF is provided for in planning guidance issued by the JFC or higher authority.

c. Postponement Plan. Postponement may be necessary because of weather conditions or unexpected moves by major enemy forces after the ATF has started its movement from final staging areas toward the AOA. This contingency is provided for by execution of a postponement plan. Usually, postponement is on a 24-hour basis, which involves backtracking or diversion of ships into a designated sea area. A longer postponement may involve return of the ATF to a staging area. The postponement plan is prepared by CATF and is usually promulgated as a part of the operation plan.

d. Alternate Plans. The alternate plan for an amphibious operation may differ from the preferred plan and necessitate separate movement or approach plans. It is seldom possible to determine far in advance the time at which an alternate plan will be placed in effect. Movement plans must therefore be flexible enough for execution of alternate plans at any point between the final staging area and a point as close as practicable to the AOA.

6. Routes, Areas, and Geographic Reference Points. Information on all routes, areas, and geographic reference points governing movement must be promulgated to all commands and ships concerned. Those that are not prescribed by the JFC or higher authority are prescribed by CATF. This information is distributed on charts, overlays, and/or tables included in the ATF operations plan. Provision should also be made for issuing pertinent navigational information to ships entering the AOA that do not hold the operation plan.

7. Sea Routes to the AOA

a. Sea routes and route points to the AOA are determined by CATF, subject to approval by the fleet or area commander or designated representative. Routes selected should lead from all possible ports of departure to the AOA. Alternate routes are also provided to avoid interference between forces and to permit diversion should the threat of enemy attack or weather prevent use of primary routes. Routes and route points are given names to facilitate reference. Small-scale charts, which show sea routes and route points, are prepared and included in the operation plans and orders of appropriate ATF echelons.

b. All sea routes should be wide enough for a movement group commander to maneuver his group without interfering with the movement of other groups.

8. Sea Routes in the AOA. CATF determines sea routes in the AOA. During planning, sea route selection must take into consideration the missions of various task forces, groups, units, and elements in the AOA, so they may proceed expeditiously to their assigned stations without interference. Sea routes to the AOA should connect with sea routes within the AOA at designated points just outside the area screen to minimize interference during the deployment and movement of forces from their cruising or approach formations to assigned stations or areas.

a. Requirements. Sea routes in the AOA are selected that:

- (1) Ensure a minimum of interference among ships and formations.
- (2) Offer possibilities for good navigational fixes.
- (3) Are clear of mines and navigational hazards to the maximum extent possible.
- (4) Provide sufficient dispersion to prevent concentrations that would make the ATF a desirable target for mass destruction weapons.
- (5) Provide for economy of screening forces.

b. Charts. Large-scale charts showing the sea areas in and adjacent to the AOA must be identified by chart number. A listing of these charts and maps must be included in the operations plans and orders of appropriate echelons of the ATF to assist command and control functions.

9. Staging Areas. Plans may be made by CATF to use staging areas while en route to the AOA. The ATF may stage at one or more intervening ports for logistic and/or CSS support, emergency repairs, and/or final rehearsals. CATF selects the staging area required and ensures:

a. Necessary service craft are available.

b. A general logistic and/or CSS schedule is promulgated.

c. Anchorages are assigned based on consideration for expediting logistic and/or CSS while facilitating entry and sortie of movement groups staging through the area and avoiding vulnerable concentrations.

d. If rehearsals are to be held, provision is made for replacing or repairing urgently needed equipment or supplies that may be expended or damaged.

10. Sea Areas. In order to minimize the possibility of interference between various elements of the ATF and other supporting forces, sea areas in the vicinity of the landing area are selected by CATF and designated by JFC or higher commander. The sea areas are divided into a number of operating areas, falling under one of the following general types:

a. Ocean Operating Areas. Three kinds of ocean operating areas are selected:

- (1) Close support areas near, but not necessarily in, the landing area. These areas are assigned to support CVBGs, surface action groups, surface action units, and certain logistic and/or CSS elements.
- (2) Distant support areas located in the vicinity of the landing area but at considerable distance seaward of it. These areas are assigned to distant support forces, such as striking forces, surface action groups, surface action units, and their logistic and/or CSS groups.
- (3) Distant retirement area located to seaward of the landing area. This area is divided into a number of operating areas to which assault shipping may retire and operate in the event of heavy weather or to prevent concentration of shipping in the landing area.

b. Sea Areas in the Landing Area. Areas in the landing area extending outward to the inner limits of the close support areas are known as the sea areas in the landing area (see subparagraph 10c regarding the Sea Echelon Plan and Figure XIII-1). CATF designates the sea areas in the landing area and includes this information in the ATF operation plans and orders. The number and titles of the areas vary with each operation. Modern amphibious ships are capable of simultaneously launching helicopters and landing craft. Helicopter capable ships may be positioned in any of the following areas:

- (1) Antisubmarine Screening Area. An area where air and surface elements of the area ASW screen operate to protect amphibious shipping and NSFS units in support of the assault.
- (2) Outer Transport Area. In amphibious operations, an area inside the antisubmarine screen to which assault transports proceed initially after arrival in the objective area.
- (3) Inner Transport Area. In amphibious operations, an area as close to the landing beach as depth of water, navigational hazards, boat traffic, and enemy action permit, to which transports may move to expedite unloading.

(4) Helicopter Transport Areas. Areas to the seaward of the outer transport area, but preferably inside the area screen, for launching and/or recovering helicopters. The area should provide ample maneuvering room to maintain required relative winds during helicopter operations.

(5) FSAs. An appropriate maneuver area assigned to fire support ships from which to deliver surface fire support of an amphibious operation.

(6) Control Ship Stations. Stations assigned to control ships for controlling the ship-to-shore movement. These stations need not of necessity be on the line of departure (LOD) and may be assigned as underway sectors to avoid the shore-based threat.

(8) Assault Amphibian Vehicle Launching Areas. Areas located in the near vicinity and to seaward of the LOD to which landing ships proceed to launch Assault Amphibian Vehicle (AAVs).

(9) Causeway Operating Areas. Causeway operating areas, which include causeway launching areas, are normally on the flank of boat lanes and include both a sea and beach component. These areas are used for causeway launching, placement and anchoring for vehicle offload, and causeway ferry operations.

(10) Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) Launching Area (CLA). CLAs are located in the transport area and the sea echelon area. The CLA, the sea component, and CLZ, the beach component, are connected by transit lanes.

c. Sea Echelon Plan. A sea echelon is a portion of the assault shipping that withdraws from, or remains out of, the transport area during an amphibious landing and operates in designated areas to seaward in an on-call or unscheduled status. The sea echelon plan seeks to implement the requirements of dispersal and reduction of MCM efforts (see Figure XIII-2). It includes:




Figure XIII-1. Typical Positions and Areas Assigned Units Off Landing Beaches When Sea Echelon Plan is Not Used




Figure XIII-1 (Continued). Typical Positions and Areas Assigned Units Off Landing Beaches When Sea Echelon Plan is Not Used



(1) Sea Echelon Area. An area to seaward of a transport area from which assault shipping is phased into the transport area and to which assault shipping withdraws from the transport area. Determination of the size and location of the sea echelon area for a particular operation is based on:

- (a) Dispersion as a defense against NBC attack.
- (b) Antisubmarine protection.
- (c) MCM effort required.

(2) Transport Area. In amphibious operations, an area assigned to a transport organization for the purpose of debarking troops and equipment. It consists of mineswept lanes, areas, and channels leading from a sea echelon area to the beaches. The maximum number of ships in the transport area is directly limited by dispersion requirements, availability of forces for MCM operations, and local hydrography and topography. Landing ship areas, helicopter transport areas, control ship stations, and FSAs are dispersed within this swept area.

#### 11. Regulating Points

a. A regulating point is an anchorage, port, or ocean area to which AE, AFOE, and follow-up shipping proceed on a schedule and at which they are retained by CATF until needed in the transport area for unloading. It also serves as a rendezvous point to which shipping proceeds when empty to await makeup of a convoy or movement group for movement toward bases outside the AOA.

b. The passage of designated movement groups may be interrupted by stopping at regulating points where they wait until called forward to the landing area by CATF. In this manner, congestion of ships in transport areas off assault beaches can be reduced. This contributes greatly to passive defense against weapons of mass destruction.




Figure XIII-2. Typical Positions and Areas Assigned Units Off Landing Beaches When Sea Echelon Plan is Used

12. Geographic Reference Points. A complete system of geographic reference points for the AOA and surrounding ocean area is formulated during planning. The points may be used to indicate routes (particularly where the direction of the routes change), to depict the shape and location of the areas discussed above, and for certain locations not related to areas or routes. Reference points are given in code letters and are defined by exact latitude and longitude.

13. Security. In formulating plans for movement to the AOA, sea routes and rendezvous points are carefully selected. Sea routes through minable waters, or close to enemy shore installations from which enemy air, surface, or subsurface attacks on movement groups can be readily carried out, are avoided if practicable. To minimize probability of detection, routes should be planned to avoid known or probable areas of enemy surveillance. Leeway must be given in allocation of transit time to permit evasive courses to be steered by movement groups if it becomes necessary to avoid surface or subsurface threats.

14. Passage at Sea. A movement group carrying all or portions of the AE or AFOE frequently contains a larger number of ships than is generally present in a nonamphibious organization of ships. In addition to those described in standard Navy publications, special cruising and maneuvering instructions required for security of the force and safety of individual ships may be issued by appropriate commanders, including commanding officers of ships.

15. Navigational Aids. Because of the exact timing required during movement to the landing area and the necessity for exact positioning of ATF elements in the landing area, accurate and precise navigation is mandatory. Special navigational aids are frequently necessary to supplement normal aids. Examples of such special aids are:

- a. Radar reflector buoys to mark swept channels, limits of minefields and dangers to navigation.
- b. Beacons or lights on shore to mark exact points of land or to mark channels. These are usually placed after the assault but may be placed beforehand by reconnaissance or SOF units.
- c. Reference ships to guide groups and individual ships to their proper stations in the landing area.

d. Guide ships to lead groups of ships through dangerous waters.

e. Corrected charts based upon latest hydrographic surveys.

f. Global Positioning System (GPS) equipment.

16. Protective Measures En Route. The LF must arrive in the landing area without critical reduction of its combat power. Measures necessary for protection of the movement groups of an ATF making a passage at sea include all those taken by any naval task organization while cruising at sea utilizing the CWC concept for organization.

17. Logistic and/or CSS En Route. The characteristics of nonamphibious ships, such as destroyers and minesweepers accompanying the movement groups, require special consideration with regard to logistic and/or CSS en route. Logistic and/or CSS replenishment may be accomplished at a staging area or at sea. The larger amphibious ships normally carry sufficient fuel for limited replenishment of other ships.

a. Essential Logistic and/or CSS Practices. Requirements for providing logistic and/or CSS services, to elements of the ATF during movement to the AOA, dictate use of economy measures for fuel and water. When practicable and without delaying passage, ships returning to rear areas because of unforeseen developments should transfer as much fuel, water, ammunition, supplies, equipment, and spare parts as is feasible.

b. The LF has no major logistic and/or CSS problem during this period. It receives subsistence and is provided medical service by the naval ships in which embarked. Logistic and/or CSS activity is limited to service and maintenance of equipment and modification of supply plans as made necessary by directions of higher authority or changes in the tactical plan. Naval commanders should afford every assistance practicable to embarked LF commanders in servicing and maintaining LF equipment during movement to the landing area.

18. Training Exercises En route. An ATF proceeding toward an AOA conducts training exercises as are practicable during passage. Training conducted while a ship is underway is limited to activities that do not interfere with the ship's operating procedures. Embarked LF personnel will participate in ship's emergency drills and conduct:

- a. Debarkation drills.
- b. LF training as appropriate.
- c. Environmental conditioning to acclimate troops to anticipated conditions in the objective area.
- d. Physical fitness training.

19. Electronic Warfare En Route

- a. Within any restrictions imposed in the initiating directive and under the overall direction of the CWC, CATF controls employment of EW within the ATF during movement to the AOA. Significant features of EW include EMCON, radar time-sharing plans, electronic warfare support measures (ESM), intercept guards, ECM employment and readiness, alteration of electronic equipment parameters, COMSEC, intimate knowledge of anticipated enemy threat emitters, and capabilities for denying effective use of EW to the enemy. Control of EW is delegated to the commander of each movement group, who designates an electronic warfare control ship (EWCS) to enforce EW employment plans. This control includes communications of embarked LF, as well as that of the movement group. Varying degrees of EMCON are normally imposed during movement to the AOA.
- b. Radio transmitters, radar, and other electronic emitters must not be operated for drill, test, or other purposes until security restrictions are removed or without specific permission of the movement group commander. An emergency situation involving the immediate safety or security of one or more units of a group may necessitate the breaking of EMCON. This is normally the only exception to an established EMCON condition, unless otherwise provided for by CATF, and is usually of a temporary nature. Test and repair of equipment may be permitted by ship commanders, if positive measures are taken to prevent radiation beyond the ship's hull. Provisions are made, when practicable, for delivery of guard mail within movement groups and for air delivery of information to flagships of other movement groups.

20. Intelligence En Route

- a. An ATF, or elements thereof, may receive significant intelligence information while en route to the AOA. This

is particularly true in situations wherein forces exterior to the ATF, such as theater air, SOF, or carrier strike forces conduct pre-D-day operations in the AOA. Another valuable source of information is remote sensor data obtained from sensors tactically emplaced by air delivery or reconnaissance teams.

b. CATF and other naval commanders are responsible for timely dissemination of pertinent intelligence information to their counterpart commanders in the LF. Commanding officers of ships receiving such information are responsible for passing information pertinent to the LF to the senior LF commander embarked.

## 21. Coordination During Passage

a. In an amphibious operation, forces not a part of, but supporting, the ATF coordinate their operations with the passages of the various movement groups of the ATF to the AOA. This coordination must be provided for in the plans of the JFC or higher authority.

b. Individual commanders must remain aware of the need for maintaining the schedule and proceeding along prescribed routes. If deviation is required, the commander of the group determines whether to break EMCON to advise other commands of the situation. In certain situations, there may be serious consequences if friendly land or carrier-based search aircraft contact a force in a position that was not indicated in the pilots' briefing. All commanders must be fully cognizant of the general scheme and area of operations of other forces.

22. Approach to the AOA. Approach to the AOA includes arrival of various movement groups in the vicinity of the AOA and deployment of movement groups from cruising formations, reforming as necessary according to assigned tasks and proceeding to designated positions in the AOA. Frequently, the final approach and deployment are made under cover of darkness. During this critical period, additional protective measures are taken beyond those provided during passage. These provisions encompass:

a. Special air defense measures including timely air strikes against enemy airfields within range of the landing area.

b. Provision for location and destruction of enemy minefields and shore batteries that can interfere with the approach.

c. Selection of approach routes that avoid lengthy exposure to fire from enemy shore batteries.

d. Provision of ASW and anti-small-boat screens, and procedures for their establishment, as well as the intensification of other ASW operations.

23. Advance Force. During passage to the AOA, if the advance force is proceeding in more than one movement group, various movement groups remain as close to each other as their missions, tactical situation, and differences in their speeds will permit. Movement groups usually arrive in vicinity of the landing area at night, so they may reach their assigned positions in the landing area under cover of darkness or during early daylight hours.

24. Main Body. Approach of the main body of an ATF is usually more complicated than the advance force, because it involves a greater number of ships and because the arrival of the main body must be carefully timed relative to H-hour. If, however, an advance force has been employed, protective measures for the main body during the approach are generally easier because the advance force may have been in the area for some time and may have had time to take many of the necessary protective measures. In particular, minesweepers of the advance force will have normally swept enough of the landing area to permit the main body of the ATF to approach with less risk.

25. Demonstration Force. The same considerations apply to the approach of the demonstration force as to the approach of the main body.

26. Later Echelons of the Main Body. If the main body of the ATF arrives in the landing area in successive echelons, later echelons may arrive on a time schedule or may remain in a specific operating area until called forward by CATF as requested by CLF.

27. Coordination During the Approach

a. Proper coordination and timing is of utmost importance in the final stages of the approach of all elements of each movement group to prevent interference between elements and permit each to arrive at its position in the AOA at the proper time to commence its task. Careful, precise, and accurate navigation is essential. Additional complications for the main body may be caused by presence of an advance force already in the landing area. The advance force commander is

responsible to ensure that elements of the advance force do not interfere with the approach of the main body of the ATF.

b. When the ATF is composed of two or more attack groups, CATF coordinates the approach of the various attack groups, but the attack group commander is responsible for the movements of each individual attack group.



## CHAPTER XIV

### PREASSAULT OPERATIONS

1. Purpose. To provide guidance on the conduct of operations preceding the arrival of the main body in the landing area.

2. General

a. A preassault operation is an operation conducted in the amphibious objective area before the assault phase begins. It includes reconnaissance, minesweeping, bombardment, underwater demolition, and destruction of beach obstacles.

b. Preassault operations are conducted by subordinate elements of the ATF that are normally organized as an advance force. These operations may be conducted to:

- (1) Isolate the landing area.
- (2) Gain information about the enemy.
- (3) Prepare the landing area for the assault.

c. Although this chapter treats preassault operations, related supporting operations may be conducted by other fleet and theater forces before the arrival of the advance force (see Chapter I). Because such supporting operations contribute to overall preparations for the amphibious assault, they should be responsive to the requirements of the ATF. Therefore, paragraphs 3 and 4 contain considerations applicable to such supporting operations although they are not actually part of the amphibious operation itself.

3. Military Deception. The operations of all forces, before arrival of the main body of the ATF in the AOA, should be conducted so as to avoid disclosure of the selected ATF and LF objectives and landing areas. Deception needs to be accomplished at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. See Joint Pub 3-53 for a complete discussion.

a. Strategic Deception Operations. Strategic deception is conducted under the direction of the JFC or higher authority. CATF, normally having made appropriate

recommendations in regard to any planned supporting strategic deception operations, should be kept informed of their progress.

b. Tactical Deception Operations. Tactical deception may be conducted under the direction of the JFC or higher authority. However, tactical deception is normally conducted under the direction of CATF with forces assigned to the ATF. Tactical deception operations may be conducted by the advance force or the main body of the ATF.

4. Supporting Operations Before Arrival of the Advance Force. The nature of a specific amphibious operation may impose certain requirements that cannot be met by the forces assigned to CATF. To ensure that all requirements are fulfilled, CATF submits requests to the JFC or higher authority for accomplishment of tasks by forces not a part of the ATF. These operations are undertaken at the direction of the JFC or higher authority before the arrival of the advance force or before the arrival of the ATF if an advance force is not employed. Any or all of the following tasks may be accomplished before the arrival of the advance force.

a. Isolation of the landing area and attainment of air, surface, and subsurface superiority.

b. Destruction of specific targets in the AOA.

c. Harassment.

d. PSYOP (see Joint Pub 3-53, "Joint Psychological Operations Doctrine").

e. Collection of intelligence.

f. Destruction or neutralization of distant forces and installations.

g. Special operations conducted by SOF (see Joint Pub 3-05 for pertinent information).

h. MCM operations.

5. Advance Force Operations. An advance force is a temporary organization within the ATF. It is usually dissolved when the main body of the ATF arrives in the AOA. At this time, various elements of the advance force are reassigned to other parts of the ATF. Composition and functions of an advance force are set forth in Chapter II.

6. Decision to Employ an Advance Force. If not made by higher authority, the decision to employ an advance force is made early in the planning phase by CATF, after consultation with CLF. The decision is made after weighing the relative advantages of strategic and/or tactical surprise and requirements for preparation of the landing area. Extent of enemy fixed defenses, air defenses, mines, beach, HLZ obstacles, and shore defenses must be taken into account.

7. Responsibilities for Planning Advance Force Operations. After the decision to employ an advance force has been made, planning responsibilities of the various commanders are:

a. CLF is responsible for the preparation of LF requirements for NSFS, air strikes, pre-D-day seizure of supporting positions, demonstrations and reconnaissance, and submission of these requirements to CATF. CLF is also responsible for indicating the LF staff representation to accompany the advance force commander. If pre-D-day landings or demonstrations are to be conducted, CLF will direct the landing group commander of the advance force to report to the advance force commander for planning.

b. CATF is responsible for consolidating the requirements of the LF with those of other elements of the ATF and for issuing directives to the advance force commander who prepares detailed plans for operations of the advance force. CATF reviews these plans to ensure they meet overall requirements.

c. The advance force commander, designated by CATF, is responsible for detailed planning for advance force operations and ensuring plans fulfill overall requirements of the ATF. The advance force commander prepares NSFS, air operations, landing site reconnaissance, underwater demolition, MCM, and pre-D-day landing plans. Landings or demonstrations to be conducted are planned in consultation with the landing group commander of the advance force. In this planning, the advance force commander follows the same procedures CATF observes when planning the main landing.

d. The landing group commander plans LF preassault operations in conjunction with the advance force commander, following the same procedures CLF observes when planning the main landing.

8. Tasks to be Accomplished by the Advance Force. Tasks to be accomplished by the advance force may include any or all of the following:

a. Destruction of Defenses Ashore. The advance force destroys beach, DZ, HLZ, and LZ defenses; gun emplacements; control and observation posts; and any other installations that could be used by the enemy in opposing the assault landings. NSFS, air strikes, and artillery (if emplaced) are utilized for the destruction of enemy facilities.

b. Preparation of Sea Areas. The advance force prepares the sea areas in the landing area by conducting MCM operations and hydrographic surveys, as necessary.

c. Preparation of Beaches and Beach Approaches. The advance force prepares beaches and beach approaches for passage of landing craft, landing ships, and amphibious vehicles. All natural or manmade obstacles that can be detected visually, including mines that make passage and landing hazardous, are destroyed or marked. SEAL teams or Special Forces combat divers accomplish destruction, removal, or marking of obstacles in the sea approaches to and on selected beaches between the 3-1/2 fathom curve and the high-water line. The LF maintains close liaison with the SEAL teams or Special Forces combat divers to obtain current information on the landing beaches, beach approaches, and exits. In certain situations, at the request of CLF, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) qualified SEAL team personnel may assist in removal of land mines and obstacles on beaches above the high-water line.

d. Beach Reconnaissance. Beach reconnaissance is conducted by the advance force to collect the latest possible detailed information on beach gradients, obstacles (natural and manmade), tide and surf, depths of water, contour of the sea bottom, routes of egress from the beaches, soil trafficability, beach defenses, and suitability of selected beaches for landing. SEAL personnel are responsible for beach and hydrographic reconnaissance. Although certain LF reconnaissance units, such as Special Forces combat divers, have the capability to perform this mission, CATF must approve their employment.

e. Isolation of the Landing Area and Attainment and Maintenance of Local Air Superiority. Attacks by air, NSFS, SOF, and amphibious raids are made, when required,

against airfields, aircraft, communications and supply centers, shipping, and other critical targets, to isolate the landing area, attain, and/or maintain local air superiority.

f. Pre-D-Day Landings. Pre-D-day landings may be executed for reconnaissance, destruction, or harassment purposes; to capture off-shore islands or promontories for establishment of artillery, navigation aids, radar stations, or logistic/CSS bases; or for other reasons. Helicopterborne troop units, airborne or air assault, or SOF units may be employed effectively to accomplish pre-D-day reconnaissance of DZs, CLZs, HLZs, or LZs. Such landings are usually executed in the same manner as assault landings described in Chapter XV.

g. Demonstrations. Demonstrations may be conducted to deceive and confuse the enemy.

h. ECM. The advance force obtains maximum information on the enemy's communications and electronic facilities in, and adjacent to, the landing area. As warranted, these facilities are neutralized or destroyed to prepare the landing area for assault.

i. Meteorological and Oceanographic Information. The advance force will observe and transmit to CATF meteorological and oceanographic data in the AOA. Of particular concern are surf, sea state, and weather conditions in the intended landing area(s).

9. Considerations in Planning Advance Force Operations. In the preparation of advance force plans, the advance force commander considers:

- a. Sufficiency of means assigned by CATF for accomplishment of advance force tasks.
- b. Enemy air, surface, and subsurface attack capabilities.
- c. Requirements for beach, DZ, and LZ preparation and reconnaissance, incorporating the detailed troop requirements.
- d. Number, type, and priority of targets to be attacked.
- e. Requirements for MCM operations.

- f. Requirements for support of any pre-D-day landings to be made.
  - g. Necessity for coordination of supporting arms.
  - h. Requirements for ammunition supply and replenishment.
  - i. Requirement for observing, evaluating, and reporting results of supporting arms fires.
  - j. Provisions for continuous development, utilization, and dissemination of new intelligence and target information.
  - k. Estimates of indigenous civil population attitudes and capability to support operations.
10. Evaluation. CATF, CLF, and other major force commanders must be apprised of results of all preassault operations so assault plans can be modified if required.

## CHAPTER XV

### THE ASSAULT

1. Purpose. To provide general information and considerations pertaining to the assault phase of an amphibious operation.

2. General

a. The assault phase begins when sufficient elements of the main body of the ATF arrive in assigned positions in the landing area and are capable of beginning the ship-to-shore movement. The assault phase terminates with accomplishment of the ATF mission.

b. The assault phase encompasses:

(1) Preparation of the landing area by supporting arms.

(2) Ship-to-shore movement of the LF.

(3) Air and surface assault landings by assault elements of the LF to seize the beachhead and designated ATF and LF objectives.

(4) Link-up operations between surface and air-landed assault forces.

(5) Provision of supporting arms and logistic/CSS throughout the assault.

(6) Landing of remaining LF elements for conduct of operations as required for accomplishment of the ATF mission.

c. Detailed information concerning the assault phase as well as operations under unusual conditions (limited visibility and cold weather) is contained in Joint Pub 3-02.1.

3. Organization for the Assault. Organization for the amphibious assault is based on the parallel organization of the LF and the Navy forces that transport, land, protect, and support the LF. LF organization for landing is the specific tactical grouping of forces for the assault. Tactical

integrity of assault elements is maintained insofar as practicable during ship-to-shore movement. The corresponding organization afloat must parallel that of the LF to facilitate execution of the landing plan and the LF scheme of maneuver ashore. Specific organization of the LF for the assault is contained in Joint Pub 3-02.1. The organization of Navy forces for the assault is as follows:

a. Navy forces afloat provide the assault transport groups for the helicopter and surface assault and also provide the necessary landing craft and AAV control organization.

b. For the waterborne landing, battalion landing teams (BLT) (or equivalent) may be landed from landing ships by landing craft or AAVs organic to the LF or directly onto the beach by tank landing ships (LST).

c. The landing ships, landing craft, and AAVs are organized to correspond to the tactical organization of troops to ensure control and maneuverability. This organization includes boat waves, boat groups, and boat flotillas.

(1) The boat group is the basic organization of landing craft. One boat group is organized for each BLT (or equivalent) to be landed as scheduled waves at a designated beach. The personnel required to command and operate a boat group are the Boat Group Commander (BGC); assistant BGC; wave commanders; an officer, petty officer, or noncommissioned officer designated as boat officer to command each landing craft or AAV not carrying one of the above officers; and crews and necessary communications personnel.

(2) A boat wave consists of the landing craft or AAVs within a boat group that carry the troops that are to be landed simultaneously. The organization into waves facilitates the control of the boat group as a whole, permitting the BGC to exercise command through wave commanders rather than dealing directly with individual landing craft or AAVs. During the ship-to-shore movement, the boat wave operates as a unit and is maneuvered by the boat wave commander. The boat group lands in successive waves in accordance with pre-arranged plans. For assault purposes, waves are numbered successively from front to rear as first wave, second wave, etc. When LSTs beach during an assault for the purpose of landing



BLTs directly on the beach, they are organized as waves but are not included in a boat group.

(3) The boat flotilla is an organization of two or more boat groups organized to facilitate control when the operation of two or more boat groups demands the presence of a common commander.

(4) Although LCACs are landing craft, their employment differs slightly from displacement landing craft. Under normal circumstances, LCACs proceed to and from the beach in formations of two or more craft. Each group will be commanded by an LCAC group commander, an officer from an LCAC detachment. When more than one group is destined for the same beach location, either separate transit lanes and CLZs should be defined or the groups should be scheduled to permit the first group to clear the CLZ before the second group proceeds to the same CLZ. LCAC will normally proceed to the beach in one of the following formations: line of bearing, line abreast, wedge, column, or deceptive (from different directions). Usually the LCAC departure officer in charge (OIC) will be in the lead craft with other craft in a line of bearing to starboard. This allows the OIC to visually sight craft and avoid the use of radio transmissions in a restrictive EMCON environment. LCAC departure point (CDP) is the geographical position that marks the seaward end of the transit lane. As a matter of practice, CDPs should not be used as loiter or rendezvous points. Timing launches should permit LCAC to proceed directly to the CDP from the LCAC launch area (CLA) and continue to the next control point. The CATF determines CDPs. They then proceed to the beach along prescribed approach and return lanes. Timing of departure will be coordinated with helicopter and AAV elements to support the landing plan. Operations conducted from approximately 25 nm offshore are usually considered OTH. Limited operations using one or more LCAC groups may be conducted as far as 100 nm offshore. However, this distance approaches the maximum capability of the craft and requires careful planning with particular attention paid to craft weight, wave height and period, craft heading relative to wind and waves, relative humidity, and temperature.

4. Area Organization. Sea operating areas, control areas, and inland areas in the landing area are selected to meet tactical requirements and to facilitate control of the

ship-to-shore movement. CATF, in coordination with CLF, selects the location of sea operating and control areas. The general organization of sea operating areas is discussed in Chapter XIII. Detailed information on the various control areas is contained in NWP 22-3. CLF selects the location of certain operating inland areas, including DZs, CLZs, HLZs, and LZs in accordance with the LF scheme of maneuver ashore. CLF and CATF coordinate selection of necessary approach and retirement lanes, check points, rendezvous areas, and aids to navigation to facilitate movement of air-landed troops. Where appropriate, other major force commanders participate in this coordination.

## 5. Control

- a. CATF is responsible for overall control of ship-to-shore movement of both surface and helicopterborne assault forces. CATF is also responsible for controlling and coordinating the movements of any airborne or air assault forces employed within the landing area.
- b. Initially, ship-to-shore movement for surface and helicopterborne assault forces is centrally controlled in order to permit coordination of support with the landing of assault elements. Later, as circumstances permit, control of surface movement is decentralized for efficient and rapid handling. Helicopterborne movement, however, remains under centralized control. Control and coordination measures necessary for employment of airborne or air-assault elements of the LF in the assault landings will be established by the CATF in conjunction with CLF and other concerned commanders specified in the appropriate operation plans and orders. CATF is responsible for coordinating, with the appropriate agencies, movement of airborne or air-assault forces to the landing area.
- c. The system for control of the ship-to-shore movement is governed by the LF plan for landing. The maximum area over which effective centralized control of ship-to-shore movement can be exercised varies in each situation and is largely governed by communications capabilities.
- d. The control system must provide the means for rapid fulfillment of LF requirements during the ship-to-shore movement. Standby control means are kept available so that casualties can be replaced rapidly.

## 6. Control of the Surface Assault. Control of assault waves of landing ships, landing craft, and amphibious vehicles from

the transport and landing ship areas to the beaches is exercised through a Navy control group. Organization of the control group is based on the arrangement and number of beaches on which the ATF is to land the LF. For detailed discussion of the organization and functions the Navy control group, see NWP 22-3.

7. Control of the Helicopterborne Assault. Helicopter units employed in the ship-to-shore movement are subordinate elements of the LF. These units execute the ship-to-shore movement in accordance with the plan for landing. Plans include provisions for shifting control of helicopter operations to CLF when the situation ashore permits. During the ship-to-shore movement, CATF coordinates and controls air operations through the TACC (afloat). Within the TACC (afloat), coordination of helicopter operations is accomplished by the HCS. Control of helicopter ship-to-shore movement is further decentralized to the HDC, which is the primary direct control agency for the helicopter transport unit commander. The HDC, normally embarked aboard the transport group or unit commander's flagship, is manned by personnel from the ship in which it is established. For further detailed discussion of the organization and control of the helicopterborne assault, see Joint Pub 3-02.1 and NWP 22-3.

8. Prelanding Operations. Prelanding operations take place between the commencement of the assault phase and the ship-to-shore movement. They encompass a continuation of similar preparation conducted by the advance force, but prelanding operations focus on the landing area and concentrate specifically on the landing beaches and helicopter landing zones to be used by the landing force. The transition between preassault and prelanding preparations may not be discernable because there is no break in activity. Prelanding operations also encompass the final preparations for the ship-to-shore movement.

9. Final Preparation of the Landing Area. The final preparation of the landing area encompasses the following operations:

- a. MCM operations with emphasis on the clearance of mines in the transport areas, FSAs, and sea approaches to the landing beaches.
- b. SEAL team operations; i.e., hydrographic reconnaissance of the landing beaches and seaward approaches thereto; demolition of visible obstacles; visible mine clearance inshore from the 3-1/2 fathom

line; locating, improving, and marking usable channels; intelligence collection and/or direct action missions; providing target acquisition and spotting for NSFS; and initial terminal guidance for designated assault landings.

c. Air operations in accordance with air support plans, including EW; preplanned air strikes against enemy defensive installations on routes to, and in the vicinity of, beaches, DZs, CLZs, HLZs, and LZs; and strikes against targets of opportunity. Air operations increase in intensity immediately before H-hour.

d. NSFS in accordance with the NSFS plan, including destruction or neutralization of hostile defensive installations that might interfere with the approach and final deployment of the ATF; support of MCM and SEAL team operations (see subparagraphs 8a and 8b); and as H-hour draws near, destruction or neutralization of hostile defenses capable of interfering with the successful landing of troops in the assault landings.

e. Artillery support on landing areas in accordance with artillery fire support plans if artillery has been emplaced during preassault operations.

10. Final Preparations for the Ship-to-Shore Movement. As the ATF starts the final approach to assigned positions for the assault, ships prepare for the debarkation or enplanement of the embarked troops, equipment, and supplies in accordance with previously prepared plans. The commencement of debarkation or enplanement and the timing of the ship-to-shore movement depend on the designated H-hour. All elements must be prepared to modify plans on short notice to conform to changes in H-hour.

11. Initiation of the Assault. Before the arrival of the assault elements of the ATF in the landing area, the decision is made to execute either the primary plan or one of the alternate plans for the assault. After arrival of assault shipping in the assigned sea operating areas, CATF initiates the ship-to-shore movement by signal. H-hour is confirmed as soon as practicable, or is changed as necessary, by CATF following consultation with CLF.

12. Ship-to-Shore Movement. NWP 22-3 discusses in detail the landing plan and execution of ship-to-shore movement during the assault, initial unloading period, and general unloading period. Further amplification as it applies to the LF may be found in Joint Pub 3-02.1. Although prelanding operations terminate with the commencement of the

ship-to-shore movement, concurrent preparation of the landing area continues as an integral component of ship-to-shore movement. These concurrent operations are called "in-stride" operations.

13. Protection of the Amphibious Task Force. Protection, comprising both active and passive measures, must be provided during the ship-to-shore movement for all participants of the ATF.

a. Active protection includes offensive and defensive air operations, ASW and anti-small-boat screens, active ECM, counterbattery, antiaircraft, and antimechanized fire.

b. Passive protection places major reliance on dispersion within units, unit separation, and mobility.

14. Landing Force Assault Operations. Assault operations by the LF begin with the landing of the first scheduled wave and continue through capture of the beachhead and LF-ATF objectives. Other forces continue to provide logistic/CSS and fire support during the assault operations of the LF and continue to provide overall protection of the ATF. See Joint Pub 3-02.1 for detailed discussion of LF operations ashore.

15. Follow-up Shipping. Follow-up shipping carries reinforcements and stores for use after landing of the AE and AFOE. This shipping is provided by an area or fleet commander and is echeloned into the AOA as requested by CATF.

a. Responsibilities of the Area or Fleet Commander. The area or fleet commander provides follow-up shipping, ensures ships are loaded in accordance with ATF requirements, directs movement of follow-up shipping to and from the AOA or regulating point, and provides protection during movement. Follow-up shipping is moved to the AOA or regulating point in accordance with the schedule requested by CATF.

b. Responsibilities of CATF. CATF directs movement of follow-up shipping from a regulating point to, and within, the AOA. Once unloaded, empty ships are returned to a regulating point or to a location where an area or fleet commander assumes responsibility. CATF provides protection for follow-up shipping under control. CATF controls all assault and follow-up shipping at regulating points and in the AOA and shipping movement between areas. When necessary, CATF orders shipping forward to fulfill needs of the LF for units, materials, and

supplies. CATF recommends the date for transfer of control of follow-up shipping to the theater or area logistic and/or CSS system and normal shipping control agencies.

c. Responsibilities of CLF. CLF informs CATF of LF requirements for units, materials, and supplies during the latter stages of the assault and specifies when they will be required. CLF is responsible for movement of the follow-up shipping cargo into CSSAs after it is received.

16. Use of USCINCTrans-provided Common-User Shipping in the Assault Phase. Because MSC-provided ships do not have the organic unload capability of amphibious ships or the organic ability to control debarkation of embarked troops or cargo, they must be augmented with personnel and material as necessary by CATF. This augmentation must be considered during planning and arrangements made to ensure timely discharge of troops and cargo (see NWP 22-8 for further details).

17. Initiation of Other Tasks During the Assault Phase. During the assault, it may be desirable to initiate, as conditions permit, certain tasks such as base development, area defense, and/or buildup of forces and supplies for further operations following the amphibious operation. Such tasks are normally undertaken by units that are designated to remain in the AOA following termination of the amphibious operation. The initiating directive will provide guidance on such taskings.

18. Termination of the Assault Phase. Termination of the assault phase also marks the termination of the amphibious operation in accordance with principles set forth in Chapter I, paragraph 16. Disestablishment of the AOA, dissolution of the ATF, reassignment of forces, and transfer of responsibility for further operations in the AOA are accomplished as prescribed in the initiating directive.

## CHAPTER XVI

### AMPHIBIOUS WITHDRAWALS, DEMONSTRATIONS, AND RAIDS

1. Purpose. To provide guidance on the organization, command relationships, planning, and execution of amphibious withdrawals, demonstrations, and raids.
2. General. Discussion thus far has concentrated on the most common type of amphibious operation, the assault. This chapter addresses the unique aspects of planning, organizing, and conducting the other types of amphibious operations: amphibious withdrawals (Section A), amphibious demonstrations (Section B), and amphibious raids (Section C).

#### SECTION A. AMPHIBIOUS WITHDRAWALS

3. Scope. Amphibious withdrawals are conducted to disengage forces for employment elsewhere. They may be conducted under enemy pressure or voluntarily. Withdrawal begins with establishment of defensive measures in the embarkation area and ends when all elements of the force have been extracted and embarked or reembarked on designated shipping.
4. Characteristics. While sharing basic maritime features of the amphibious assault, the amphibious withdrawal embraces the following distinguishing characteristics:
  - a. Except in the case of withdrawal associated with amphibious raids, planning processes will usually be abridged.
  - b. When enemy action against the LF is substantial or when the requirement for forces elsewhere is great, the time available for execution of the withdrawal will be brief.
  - c. Facilities for embarkation and loading may be extremely restricted, compounding logistic/CSS problems.
  - d. All requisite fire support means may not be available.
  - e. Means for controlling the withdrawal may be limited.

f. The operation may, by necessity, be conducted under adverse conditions of weather, terrain, and hydrography.

g. Circumstances may render it advisable to conduct the operation under conditions of limited visibility.

h. The force to be withdrawn could be land forces not originally inserted by amphibious operations. Therefore, the forces to be withdrawn may be unfamiliar with amphibious procedures thus significantly complicating the operation.

5. Organization and Command Relationships. Organization of forces, responsibilities for accomplishment of tasks, and command relationships during an amphibious withdrawal are essentially the same as those existing in the AOA during the assault phase of an amphibious operation. Variations in responsibility and authority, as required by the individual situation, are announced in the initiating directive.

6. Execution. The amphibious withdrawal will be executed in accordance with the following general sequence of steps:

a. Establish defense of the embarkation area by air, naval, and ground covering forces while organizing and embarking LF personnel, supplies, and equipment not required for support of operations ashore. The importance of maintaining local air superiority to the success of the withdrawal cannot be overemphasized.

b. Progressively reduce troop and material strength ashore under protection of air, naval, and ground covering forces. Depending on limitations in afloat cargo capacity and/or loading time, all usable military material is either evacuated or destroyed. During this phase, specific provisions are made for the evacuation of casualties.

c. Withdraw the ground covering force, with priority to heavy elements such as artillery and tanks, usually under cover of darkness and supported, as necessary, by air and NSFS. -

5. Supporting Arms. As in the amphibious assault, defense of an embarkation area on a hostile or potentially hostile shore requires closely coordinated employment of all supporting arms. Procedures used in the coordination are essentially the same in both cases. The primary difference is that in the assault, supporting arms and control



facilities are progressively built up ashore, whereas, in a withdrawal, supporting arms and control facilities are progressively decreased ashore until all functions are performed afloat.

6. Embarkation Procedures

a. Planning for embarkation of forces incident to an amphibious withdrawal is conducted in accordance with normal planning procedures as set forth in Chapter XI and Joint Pub 3-02.2 if embarkation is preparatory to subsequent employment of the force. If embarkation is incident to a decision to terminate operations ashore and to redeploy troops to a designated base or base areas, the planning procedures are abridged as necessary to conform to time requirements.

b. Combat loading will be employed in embarkation in preparation for an amphibious operation. Embarkation for movement to base areas will normally employ administrative loading. The level of pressure from the enemy and the degree of familiarity with amphibious procedures of the forces being withdrawn will significantly affect the ability to conduct the embarkation in the most efficient manner.

c. Initial size of the embarkation area depends on several factors, such as:

- (1) Terrain essential for defense in event the embarkation is conducted under enemy pressure.
- (2) Number of personnel and amount of equipment and supplies to be embarked.
- (3) Artillery, NSFS, and air support available for defense if required.
- (4) Nature and extent of usable beaches.
- (5) Time available for the embarkation.

## SECTION B. AMPHIBIOUS DEMONSTRATIONS

7. Scope. The amphibious demonstration is intended to confuse the defender as to time, place, or strength of the main operation. In the AOA, an amphibious demonstration may be conducted in or near the landing area, in conjunction with an amphibious assault. In other cases, a demonstration may be conducted outside the AOA by a separate ATF to divert or immobilize enemy strategic reserve forces that could threaten the amphibious assault. The JFC could, likewise, use the demonstration to divert enemy attention from other friendly nonamphibious operations in the theater of operations.

8. General. Effectiveness of a demonstration increases in direct proportion to the degree of realism involved in its execution. It should neither be underplayed nor overplayed. It is crucial that the enemy receive a convincing impression of preparations for a landing. All visible, audible, and electronic aspects of the demonstration must appear to be authentic. A demonstration normally includes the approach of demonstration forces to the demonstration area, at least a part of the ship-to-shore movement, and employment of supporting fires. A brief but intense preliminary bombardment will usually be more effective than deliberate harassing fire over longer periods of time. A communications deception plan should be used. SOF and tactical deception units may be employed.

9. Demonstrations Within the Amphibious Objective Area. An amphibious demonstration may be conducted by a portion of the ATF within the AOA when it is intended to influence enemy action within that area. Its intended purpose may be to cause the enemy to employ its reserves improperly, to disclose weapon positions by inducing it to fire prematurely, to distract its attention, to place an early burden on its C3 system, to precipitate a general air or naval engagement, and/or to harass it. The decision to conduct such a demonstration is made during planning by CATF, following consultation with CLF and other major force commanders as appropriate.

10. Demonstrations Outside the Amphibious Objective Area. An amphibious demonstration may be conducted outside the AOA to divert or immobilize enemy strategic reserves or other forces capable of affecting the amphibious operation, to distract hostile attention from such an operation, or to precipitate a general air or naval engagement. Such a demonstration may be executed as a supporting operation by a

separate ATF. The time and place of the demonstration is decided by the JFC or higher authority on the basis of the recommendations of CATF.

11. Demonstrations in Support of Other Operations. An amphibious demonstration may be conducted with the intent of supporting other, nonamphibious operations in the theater. A demonstration conducted before, during, or after commencement of another operation may distract the attention of enemy commanders and induce the enemy to divert major resources from the main area of operations. The decision to conduct such a demonstration is made by the JFC or higher authority on the basis of the recommendations of CATF and other major force commanders as appropriate.

12. Planning Considerations. In planning amphibious demonstrations, consideration must be given to the following:

a. Location. The demonstration area must be near enough to the main operation area to permit subsequent employment of the demonstration force in accordance with the tactical plan. On the other hand, it should be sufficiently separated from the main effort to avoid interference and to ensure the enemy will be materially delayed in repositioning forces. The demonstration area must be suitable for an actual landing, for only in such an area can the threat of landing be plausible. The demonstration area should be important to the enemy, otherwise the enemy may not react. An alternate landing area will often prove suitable for demonstration purposes. If the purpose of the demonstration is to cause the enemy to prematurely disclose its positions or for harassment, it may be conducted in the vicinity of the main operation area prior to execution.

b. Timing. The timing of a demonstration conducted in support of another operation must be coordinated to achieve the maximum desired level of reaction from the enemy force.

(1) Prior to Main Operation. A demonstration before the main operation is conducted to:

- (a) Draw enemy forces to the threatened area and away from the area of the main operation.
- (b) Cause the enemy to disclose its positions.
- (c) Provide protracted and systematic harassment.

(d) Divert the attention of the enemy from the main operation.

(e) Cause premature commitment of enemy forces.

(2) Simultaneously with Main Operation. A demonstration may commence at the same time as the main operation if it is desired to:

(a) Prevent redeployment of enemy forces.

(b) Deceive the enemy as to the location of the main operation.

(3) Subsequent to Main Operation. A demonstration may be conducted subsequent to the main operation if the desired effect is to divert enemy forces or fire from the point of the main effort. Successive demonstrations may be executed at a number of points after the main operation commences.

c. Forces. The demonstration force must be of such composition and size as to cause the desired reaction. When the demonstration force is constituted from within the ATF, the LF reserve and the shipping in which it is embarked may be employed if the presence of the reserve is not required in the immediate area of the main landing. On completion of the demonstration, the demonstration force is dissolved and its elements are reassigned in accordance with the operation order or plan.

d. Supporting Arms. The demonstration force should execute supporting fires of a nature and scope that ensures credibility. Factors that may serve to limit the availability of supporting fires are the availability of NSFS ships, aircraft, and ammunition supply.

e. Rehearsals. Sufficient rehearsals are held to ensure that the demonstration will be realistic.

13. Execution. The demonstration must occur during a long enough period to allow the enemy to react. The movement of waves toward the beach or LZs is conducted as a normal ship-to-shore movement, except that boat waves do not actually beach and helicopter waves do not land. Empty landing craft must maintain sufficient distance from the beach so as to preclude close enemy observation. At a prearranged time or distance from the beach or HLZ, or on signal, the boat waves and/or helicopter waves withdraw.

## SECTION C. AMPHIBIOUS RAIDS

14. Scope. Amphibious raids are conducted as independent operations or in support of other operations, such as another landing, land campaign, or air or naval operation. Depending on the purpose of the raid, they may be conducted by stealth or appropriately supported so that they resemble the early stages of an amphibious assault. Generally, amphibious raids are conducted to:

- a. Destroy certain targets, particularly those that do not lend themselves to destruction by other means.
- b. Harass the enemy by attacks on isolated posts, patrols, and headquarters and to capture or neutralize key personnel.
- c. Attack the enemy rear or flank positions on a seacoast, in support of forces engaged with the enemy.
- d. Obtain information on hydrography, terrain, enemy dispositions, morale, strength, movements, and weapons.
- e. Create a diversion in connection with strategic or tactical deception operations.
- f. Evacuate individuals, including agents, or materiel.
- g. Establish, support, or coordinate unconventional warfare activities.

15. General. Thorough, integrated rehearsals are essential to precision and speed in executing a raid. All participating forces must be drilled in every detail of debarkation, movement ashore, operations ashore, withdrawal, and reembarkation. Rehearsals are more important in preparation for amphibious raids than for other types of amphibious operations. Timing, critically important in all amphibious raids, cannot be accurately estimated or adhered to without adequate rehearsals.

16. Organization and Command Relationships. Principles of organization and command relationships addressed in Chapter II apply to amphibious raids. The wide variation in the purpose of raiding operations and the consequent variation in composition of the raiding force and associated naval forces require a full description of the precise command arrangements which apply in each case.

## 17. Planning Considerations

a. An amphibious raid is planned and executed in the same general manner as an amphibious assault, except a raid always includes provision for withdrawal of the raid force. The following factors must be considered when planning for an amphibious raid:

(1) It may be unnecessary for selected beaches or LZs to meet all the requirements of an amphibious assault. In small-scale raids, beaches or LZs are chosen from the point of view of insuring tactical surprise.

(2) A raid will be of limited duration of a raid.

(3) Final deployment of the raiding force may not be required until it reaches its objective ashore.

(4) Limited objective and short duration of the amphibious raid will usually simplify logistic/CSS requirements.

(5) Through prearrangement, it may be possible for a small-scale raid to be executed with very limited communications means.

b. Detailed Planning Considerations. The following basic considerations must be considered when planning a raid:

(1) Surprise is an essential ingredient in the success of an amphibious raid and offsets the lack of logistic and/or CSS and fire support normally associated with amphibious operations.

(2) Security during the planning and execution of a raid must receive particular attention, to include full exploitation of deceptive measures. Such deceptive measures may take the form of elaborate cover plans or may be confined to simple ruses.

(3) The following factors will influence the choice of landing areas for the raiding force.

(a) Enemy dispositions.

(b) Sea approaches.

(c) Hydrographic and beach characteristics.

(d) Availability of LZs.

(e) Avenues of approach to the objective.

(4) Estimated time that the raiding force will have to be ashore may influence the choice of H-hour and, consequently, the conditions of visibility under which the raiding force may be landed. It will likewise affect the scope of logistic and/or CSS arrangements that must be made.

(5) Purpose of the raid, including its relation to other concurrent or imminent operations that it may support, will influence the selection of D-day for the raid. In addition, these same factors may affect the availability of shipping, aircraft, and logistic and/or CSS and/or fire support means for the raid.

(6) Planning for the embarkation of forces assigned to participate in an amphibious raid is similar to preparation for the amphibious assault, including consideration of operational security measures.

(7) Fire support planning is similar to that for an amphibious assault, except, where surprise is a major factor, supporting fires usually are withheld and radio silence is maintained until surprise is lost.

(8) Planning for ship-to-shore movement is generally similar to that for an amphibious assault, except that movement may be made entirely by helicopter.

(9) Withdrawal must be planned in detail including provisions as to time and place for reembarkation. If the landing point and withdrawal point are not the same, positive means of location and identification of the latter must be established. Special situations may permit planning for withdrawal of the raiding force directly into friendly territory without reembarkation. Withdrawal by air may be possible when the area of the raid includes a usable airfield or terrain suitable for landing helicopters.

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## APPENDIX A

### OVERVIEW OF THE NAVY COMPOSITE WARFARE COMMANDER'S CONCEPT AND STRUCTURE

#### 1. General

a. The CWC concept allows the OTC to aggressively wage combat operations against air, surface, and subsurface threats while carrying out the primary mission of his force. The CWC concept is capable of flexible implementation and application to any naval task force (TF) or task group (TG) operating at sea. In particular, the concept is applicable to the battle force that consists of two or more CVBGs and associated supporting units.

b. Control by negation may be exercised by a subordinate commander while operating under the CWC concept. Control by negation is a C2 philosophy in which the subordinate commander has freedom of action to direct and execute those operations necessary to accomplish assigned and implied missions, unless specific actions and operations are overridden by a superior commander.

#### 2. Command Structure

a. The OTC usually fulfills responsibilities as the CWC. The OTC-CWC exercises overall responsibility for C2 of the force and is responsible for the accomplishment of the mission and allocation of warfighting assets. Subordinated to the OTC-CWC are four principal warfare commanders:

- (1) AAWC.
- (2) Strike warfare commander (SWC).
- (3) Antisurface warfare commander (ASUWC).
- (4) Antisubmarine warfare commander (ASWC).

b. The warfare commanders are responsible for collecting, evaluating, and disseminating tactical information and, at the discretion of the OTC-CWC, are delegated tactical authority to use assigned forces to

respond to threats. Supporting the OTC-CWC and the warfare commanders are:

(1) The submarine element coordinator (SEC), which is a cell of the ASWC staff that, when assigned, is responsible for coordinating the actions of direct support submarines.

(2) The air element coordinator (AREC), who is responsible for managing and coordinating the distribution of carrier aircraft and keeping the OTC-CWC and other warfare commanders and coordinators apprised of carrier air operations.

c. The supporting coordinators differ from the warfare commanders in one very important respect: when authorized by the OTC-CWC, the warfare commanders have TACON of assigned resources and may autonomously initiate action. The supporting coordinators execute policy but do not initiate autonomous actions.

d. In addition to the coordinators discussed above, a specifically identified cell of the OTC-CWC's staff is the electronic warfare coordinator (EWC). This cell plans, and when authorized, implements and executes EW and command, control, and communications countermeasures (C3CM) policy.

3. CWC Concept. The OTC can implement the CWC procedures outlined in NWP 10-1, "Composite Warfare Commander's Manual," to the extent required by the mission and threat. Fundamental provisions associated with implementation of CWC procedures are:

a. The OTC is normally the CWC. Designated warfare commanders are responsible to the OTC-CWC for the conduct of antiair warfare (the AAWC), strike warfare (the SWC), antisurface warfare (the ASUWC), and antisubmarine warfare (the ASWC). Other designated subordinates act as coordinators to assist in the management of specified sensors and warfighting assets of the force in support of the warfare commanders and the OTC-CWC.

b. A wide range of options are available to the OTC-CWC in delegating authority to the warfare commanders for the conduct of AAW, strike warfare, ASUW, and ASW operations. These options range from full delegation of authority to no delegation at all, depending on the threat and the tactical situation. The OTC-CWC of a multicarrier battle force might use every element of the

concept, including supporting CWCs, while the OTC-CWC of a small task group might use only a few of the elements; i.e., an AAWC and ASWC. Regardless of the amount of authority delegated, the CWC always retains the option to control by command override.

#### 4. Coordination

a. Requests for Air Support for Land-based Commanders. Requests for sea-based aircraft are made through the OTC-CWC, who endeavors to meet the requirements of the JFC, other elements or components of the joint force, and the warfare commanders. Sortie requirements to support operations conducted as part of a joint force are governed by Joint Pub 3-56.24, "Tactical Command and Control Planning Guidance and Procedures for Joint Operations Joint Interface Operational Procedures--Message Text Formats." The OTC-CWC, with support of the AREC, must resolve conflicting demands and ensure that available assets are allocated to mission requirements. This function is tied to the concept of decentralized control and the OTC-CWC's authority to intervene and redirect forces when required. The OTC-CWC must reach a compromise to allocate limited assets to a number of conflicting requests. Unresolved conflicts affecting other joint forces are submitted to the JFC for resolution.

b. Requests for Air Support from Land-based Commanders. All warfare commanders and coordinators make requests for air assets from external sources through the OTC-CWC or other designated authority. In some situations, the requesting authority may be decentralized. Coordination between warfare commanders and coordinators for dual or shared tasking of external air assets is encouraged. Requests for air support from adjacent theaters will be made through the appropriate combatant commanders. See chapters II, VI, and VII for additional discussion.

#### 5. Relationship of the OTC-CWC to CATF

a. Except for limited self-defense capabilities, amphibious ships are ill-suited to counter a sophisticated air, surface, and subsurface threat by their own means. For this reason, under most scenarios, the ATF will require assigned screening assets both during the movement phase and while conducting operations in the AOA. Depending on the size and scope of the operation, carriers may be assigned to the ATF, or a

multicarrier battle force assigned exclusively to support a single amphibious operation.

b. The integration of the CWC doctrine with existing amphibious doctrine becomes a difficult problem because of the wide variety of tactical situations that may be encountered. It is, therefore, critical that the common superior ordering formation of the force specifically indicate what command relationships will apply with consideration of the following factors:

(1) Under all circumstances, upon activation of the AOA, unity of command within the AOA must be maintained to ensure that the CATF retains that degree of authority necessary to ensure success of the operation. This will normally dictate that CATF is the CWC within the AOA and receiving or giving associated or mutual support to the designated CWC outside the AOA.

(2) As the operation progresses from phase to phase, transition from one CWC relationship to another is possible and may, in fact, be required to optimize the protection and employment of forces in the most efficient manner as the tactical situation evolves.

(3) The carrier battle group (force) may be assigned the single mission of providing dedicated support to the amphibious operation, but more likely, this force will be assigned multiple missions in support of the larger joint operation which will significantly affect command relationships and coordination requirements. A mechanism must, therefore, exist to adjudicate conflicting priorities for the use of assets at the appropriate level of the JTF.

c. With these factors in mind, the following is a description of three situations that may exist, requiring different levels of association between amphibious and supporting forces. These can be tailored, as desired, to the specific requirements of the mission.

(1) Situation A. The support force is to join and integrate with the ATF. The senior officer present (which could be CATF) becomes the OTC-CWC of the combined force unless otherwise directed by higher authority. All forces are integrated under a single OTC-CWC and set of warfare commanders. This situation has most applicability during the movement

phase of the operation. This is the most probable situation.

(2) Situation B. The support force does not join but provides direct support as designated by higher authority. The senior OTC of the separate forces has TACON and coordinates the tactical operations of all assigned forces. The junior commander is designated a support CWC and is delegated specific responsibilities and TACON of specific forces. This situation also applies during the movement phase. But, because the individual battle group structure should not be broken, this situation may also apply once the AOA is activated, especially if CVBG forces are more or less dedicated to amphibious operation support.

(3) Situation C. Each force has its own OTC-CWC and warfare commanders. Individual battle group integrity is maintained. The OTC-CWCs operate in associated or mutual support to achieve the same broad mission objectives, but each has discretion as to how best to support the other. The individual OTC-CWCs may or may not report to an on-scene common superior. This situation also applies during the movement phase. This relationship is most applicable when the supporting forces have multiple joint force requirements beyond simple dedicated support to the amphibious operation.

d. Detailed discussion of guidelines for battle force operations is provided in Appendix A of NWP 10-1.

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## APPENDIX B

### REFERENCES

The following references were reviewed and considered during the development of this publication. Where indicated, classification markings refer to the overall classification level of the publication. All listed publication titles are unclassified.

#### a. Joint Publications

- (1) Joint Pub 0-2, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)"
- (2) Joint Pub 1-01, "Joint Publication System, Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Development Program"
- (3) Joint Pub 1-02, "DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms"
- (4) Joint Pub 2-0, "Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations"
- (5) Joint Pub 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations"
- (6) Joint Pub 3-01.2, "Joint Doctrine for Theater Counterair Operations"
- (7) Joint Pub 3-02.1, "Joint Doctrine for Landing Force Operations"
- (8) Joint Pub 3-02.2, "Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Embarkation"
- (9) Joint Pub 3-04, "Doctrine for Joint Maritime Operations (Air)"
- (10) Joint Pub 3-04.1, "JTTP for Shipboard Helicopter Operations"
- (11) Joint Pub 3-05, "Doctrine for Joint Special Operations"

- (12) Joint Pub 3-09, "Doctrine for Joint Fire Support"
- (13) Joint Pub 3-11, "Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense"
- (14) Joint Pub 3-12, "Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations"
- (15) Joint Pub 3-12.1, "Doctrine for Joint Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons Employment"
- (16) Joint Pub 3-13, "C3CM in Joint Military Operations" (S)
- (17) Joint Pub 3-50, "Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue"
- (18) Joint Pub 3-50.3, "Joint Doctrine for Evasion and Recovery" (S)
- (19) Joint Pub 3-51, "Electronic Warfare in Joint Military Operations" (S)
- (20) Joint Pub 3-52, "Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone"
- (21) Joint Pub 3-53, "Joint Psychological Operations Doctrine" (C)
- (22) Joint Pub 3-54, "Joint Doctrine for Operations Security"
- (23) Joint Pub 3-56.24, "Tactical Command and Control Planning Guidance and Procedures for Joint Operations Joint Interface Operational Procedures-Message Text Formats" (C)
- (24) Joint Pub 3-57, "Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs"
- (25) Joint Pub 4-0, "Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations"
- (26) Joint Pub 4-01.1, "JTTP for Airlift Support to Joint Operations"
- (27) Joint Pub 4-01.3, "JTTP for Movement Control"



- (28) Joint Pub 4-01.5, "JTTP for Water Terminal Operations"
- (29) Joint Pub 4-01.6, "JTTP for Joint Logistics Over the Shore (JLOTS)"
- (30) Joint Pub 4-02, "Doctrine for Health Services Support in Joint Operations"
- (31) Joint Pub 5-00.2, "Joint Task Force (JTF) Planning Guidance and Procedures"
- (32) Joint Pub 5-03.1, "Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I (Procedures Description)"
- (33) Joint Pub 6-0, "Doctrine for C3 Systems Support to Joint Operations"
- (34) Joint Pub 6-04 Series, "US Message Text Formatting Program"
- (35) CJCS MOP 6, "Electronic Warfare"
- (36) CJCS MOP 29, "Operations Security"
- (37) CJCS MOP 30, "Command, Control, and Communications Countermeasures"

b. US Navy Publications

- (1) NWP 6, "Operational Medical and Dental Support"
- (2) NWP 9/Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 1-10, "Law of Naval Warfare"
- (3) NWP 10-1, "Composite Warfare Commander's Manual"
- (4) NWP 10-1-41, "Navy Operational Deception"
- (5) NWP 12-4, "Soviet Ocean Surveillance System"
- (6) NWP 22-1, "The Amphibious Task Force Plan"
- (7) NWP 22-2, "Supporting Arms in Amphibious Operations"
- (8) NWP 22-3, "Ship-to-Shore Movement"

(9) NWP 22-4, "Underwater Demolition Teams in Amphibious Operations"

(10) NWP 22-5, "The Naval Beach Group"

(11) NWP 22-8, "MSC Support of Amphibious Operations"

c. US Marine Corps Publications

(1) FMFM 4-50, "Health Service Support"

(2) FMFM 4-51, "Task Force Medical Regulating Manual"

APPENDIX C

USERS EVALUATION REPORT  
ON JOINT PUB 3-02

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GLOSSARY

PART I--ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AADC	area air defense commander
AAV	assault amphibious vehicle
AAW	antiair warfare
AAWC	antiair warfare commander
ACA	airspace control authority
AE	assault echelon
AFOE	assault follow-on echelon
AOA	amphibious objective area
AOR	area of responsibility
AREC	air element coordinator
ASUW	antisurface warfare
ASUWC	antisurface warfare commander
ASW	antisubmarine warfare
ASWC	antisubmarine warfare commander
ATF	amphibious task force
BGC	boat group commander
BLT	battalion landing team
BSA	beach support area
C2	command and control
C3	command, control, and communications
C3CM	command, control, and communications countermeasures
C3I	command, control, communications, and intelligence
CAS	close air support
CATF	commander amphibious task force
CDP	LCAC departure point
CHB	cargo handling battalion
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CLA	LCAC launch area
CLF	commander landing force
CLZ	cushion landing zone
COMSEC	communications security
CRTS	casualty receiving and treatment ship
CSAR	combat search and rescue
CSS	combat service support
CSSA	combat service support area
CVBG	carrier battle group
CWC	composite warfare commander
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DNBI	disease and nonbattle injury

DOS	day of supply
DZ	drop zone
ECM	electronic countermeasures
EMCON	emission control
EOD	explosive ordnance disposal
EPW	enemy prisoner of war
ESM	electronic warfare support measures
EUSC	Effective US Controlled Shipping
EW	electronic warfare
EWC	electronic warfare coordinator
EWCS	electronic warfare control ship
FAC	forward air controller
FAC(A)	forward air controller (airborne)
FSA	fire support area
FSCC	fire support coordination center
FSE	fire support element
GPS	global positioning system
HCS	helicopter coordination section
HDC	helicopter direction center
HLZ	helicopter landing zone
HST	helicopter support team
IUWG	inshore undersea warfare group
JATF	joint amphibious task force
JCEOI	joint communications-electronics operating instructions
JFACC	joint force air component commander
JFC	joint force commander
JIC	joint intelligence center
JOPES	Joint Operations Planning and Execution System
JTCB	Joint Target Coordination Board
JTF	joint task force
LCAC	landing craft, air cushion
LF	landing force
LFSP	landing force support party
LOD	line of departure
LOTS	logistics over-the-shore
LPH	amphibious assault ship, landing platform helicopter
LST	landing ship, tank
LZ	landing zone
LZSA	landing zone support area

MCM	mine countermeasures
MEP	mobile electric power
MIUW	mobile inshore undersea warfare
MPA	maritime patrol air
MPS	maritime pre-positioning ships
MSC	Military Sealift Command
MTMC	Military Traffic Management Command
NAVCHAPGRU	Navy Cargo Handling and Port Group
NBC	nuclear, biological, and chemical
NBG	naval beach group
NCA	National Command Authorities
NDRF	National Defense Reserve Fleet
NSA	National Security Agency
NSFS	naval surface fire support
NWP	naval warfare publication
OIC	officer in charge
OPCON	operational control
OPDS	offshore petroleum discharge system
OPSEC	operations security
OTC	officer in tactical command
OTH	over the horizon
PCO	primary control officer
PHIBCB	amphibious construction battalion
POE	port of embarkation
PSYOP	psychological operations
RO/RO	roll-on/roll-off
RRF	ready reserve force
SACC	supporting arms coordination center
SEAD	suppression of enemy air defenses
SEAL	sea-air-land (USN)
SEC	submarine element coordinator
SFCP	shore fire control party
SLCP	ship's loading characteristics pamphlet
SOF	special operations forces
SRP	Sealift Readiness Program
SSSC	surface, subsurface search surveillance coordination
SWC	strike warfare commander
TAC(A)	tactical air coordinator (airborne)
TACC	tactical air control center (USAF/USN)
	tactical air command center (USMC)
TACLOG	tactical-logistical group
TACON	tactical control
T-ACS	auxiliary crane ship

TADC	tactical air direction center
TAH	hospital ship
TAVB	aviation logistics support ship
TF	task force
TG	task group
TIC	target information center
TIO	target intelligence officer
UAV	unmanned aerial vehicle
UNAAF	Unified Action Armed Forces
USMTF	United States Message Text Formats
USCINTRANS	Commander in Chief US Transportation Command
V/STOL	vertical/short takeoff and landing
WWMCCS	Worldwide Military Command and Control System



PART II--DEFINITIONS\*

air transport group.\*\* A task organization of transport aircraft units that provides air transport for landing force elements or provides logistic support.

amphibious assault.\*\* The principal type of amphibious operation that involves establishing a force on a hostile or potentially hostile shore. (Note: Changes definition in Joint Pub 1-02 dated 1 Dec 1989.)

amphibious construction battalion.\*\* A permanently commissioned naval unit, subordinate to the commander, naval beach group, designed to provide an administrative unit from which personnel and equipment are formed in tactical elements and made available to appropriate commanders to operate pontoon causeways; transfer barges, warping tugs, and assault bulk fuel systems; and meet salvage requirements of the naval beach party.

amphibious demonstration. A type of amphibious operation conducted for the purpose of deceiving the enemy by a show of force with the expectation of deluding the enemy into a course of action unfavorable to him. (Joint Pub 1-02)

amphibious lift. The total capacity of assault shipping utilized in an amphibious operation, expressed in terms of personnel, vehicles, and measurement or weight tons of supplies. (Joint Pub 1-02)

amphibious objective area. A geographical area, delineated in the initiating directive, for purposes of command and control within which is located the objective(s) to be secured by the amphibious task force. This area must be of sufficient size to ensure accomplishment of the amphibious task force's mission and must provide sufficient area for conducting necessary sea, air and land operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

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\* Unless identified as extracted from Joint Pub 1-02, terminology herein is not standardized within the Department of Defense and is applicable only in the context of this document.

\*\* This term has been approved and will be included in next revision of Joint Pub 1-02.

amphibious operation.\*\* An attack launched from the sea by naval and landing forces, embarked in ships or craft involving a landing on a hostile or potentially hostile shore. As an entity, the amphibious operation includes the following phases:

- a. Planning--The period extending from issuance of the initiating directive to embarkation.
- b. Embarkation--The period during which the forces, with their equipment and supplies, are embarked in the assigned shipping.
- c. Rehearsal--The period during which the prospective operation is rehearsed for the purpose of: (1) testing adequacy of plans, the timing of detailed operations, and the combat readiness of participating forces; (2) ensuring that all echelons are familiar with plans; and (3) testing communications.
- d. Movement--The period during which various components of the amphibious task force move from points of embarkation to the objective area.
- e. Assault--The period between the arrival of the major assault forces of the amphibious task force in the objective area and the accomplishment of the amphibious task force mission.

(Note: Changes definition in Joint Pub 1-02 dated 1 Dec 1989.)

amphibious raid. A type of amphibious operation involving swift incursion into or temporary occupation of an objective followed by a planned withdrawal (Joint Pub 1-02).

amphibious shipping. Organic Navy ships specifically designed to transport, land, and support landing forces in amphibious assault operations and capable of being loaded or unloaded by naval personnel without external assistance in the amphibious objective area (Joint Pub 1-02).

amphibious task force.\*\* The task organization formed for the purpose of conducting an amphibious operation. The amphibious task force always includes Navy forces and a landing force, with their organic aviation, and may include Military Sealift Command provided ships and Air Force forces when appropriate.

amphibious withdrawal. A type of amphibious operation involving the extraction of forces by sea in naval ships or craft from a hostile or potentially hostile shore (Joint Pub 1-02).

antisubmarine screening area. An area within which the air and surface elements of the area antisubmarine screen operate to protect the amphibious shipping and the fire support units in support of the assault.

approach and retirement route. The track or series of tracks over which helicopters move to and from a specific landing site or helicopter landing zone.

assault amphibious vehicle launching area. An area in the vicinity of and to seaward of the line of departure, to which landing ships proceed and launch assault amphibious vehicles.

assault area.\*\* In amphibious operations, that area that includes the beach area, the boat lanes, the lines of departure, the landing ship areas, the transport areas, and the fire support areas in the immediate vicinity of the boat lanes.

assault craft unit.\*\* A permanently commissioned naval organization, subordinate to the commander, naval beach group, that contains landing craft and crews necessary to provide lighterage required in an amphibious operation.

assault echelon. The element of a force that is scheduled for initial assault on the objective area (Joint Pub 1-02).

assault follow-on echelon. In amphibious operations, that echelon of the assault troops, vehicles, aircraft equipment, and supplies which, though not needed to initiate the assault, is required to support and sustain the assault. In order to accomplish its purpose, it is normally required in the objective area no later than five days after commencement of the assault landing (Joint Pub 1-02).

attack group. A subordinate task organization of the navy forces of an amphibious task force. It is composed of assault shipping and supporting naval units designated to transport, protect, land and initially support a landing group (Joint Pub 1-02).

beachhead.\*\* A designated area on a hostile or potentially hostile shore that, when seized and held, ensures the continuous landing of troops and materiel, and provides maneuver space requisite for subsequent projected operations ashore. (Note: Changes definition in Joint Pub 1-02 dated 1 Dec 1989.)

boat group commander.\*\* An officer assigned to be embarked in a control boat who is responsible for discipline and organization within the boat group to complete the assigned mission.

call fire. Fire delivered on a specific target in response to a request from the supported unit (Joint Pub 1-02).

casualty receiving and treatment ship.\*\* In amphibious operations, a ship designated to receive, provide treatment for, and transfer casualties.

causeway launching area.\*\* An area located near the line of departure but clear of the approach lanes, where ships can launch pontoon causeways.

central control ship. The ship in direct charge of the ship-to-shore movement for the entire amphibious operation.

close support area.\*\* Those parts of the ocean operating areas nearest to, but not necessarily in, the objective area. They are assigned to naval support carrier battle groups, surface action groups, surface action units, and certain logistic combat service support elements.

close supporting fire. Fire placed on enemy troops, weapons, or positions which, because of their proximity present the most immediate and serious threat to the supported unit (Joint Pub 1-02).

colored beach.\*\* That portion of usable coastline sufficient for the assault landing of a regimental landing team or similar sized unit. In the event that the landing force consists of a single battalion landing team, a colored beach will be used and no further subdivision of the beach is required. See also numbered beach.

Combatant Command (command authority). Non-transferable command authority established by title 10, United States code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands. Combatant Command (command authority) is the authority of a Combatant Commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces

involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant Command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations; normally this authority is exercised through the Service component commander. Combatant Command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the CINC considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Also called COCOM. (Joint Pub 1-02).

combat service support. The essential functions, activities, and tasks necessary to sustain all elements of operating forces in an area of operations. At the tactical level of war, it includes but is not limited to that support rendered by service troops in ensuring the operational and tactical aspects of supply, maintenance, transportation, health services, and other services required by aviation and ground combat troops to permit those units to accomplish their missions in combat. Combat service support encompasses those activities at the operational level of war that link strategic objectives to tactical objectives on the battlefield. (Joint Pub 4-0).

combat service support areas.\*\* An area ashore that is organized to contain the necessary supplies, equipment, installations, and elements to provide the landing force with combat service support throughout the operation.

commander, amphibious task force.\*\* The US Navy officer designated in the initiating directive as commander of the amphibious task force. Also called CATF.

commander, landing force.\*\* The officer designated in the initiating directive for an amphibious operation to command the landing force. Also called CLF.

composite warfare commander.\*\* The officer in tactical command is normally the composite warfare commander. However the composite warfare commander concept allows an officer in tactical command to delegate tactical command to the composite warfare commander. The composite warfare commander wages combat operations to counter threats to the force and to maintain tactical sea control with assets assigned; while the officer in tactical command retains close control of power projection and strategic sea control operations.

control group.\*\* Personnel, ships, and craft designated to control the waterborne ship-to-shore movement.

corresponding commanders. Commanders for Services providing forces to the amphibious landing force, established at each echelon of the parallel chain of command to direct aspects of an amphibious operation. The commander, landing force develops the chain of command necessary to conduct operations ashore, and this chain of command holds primacy for all parallel chains.

deep supporting fire. Fire directed on objectives not in the immediate vicinity of our forces, for neutralizing and destroying enemy reserves and weapons, and interfering with enemy command, supply, communications, and observations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

distant retirement area. An area located to seaward of the amphibious objective area. This area is divided into a number of operating areas to which assault shipping may retire and operate in the event of heavy weather or to prevent concentration of shipping in the amphibious objective area.

distant support areas. Areas located in the vicinity of the amphibious objective area but at considerable distance seaward of it. These areas are assigned to distant support forces, such as striking forces, surface action groups, surface action units, and their logistic groups.

embarkation phase. The period during which the forces, with their equipment and supplies, are embarked in the assigned shipping.

embarkation plans.\*\* The plans prepared by the landing force and appropriate subordinate commanders containing instructions and information concerning the organization for embarkation, assignment to shipping, supplies and equipment to be embarked, location and assignment of embarkation areas, control and communication arrangements, movement schedules and embarkation sequence, and additional pertinent instructions relating to the embarkation of the landing force.

fire support area. An appropriate maneuver area assigned to fire support ships from which to deliver gunfire support of an amphibious operation (Joint Pub 1-02).

floating dump.\*\* Emergency supplies preloaded in landing craft, amphibious vehicles, or in landing ships. Floating dumps are located in the vicinity of the appropriate control officer who directs their landing as requested by the troop commander concerned.

follow-up. In amphibious operations, the landing of reinforcements and stores after the assault and assault follow-on echelons have been landed (Joint Pub 1-02).

helicopter landing zone. A specified ground area for landing assault helicopters to embark or disembark troops and/or cargo. A landing zone may contain one or more landing sites (Joint Pub 1-02).

helicopter transport area.\*\* Areas to the seaward and on the flanks of the outer transport and landing ship areas, but preferably inside the area screen, for launching and/or recovering helicopters. (Note: Changes definition in Joint Pub 1-02 dated 1 Dec 1989.)

initiating directive.\*\* An order to the commander, amphibious task force, to conduct an amphibious operation. It is issued by the unified commander, subunified commander, Service component commander, or joint force commander delegated overall responsibility for the operation.

inner transport area. In amphibious operations, an area as close to the landing beach as depth of water, navigational hazards, boat traffic, and enemy action permit, to which transports may move to expedite unloading (Joint Pub 1-02).

inshore undersea warfare group. A task organization that provides surface and subsurface detection of enemy targets in the seaward approach to the amphibious objective area. It is ordinarily composed of one or more inshore undersea warfare surveillance units.

joint force. A general term applied to a force which is composed of significant elements of the Army, the Navy or the Marine Corps, and the Air Force, or two or more of these Services, operating under a single commander authorized to exercise unified command or operational control over joint forces (Joint Pub 1-02).

Joint Intelligence Center. The agency that consolidates amphibious task force and landing force intelligence functions to efficiently support the commander, amphibious task force, and the commander, landing force. It is activated as early as possible and dissolved when the commander, landing force, assumes full responsibility for operations ashore.

joint task force. A force composed of assigned or attached elements of the Army, the Navy or the Marine Corps, and the Air Force, or two or more of these Services, which is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense or by the commander of a unified command, a specified command, or an existing joint task force. (Joint Pub 1-02).

landing area. 1. That part of the objective area within which are conducted the landing operations of an amphibious force. It includes the beach, the approaches to the beach, the transport areas, the fire support areas, the air occupied by close supporting aircraft, and the land included in the advance inland to the initial objective. 2. (Airborne) The general area used for landing troops and materiel either by airdrop or air landing. This area includes one or more drop zones or landing strips. (Joint Pub 1-02).

landing beach. That portion of a shoreline usually required for the landing of a battalion landing team. However, it may also be that portion of a shoreline constituting a tactical locality (such as the shore of a bay) over which a force larger or smaller than a battalion landing team may be landed (Joint Pub 1-02).

landing force. A task organization of troop units, aviation and ground, assigned to an amphibious assault. It is the highest troop echelon in the amphibious operation (Joint Pub 1-02).

landing force support party.\*\* The forward echelon of the combat service support element formed to facilitate the ship-to-shore movement. It may contain a surface assault support element (shore party) and a helicopter assault support element (helicopter support). The landing force support party is brought into existence by a formal activation order issued by the commander, landing force.

landing group.\*\* In amphibious operations, a subordinate task organization of the landing force capable of conducting landing operations, under a single tactical command, against a position or group of positions.



landing plan.\*\* In amphibious operations, a collective term referring to all individually prepared naval and landing force documents that, taken together, present in detail all instructions for execution of the ship-to-shore movement.

landing site. 1. A site within a landing zone containing one or more landing points. See also airfield. 2. In amphibious operations, a continuous segment of coastline over which troops, equipment and supplies can be landed by surface means (Joint Pub 1-02).

lighterage.\*\* A small craft designed to transport cargo or personnel from ship to shore. Lighterage includes amphibians, landing craft, discharge lighters, causeways, and barges.

logistics. The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations which deal with: a. design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; b. movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; c. acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and d. acquisition or furnishing of services (Joint Pub 1-02).

medical regulating. The administrative control and coordination of patient evacuation to treatment facilities capable of providing appropriate medical care.

movement plan.\*\* In amphibious operations, the naval plan providing for the movement of the amphibious task force to the objective area. It includes information and instructions concerning departure of ships from loading points, the passage at sea, and the approach to and arrival in assigned positions in the objective area.

MSC-controlled ships.\*\* Those ships assigned by the Military Sealift Command (MSC) for a specific operation. They may be MSC nucleus fleet ships, contract-operated MSC ships, MSC-controlled time or voyage chartered commercial ships, or MSC-controlled ships allocated by the maritime administration to MSC to carry out DoD objectives.

naval surface fire support.\*\* Fire provided by Navy surface gun, missile, and electronic warfare systems in support of a unit or units tasked with achieving the commander's objectives. Also called NSFS.

numbered beach.\*\* In amphibious operation, a subdivision of a colored beach, designated for the assault landing of a battalion landing team or similar sized unit, when landed as part of a larger force.

operational control. Transferable command authority which may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in Combatant Command (command authority) and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations; normally this authority is exercised through the Service component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called OPCON. (Joint Pub 1-02).

organization for embarkation.\*\* In amphibious operations, the administrative grouping of the landing force for the overseas movement. It includes, in any vessel or embarkation group, the task organization which is established for landing as well as additional forces embarked for purposes of transport, labor or for distribution to achieve a maximum of security.

organization for landing.\*\* In amphibious operations, the specific tactical grouping of the landing force for the assault.

outer landing ship areas.\*\* In amphibious operations, areas to which landing ships proceed initially after their arrival in the objective area. They are usually located on the flanks of the outer transport areas.

outer transport area. In amphibious operations, an area inside the antisubmarine screen to which assault transports proceed initially after arrival in the objective area. (Joint Pub 1-02)

over-the-horizon amphibious operations.\*\* An operational initiative launched from beyond visual and radar range of the shoreline.

parallel chains of command.\*\* In amphibious operations, a parallel system of command, responding to the interrelationship of Navy, landing force, Air Force, and other major forces assigned, wherein corresponding commanders are established at each subordinate level to facilitate coordinated planning for, and execution of, the amphibious operation.

planning directive.\*\* In amphibious operations, the plan issued by commander amphibious task force, following receipt of the initiating directive, to ensure that the planning process and interdependent plans developed by the amphibious task force headquarters and assigned major forces will be coordinated, the plan completed in the time allowed, and important aspects not overlooked.

planning program. The program prepared and issued by a commander that prescribes the schedule of planning events for his staff.

prearranged fire. Fire that is formally planned and executed against targets or target areas of known location. Such fire is usually planned well in advance and is executed at a predetermined time or during a predetermined period of time. (Joint Pub 1-02)

preassault operation.\*\* In amphibious operations, an operation conducted in the amphibious objective area before the assault phase begins. (Note: Changes definition in Joint Pub 1-02 dated 1 Dec 1989.)

prelanding operations.\*\* In amphibious operations, operations conducted between the commencement of the assault phase and the commencement of the ship-to-shore movement by the main body of the amphibious task force. They encompass similar preparations conducted by the advanced force but focus on the landing area, concentrating specifically on the landing beaches and the helicopter landing zones to be used by the main landing force. Prelanding operations also encompass final preparations for the ship-to-shore movement.

primary control officer.\*\* In amphibious operations, the officer embarked in a primary control ship assigned to control the movement of landing craft, amphibious vehicles, and landing ships to and from a colored beach.

primary control ship.\*\* In amphibious operations, a ship of the task force designated to provide support for the primary control officer and a Combat Information Center (CIC) control team for a colored beach.

regulating point. An anchorage, port, or ocean area to which assault and follow-up echelons proceed on a schedule, and at which they are retained by commander amphibious task force, until needed in the transport area for unloading.

rehearsal. The period during which the prospective operation is rehearsed for the purpose of: (1) testing adequacy of plans, the timing of detailed operations, and the combat readiness of participating forces; (2) ensuring that all echelons are familiar with plans; and (3) testing communications. (Joint Pub 1-02)

screening group.\*\* In an amphibious operation, a task organization of ships that furnishes protection to the task force en route to the objective area and during operations in the objective area.

sea echelon. A portion of the assault shipping which withdraws from, or remains out of, the transport area during an amphibious landing and operates in designated areas to seaward in an on-call or unscheduled status (Joint Pub 1-02).

sea echelon area.\*\* In amphibious operations, an area to seaward of a transport area from which assault shipping is phased into the transport area and to which assault shipping withdraws from the transport area.

sea echelon plan.\*\* In amphibious operations, the plan for reduction of concentration of amphibious shipping in the transport area, to minimize losses due to enemy attack by mass destruction weapons and to reduce the area to be swept of mines.

ship-to-shore movement. That portion of the assault phase of an amphibious operation which includes the deployment of the landing force from the assault shipping to designated landing areas (Joint Pub 1-02).

stowage.\*\* The method of placing cargo into a single hold or compartment of a ship to prevent damage, shifting, etc.

subsidiary landing. In an amphibious operation, a landing usually made outside the designated landing area, the purpose of which is to support the main landing (Joint Pub 1-02).

supporting arms. Air, sea, and land weapons of all types employed to support ground units (Joint Pub 1-02).

supporting operations. In amphibious operations, those operations conducted by forces other than those assigned to the amphibious task force. They are ordered by higher authority at the request of the amphibious task force commander and normally are conducted outside the area for which the amphibious task force commander is responsible at the time of their execution (Joint Pub 1-02).

tactical air groups (shore-based).\*\* Task organizations of tactical air units assigned to the amphibious task force that are to be land-based within, or sufficiently close to, the objective area to provide tactical air support to the amphibious task force.

tactical control. The detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Also called TACON. (Joint Pub 1-02).

tactical deception group.\*\* A task organization that conducts deception operations against the enemy, including electronic, communication, visual, and other methods designed to misinform and confuse the enemy.

target information center. The agency or activity responsible for collecting, displaying, evaluating and disseminating information pertaining to potential targets.

transport area. In amphibious operations, an area assigned to a transport organization for the purpose of debarking troops and equipment (Joint Pub 1-02).

wave commanders. Officers assigned to form waves and control them in all subsequent movements under the direction of a boat group commander.

wave number. The number assigned to surface and helicopter waves employed in the scheduled ship-to-shore movement. Waves are numbered successively from front to rear as first wave, second wave, etc.

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